SOPhiA

6th Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy

2015

Programme and Abstracts

Organisation:	Department of Philosophy (Humanities)
	University of Salzburg
Date:	September 2–4, 2015
Venue:	University of Salzburg
	Universitätsplatz 1, 5020 Salzburg
Languages:	English and German
Website:	http://www.sophia-conference.org/

Contents

Preface

I n recent years the opportunities for keeping track of science-business for students of philosophy have increased. The raising number of essay competitions and graduate conferences support this claim.

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In 2015, the Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy is, once again, joining the midst of these events. The title of the conference already reveals some details about the organisers, the contributors and the conference's guiding principles. To avoid misunderstandings we want to add the following remarks: (i) Because of the high number of international participants, Salzburg stands for the location of the conference only. (ii) One of the conference's distinctive features compared to similar events is that we do not make any constraints regarding the topic of presentations. (iii) On the contrary, every philosophical discipline – as long as it is carried out in an analytic way – has its place at SOPhiA.

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By combining (ii) and (iii) we want to demonstrate, in contrast to some voices which claim that Analytic Philosophy constrains our intellectual life, that all traditional topics can be advantageously examined in Analytic Philosophy. It is our utmost concern to unite analytic philosophers from all around the world (cf. (i)). This is also in the sense of Carnap, who claims in his early work *The Logical Structure of the World*:

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" *The new type of philosophy has arisen in close contact with the work of the special sciences, especially mathematics and physics. Consequently they have taken the strict and responsible orientation of the scientific investigator as their guideline for philosophical work, while the attitude of the traditional philosopher is more like that of a poet. This new attitude not only changes the style of thinking but also the*

type of problem that is posed. The individual no longer un-
dertakes to erect in one bold stroke an entire system of phi-
losophy. Rather, each works at his special place within the
one unified science."

In spirit of this motto, we wish you an interesting conference, fruitful
discussions and stimulating thoughts.

The Organising Committee

The Organising Committee:
Albert J. J. Anglberger, Kevin Butz, Christian J. Feldbacher, Alexan-
der Gebharter, Markus Hierl, Laurenz Hudetz, Pascale Lötscher,
Christine Schurz

Special thanks to our sponsors:

General Information

TIMEFRAME AND GENERAL INFORMATION. From September 2–4 2015 the sixth Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy (SOPhiA 2015) will be held at the University of Salzburg's Department of Philosophy (Humanities). The conference is public and attending it is free of charge. The official languages of the conference are English and German. Contributed talks will be given by philosophy students (pre-doc). The conference is hosted by members of the University of Salzburg's Department of Philosophy (Humanities). The organisers can be contacted via organization@sophia-conference.org.

MISSION STATEMENT. In the conference, problems of all areas of philosophy should be discussed. The conference has no specific topic. The presentations should rather set themselves apart by a methodological limitation to the tradition of Analytic Philosophy by usage of clear language and comprehensible arguments. The conference is meant to be a common effort to clearly formulate critically assess some of the problems of philosophy. No individual is expected to construct "a whole building of philosophy" all by himself; rather, the conference hosts expect everyone, as Carnap proposes, to bring the undertaking forward "at his specific place within" philosophy.

PROCEDURE. About 150 participants are expected. There will be 105 talks. The speakers are from institutions of the following 27 countries: Austria, Brazil, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Republic of Serbia, Spain, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. There are three types of talks:

Plenary talks: held by invited speakers

Workshop talks: held by invited speakers

Contributed talks: held by contributed speakers

Invited Speakers.

- Christopher Gauker (University of Salzburg): *On the Difference between Realistic and Fantastic Imagining*

- Friederike Moltmann (CNRS-IHPST and NYU): *Sentences as Predicates of Modal and Attitudinal Objects*

- Sonja Smets (University of Amsterdam): *New Developments in the Logical Foundations of Quantum Physics*

- Ulla Wessels (Saarland University): *What Ought We to Do? In Defense of a Welfarist Answer*

Workshop Speakers.

Affiliated Workshop: *Causality meets quantum mechanics*

- Florian Boge (University of Cologne): *Locality, Causality, Reality. Implications of Bell's Inequality*

- Alexander Gebharter (University of Düsseldorf): *Introduction to causal (Bayes) nets*

- Paul M. Näger (University of Münster): *The Causal Markov Condition in the Quantum Realm*

- Nina Retzlaff (University of Düsseldorf): *Causality within Quantum Mechanics*

- Paul Weingartner (University of Salzburg): *The need of pluralism of Causality*

Affiliated Workshop: *Numbers: their words, nature & existence*

- Katharina Felka (UZH Zurich): *On Indifferentialism in Ontology*

- Robert Schwartzkopff (University of Hamburg): *Number Words and Ontological Innocence*

- Alexander Steinberg (UZH Zurich): *Numbers as Derivative Objects*

- Julia Zakkou (University of Hamburg): *At least, at most, and exactly two moons*

Affiliated Workshop: *Risk Assessment and Values in Science*

- Alexander Christian (University of Düsseldorf): *The Suppression of Medical Evidence*

- Giovanna Cultrera (Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia): *Science in a Criminal Trial: The L'Aquila Case*

- Christian J. Feldbacher (University of Düsseldorf): *A Historical and Systematic Overview of the Debate about Values in Science*

- Wolfgang Kneifel (BOKU - University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences): *Food Safety Risks: Is there a Balance Between Facts and Perception?*

- Gerhard Schurz (University of Düsseldorf): *Error Probabilties, Rational Acceptance and the Role of Values*

- Charlotte Werndl (University of Salzburg): *Model Selection Theory Applied to Climate Science: the Need for a More Nuanced View on Use-Novelty*

Schedule

2 September 2015 (Wednesday)

Time	Location				
	HS 101	**HS 104**	**HS 107**	**HS 122**	**HS 103**
09:00-12:45	**Affiliated Workshop** Alexander Christian & Giovanna Cultrera & Christian J. Feldbacher & Wolfgang Kneifel & Gerhard Schurz & Charlotte Werndl *Risk Assessment and Values in Science* Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher (English)		**Affiliated Workshop** Paul Weingartner & Florian Boge & Alexander Gebharter & Nina Retzlaff & Paul M. Näger *Causality meets quantum mechanics* Chair: Nina Retzlaff (English)		**Affiliated Workshop** Robert Schwartzkopff & Julia Zakkou & Katharina Felka & Alexander Steinberg *Numbers: their words, nature, and existence* Chair: Robert Schwartzkopff (English)
12:45-14:00	Lunch Break				
14:00-15:30	**Plenary Lecture** Friederike Moltmann *Sentences as Predicates of Modal and Attitudinal Objects* Chair: Laurenz Hudetz (English, Location: HS 101)				
15:30-16:00	Coffee Break				
16:00-16:30	**Affiliated Workshop** Alexander Christian & Giovanna Cultrera & Christian J. Feldbacher & Wolfgang Kneifel & Gerhard Schurz & Charlotte Werndl *Risk Assessment and Values in Science* Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Tony Cheng *Consciousness and the Flow of Attention* Chair: Gerhard Kreuch (English)	**Philosophy of Science** Marco Marletta *Structural Realism and the Semantic Theory of Truth* Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English)	**Metaphysics** Jack, Tak Ho YIP *Truthmaking as an account of how grounding facts hold* Chair: Johannes Korbmacher (English)	**Ethics** Barbara Sophie Hartl *Voluntary Refusal of Food and Fluid (VRFF): an ethical and legal perspective of care for people who wish to die* Chair: Elias Moser (German)
16:40-17:10	**Affiliated Workshop** Alexander Christian & Giovanna Cultrera & Christian J. Feldbacher & Wolfgang Kneifel & Gerhard Schurz & Charlotte Werndl *Risk Assessment and Values in Science* Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Andrew J. Routledge *Representing phenomenal properties: Pereboom's panacea for physicalism* Chair: Gerhard Kreuch (English)	**Philosophy of Science** Adem Mulamustafić *Are Naïve Realism and Scientific Realism Compatible?* Chair: Alexander Gebharter (German)	**Metaphysics** Sylvia Barnett *Some Thoughts about the Relata of Ground* Chair: Johannes Korbmacher (English)	**Ethics** Svantje Guinebert *Loners, Slaves and the Selves in the Middle* Chair: Elias Moser (English)
17:20-17:50	**Affiliated Workshop** Alexander Christian & Giovanna Cultrera & Christian J. Feldbacher & Wolfgang Kneifel & Gerhard Schurz & Charlotte Werndl *Risk Assessment and Values in Science* Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Pablo Gutierrez Echegoyen *The functional role of attention in our conscious mental life* Chair: Gerhard Kreuch (English)	**Philosophy of Science** Philippe van Basshuysen *A critical note on Dawid, Hartmann & Sprenger's (2015) No Alternatives Argument.* Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English)	**Metaphysics** Karol Kleczka *A semantic conception of truthmaking and the problem of undecidable sentences* Chair: Johannes Korbmacher (English)	**Ethics** Korbinian Rüger *The Close Enough View in distributive ethics and two dominance objections* Chair: Elias Moser (English)
18:00-18:30	**Affiliated Workshop** Alexander Christian & Giovanna Cultrera & Christian J. Feldbacher & Wolfgang Kneifel & Gerhard Schurz & Charlotte Werndl *Risk Assessment and Values in Science* Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Nina Laura Poth *A Solution to the Complex First Paradox* Chair: Gerhard Kreuch (English)	**Philosophy of Science** Allert van Westen *Powers without Finks* Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English)	**Metaphysics** Jonathan Egeland Harouny *Metaontological Deflationism in the Aftermath of the Quine-Carnap Debate* Chair: Johannes Korbmacher (English)	**Ethics** Johanna Privitera *Interpersonal Aggregation and Lexically Ordered Harms* Chair: Elias Moser (English)
18:30-	Warm evening buffet				

3 September 2015 (Thursday)

Time	Location				
	HS 101	**HS 104**	**HS 107**	**HS 122**	**HS 103**
09:00-10:30	**Plenary Lecture** Sonja Smets *New developments in the logical foundations of quantum physics* Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English, Location: HS 101)				
10:30-10:45	Short Break				
10:45-11:15	**Epistemology** Tamás Paár *Disagreement, Self-Refutation and the Minority Report of the Meta-Skeptics* Chair: Michael Bruckner (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Florian Leonhard Wüstholz *De Se Beliefs: Troubles With Self-Ascription* Chair: Andrew J. Routledge (English)	**Philosophy of Science** M. Efe Ateş *Epistemological Status of Models in Science: Galileo and Falling Bodies* Chair: Philippe van Basshuysen (English)	**Philosophy of Language** David Kashtan *Paradox and Empirical Semantics* Chair: Markus Tschögl (English)	**Ethics** Alina Omerbasic *The Notion of Harm in Reproductive Ethics* Chair: Svantje Guinebert (English)
11:30-12:00	**Epistemology** Friedrich Lehrbaumer *The epistemic value of reasonable peer disagreement* Chair: Michael Bruckner (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Benjamin Horrig *The Conjunction Fallacy, Belief and Inference to the Best Explanation* Chair: Andrew J. Routledge (English)	**Philosophy of Science** Vlasta Sikimic *Testing epistemic efficiencies via data-driven simulations* Chair: Philippe van Basshuysen (English)	**Philosophy of Language** Raffael Joggi *Let's Talk about Pegasus* Chair: Markus Tschögl (English)	**Ethics** Elias Moser *The Right to Life, Voluntary Euthanasia, and Termination of Life on Request* Chair: Svantje Guinebert (English)
12:15-12:45	**Epistemology** Simon Blessenohl *Self-Exempting Conciliationism is Arbitrary* Chair: Michael Bruckner (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Gerhard Kreuch *Self-Feeling. Can self-consciousness be understood as affective phenomenon?* Chair: Andrew J. Routledge (English)	**Philosophy of Science** Miguel de la Riva *The "Social" in Social Empiricism* Chair: Philippe van Basshuysen (English)	**Philosophy of Language** Ken Kamiya *The Role of History in a Theory of Meaning* Chair: Markus Tschögl (English)	**Ethics** Alexander Christian *A modest account of social responsibility in medical research* Chair: Svantje Guinebert (English)
12:45-14:00	Lunch Break				
14:00-14:30	**Epistemology** Michael Bruckner *Do You Really Want to Know? Challenging Pragmatism and Clearing Space for the Intrinsic Value View* Chair: Friedrich Lehrbaumer (English)	**Political Philosophy** Adéla Eichlerová *Hume's Political Philosophy* Chair: Albert Anglberger (English)	**Philosophy of Science** Alexander Gebharter *Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets* Chair: Laurenz Hudetz (English)	**Philosophy of Language** Gregor Walczak *Aristotle meets Grice: Why Conversational Implicatures are Cancellable* Chair: David Kashtan (English)	**Ethics** Doris Schneeberger *Animal Rights - Interpretation and Justification - Towards a UN-Declaration of Animal Rights* Chair: Maximilian Kiener (English)
14:45-15:15	**Epistemology** Patricia Meindl *Epistemological relativism, reflection and "thick" experiences* Chair: Friedrich Lehrbaumer (English)	**Political Philosophy** Philipp Kanschik *Why sufficientarianism is not indifferent to taxation* Chair: Albert Anglberger (English)	**Philosophy of Science** Matthew Baxendale *The Layer Cake Model of the World and Non-Reductive Physicalism* Chair: Laurenz Hudetz (English)	**Philosophy of Language** Lukas Lewerentz & Benjamin Marschall *Keep it simple! Intentions in the metasemantics of demonstratives* Chair: David Kashtan (German)	**Ethics** Sebastian Thome *Who is right? Why we have to change our dealings with animals* Chair: Maximilian Kiener (German)
15:30-16:00	**Epistemology** Matt Hewson *The preface paradox and epistemic justification* Chair: Friedrich Lehrbaumer (English)	**Political Philosophy** Nathan Wood *Republican International Relations* Chair: Albert Anglberger (English)	**Philosophy of Science** Ilaria Canavotto *A Three-Stage Causal Analysis of the EPR/B Experiment* Chair: Laurenz Hudetz (English)	**Philosophy of Language** Markus Tschögl *Challenging Relativism* Chair: David Kashtan (English)	**Ethics** Frauke Albersmeier *All kinds of prejudice: Speciesism and the original analogy to racism and sexism* Chair: Maximilian Kiener (English)
16:00-16:30	Coffee Break				
16:30-18:00	**Plenary Lecture** Ulla Wessels *What Ought We to Do? In Defense of a Welfarist Answer* Chair: Albert Anglberger (English, Location: HS 101)				
18:15-	Warm evening buffet				

4 September 2015 (Friday)

Time	Location				
	HS 101	HS 104	HS 107	HS 122	HS 103
09:00-09:30	**Epistemology** Christian J. Feldbacher *Epistemic Normativity in Social Epistemology* Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Marek Vanzura *Drones: A case for extended mind, cognition and emotions* Chair: Pascale Lötscher (English)	**Logic** Maria Paola Sforza Fogliani *The Centrality Argument: Justifiability and Revisability of Logic* Chair: Vlasta Sikimic (English)	**Metaphysics** Jules Salomone *Circularity and Coordination. A non-circular account of collective intentional action* Chair: Fabio Ceravolo (English)	**Ethics** Tanja Rechnitzer *What kind of principle is the Precautionary Principle?* Chair: Frauke Albersmeier (English)
09:45-10:15	**Epistemology** Jonathan Krude *Demonstrating the Infallibility of Thought* Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Kinga Jęczmińska *The Cartesian theatre and the modification of the metaphor of a theatre in Dennett's multiple drafts model, Baars's global workspace theory and O'Regan and Noë's sensorimotor theory* Chair: Pascale Lötscher (English)	**Logic** Annika Schuster *Quantum-logical arguments against the distributive law and their defeaters* Chair: Vlasta Sikimic (English)	**Metaphysics** Jan Stühring *Crane on Truth about the Non-Existent* Chair: Fabio Ceravolo (English)	**Ethics** Meredith McFadden *Reasons, Value, and Valuing* Chair: Frauke Albersmeier (English)
10:30-11:00	**Epistemology** Giovanni Rolla *Could envatted brains be rational?* Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Riin Kõiv *On Why Innate Is not Within* Chair: Pascale Lötscher (English)	**Logic** Attila Molnár *On some first-order spatiotemporal logics* Chair: Vlasta Sikimic (English)	**Metaphysics** Daniel Milne-Plückebaum *Extended Modal Meinongianism* Chair: Fabio Ceravolo (English)	**Ethics** Samuel Elgin *Ethical Atomism and the Immorality of Hypocrisy* Chair: Frauke Albersmeier (English)
11:15-11:45	**Epistemology** Lukas Schwengerer *A Unified Transparency Account of Self-Knowledge* Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Matthias Rolffs *Production, Dependence and Mental Causation worth wanting* Chair: Pascale Lötscher (English)	**Logic** Cornelia Kroiß *Two Extensions of McCulloch and Pitts type neural networks* Chair: Vlasta Sikimic (English)	**Metaphysics** Tereza Kunešová *Paradox of Fiction: What does it mean to be moved by the fictional character?* Chair: Fabio Ceravolo (English)	**Ethics** Gustav Alexandrie *How to accept the Repugnant Conclusion* Chair: Frauke Albersmeier (English)
12:00-12:30	**Epistemology** Aleksandra Ninković *Should rationality and justification be interpreted in internalist or externalist terms? The relationship between epistemic rationality and epistemic justification.* Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher (English)	**Philosophy of Mind** Marta Zaręba *Internal Causes and External Reasons* Chair: Pascale Lötscher (English)	**Logic** Johannes Korbmacher *Yet Another Puzzle of Ground* Chair: Vlasta Sikimic (English)	**Metaphysics** Annabel Colas *Is there such a thing as a perfect performance of a musical work?* Chair: Fabio Ceravolo (English)	**Ethics** Maximilian Kiener *Constructivism As a Genuine Metaethical Theory* Chair: Frauke Albersmeier (English)
12:30-14:00	Lunch Break				
14:00-14:30	**Epistemology** Daniel Pinto *Why Epistemic Situationism is Bound to Fail* Chair: Patricia Meindl (English)	**History of Philosophy** Zuzana Rybaříková *"...but in any case you will have the Poles on your side." Prior's Reception of Lesniewska's Ideas: A Comparison of Sobocinska's and Lejewski's Influence* Chair: Albert Anglberger (English)	**Philosophy of Language** Henrik Sova *Kripkensteinian stand off and magical robust realism* Chair: Gregor Walczak (English)	**Metaphysics** Jonathan Dittrich *What gradual modality could and could not be* Chair: Sylvia Barnett (English)	**Ethics** Nathan Cornwell *Cluelessness Again: Against the Principle of Indifference* Chair: Meredith McFadden (English)
14:45-15:15	**Epistemology** Gregor P. Greslehner *Epistemic Game Theory: Farewell to Common Knowledge of Rationality and Nash Equilibrium?* Chair: Patricia Meindl (English)	**History of Philosophy** Mika Suojanen *George Berkeley's Reasons Why the Immediate Object of Perception Is Not a Physical Substance* Chair: Albert Anglberger (English)	**Philosophy of Language** Ryan Cox *Hyperintensional Contexts in Explanatory Language* Chair: Gregor Walczak (English)	**Metaphysics** Mattia Sorgon *Sometimes Coincidence and De Re Modality* Chair: Sylvia Barnett (English)	**Ethics** Norbert Paulo *In Search of Greene's Argument* Chair: Meredith McFadden (English)
15:30-16:00	**Epistemology** Stanisław Ruczaj *"I was blind, but now I see"? - the critique of aspect-seeing approach to religious beliefs* Chair: Patricia Meindl (English)	**History of Philosophy** Jonas Raab *Plato's Sophistes: Rise and Fall of the Greatest* Chair: Albert Anglberger (English)	**Philosophy of Language** Arno Goebel *Relevant Presuppositons: The Proviso Problem* Chair: Gregor Walczak (English)	**Metaphysics** Fabio Ceravolo *A Clash of Necessitarians: Dispositional Essentialism and Varieties of Necessity* Chair: Sylvia Barnett (English)	**Ethics** Beba Cibralic *The paradox of toleration* Chair: Meredith McFadden (English)
16:00-16:30	Coffee Break				
16:30-18:00	Plenary Lecture Christopher Gauker *On the Difference between Realistic and Fantastic Imagining* Chair: Pascale Loetscher (English, Location: HS 101)				
18:15-	Closing Dinner				

Plenary Talks

On the Difference between Realistic and Fantastic Imagining

Christopher Gauker

When we imaginatively picture what might happen, we take what we imagine to be either realistic or fantastic. A wine glass falling to the floor and shattering is realistic. A falling wine glass morphing into a bird and flying away is fantastic. How we do we decide which kind of imagining we are dealing with? Assuming that imagistic cognition does not reduce to some kind of discursive cognition, the difference does not lie in the satisfaction of some discursively represented constraints. A better explanation begins with an account of imagistic representation in terms of a mapping from perceptual similarity space into objective quality space. Next, small permissible imagistic transformations may be defined as those that represent actually observed sequences of events. Finally, realistic transformations may be defined as a product of stringing together small permissible transformations. There remain some problem cases that this approach seems not to handle adequately.

Section:	Plenary
Language:	English
Chair:	Pascale Lötscher
Date:	16:30–18:00, September 4th 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 101

Christopher Gauker (University of Salzburg)
Christopher Gauker is professor for theoretical philosophy at the University of Salzburg. Before that he was a member of the University of Cincinnati for over 25 years, 14 years as a professor. His main research areas are philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and philosophical logic. Recent Publications are 'Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas', Oxford University Press, 2011 and 'How Many Bare Demonstratives are There in English?', Linguistics and Philosophy, 2015.
E-Mail: christopher.gauker@sbg.ac.at

Sentences as Predicates of Modal and Attitudinal Objects

Friederike Moltmann

This talk develops the view that sentences (especially as complements of both attitudinal and modal predicates) are not terms standing for propositions, but rather are predicates of cognitive, illocutionary, or modal products, entities of the sort of claims, thoughts, decisions, demands, offers, possibilities, and needs. The view will be applied to different types of complement clauses and embedding predicates by making use of the view that attitudinal and modal objects are not only the bearers of truth- or satisfaction conditions, but also the bearers of truthmakers or satisfiers, of various sorts. The view will furthermore be applied to different types of 'modal concord'.

Section:	Plenary
Language:	English
Chair:	Laurenz Hudetz
Date:	14:00–15:30, September 2nd 2015 (Wednesday)
Location:	HS 101

Friederike Moltmann (CNRS-IHPST and NYU)
Friederike Moltmann is a research director 1st class at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique (French National Centre for Scientific Research) at the University of Paris 1 and a visiting researcher at the New York University. Before that she was a reader at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Stirling. She got her PhD in Linguistics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Her main research areas are philosophy of language, metaphysics, natural language semantics and natural language syntax. Recent publications are 'Abstract Objects and the Semantics of Natural language', Oxford University Press, 2013; 'The Semantics of Existence', Linguistics and Philosophy 36(1), 2013; 'Reference to Numbers in Natural Language', Philosophical Studies 162(3), 2013.
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New Developments in the Logical Foundations of Quantum Physics

Sonja Smets

In this presentation I address the old question on whether a logical understanding of Quantum Mechanics requires abandoning some of the principles of classical logic. My answer to this question is "no". Philosophically, the argument is based on combining a formal semantic approach with an empirical-experimental approach to Logic. Technically, I use the recently-developed setting of Dynamic Quantum Logic to make explicit the operational meaning of quantum-mechanical concepts in our formal semantics. Based on recent results obtained in joint work with A. Baltag, I show that the correct interpretation of quantum-logical connectives is dynamical, rather than purely propositional. I will argue for the fact that there is no contradiction between classical logic and (the dynamic reinterpretation of) quantum logic.

Section:	Plenary
Language:	English
Chair:	Alexander Gebharter
Date:	09:00–10:30, September 3rd 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 101

Sonja Smets (University of Amsterdam)
Sonja Smets is an associate professor at the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation at the University of Amsterdam. Before that she was a University Lecturer at the University of Groningen. Her main areas of research and interest are logic (in particular non-classical logics), formal epistemology, and philosophy of quantum physics. She is a member of the Amsterdam Dynamics Group, the Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science in Brussels and of the Oxford University Research Group on the Philosophy of Information. In 2012, she won the Birkhoff-van Neumann Prize for her studies on quantum structures and related epistemic semantics. Recent publications are 'The Dynamic Turn in Quantum Logic', Synthese, 2012 and together with J. van Benthem 'Special issue of Synthese on Logic meets Physics' (2012).
E-Mail: S.J.L.Smets@uva.nl

What Ought We to Do? In Defense of a Welfarist Answer

Ulla Wessels

hat ought we to do? In my talk, I will briefly sketch a welfarist answer and then defend it against an influential objection: the objection from adaptive desires. According to this objection, welfarism often gives its blessing to the prevailing circumstances because people tend to adapt their desires to them and thus don't have desires that speak in favour of changing the circumstances. I will try to show, though, that the objection fails. When asking what ought to be the case, welfarism does not give an inadequate bonus to what is the case. It does not suffer from normative torpidity.

Section:	Plenary
Language:	English
Chair:	Albert Anglberger
Date:	16:30-18:00, September 3rd 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 101

Ulla Wessels (Saarland University)
Ulla Wessels is Professor for Practical Philosophy at the Saarland University in Saarbrücken. Before that she was at the University of Leipzig, the University of Göttingen and at the University of California, Berkeley. Her main research area is ethics. In particular, she is interested in bioethics (abortion, genetic engineering), moral psychology and supererogation, among other things. She received the Wolfgang Stegmüller-Prize in 2003 for her book 'Die gute Samariterin: Zur Struktur der Supererogation'. Recent publications are 'Das Gute', Frankfurt am Main, 2011 and 'Wie gut wollen wir sein?' (forthcomming).
E-Mail: ulla@uwessels.de

Workshops

Causality meets quantum mechanics

Florian Boge & Alexander Gebharter & Paul Näger & Nina Retzlaff &
Paul Weingartner

Venue: University of Salzburg, Universitätsplatz 1
Room: HS 107
Date: 09:00–12:45, September 2nd 2015 (Wednesday)

Background

Quantum mechanical phenomena irritate our habit to structure events in cause and effect. In everyday use we do not question that the cause occurs temporally before its effect, that a cause produces its effect, but this effect never produces its cause, and that cause and effect are spatially close to each other (cf. Hüttemann 2013, p. 7).

In quantum mechanics (QM), certain phenomena challenge those features of causation. The strongest discussed phenomenon is the quantum entanglement, which questions the locality, that is the feature that cause and effect are spatially close to each other. If a quantum system consists of several distinct subsystems, then local operations on each individual subsystem can be done. For example with respect to a two-photon system the polarization at each photon can be measured. If the system is in an entangled state, then a local operation at one of the subsystems has impact on the states of all other subsystems, namely immediately and independent of their distance. If the two-photon system is in an entangled state, then the measurement of the polarization of one photon determines the polarization of the other photon. (cf. Audretsch 2005, p. 110)

How do we deal with this fact? Should we call into question the features of causation or have we to rephrase features for some areas such as the microcosm, or have we to give up causality in QM?

References:

Audretsch J. (2005): Verschränkte Systeme: Die Quantenphysik auf neuen Wegen. Weinheim: WILEY-VCH.

Hüttemann A. (2013): Ursachen. Berlin; Boston: Walter de Gruyter.

Aim and Scope of the Workshop

The goal of this workshop is to capture the theme of causality in quantum mechanics and search for answers how to deal with the facts and how to combine the two theories: Causality and Quantum Mechanics. We will start in general and become more and more specific from talk to talk. The workshop will be opened with the general issue of causality in physics by Prof Dr. Paul Weingartner. Florian Boge will then explore the issue of causality specifically with regard to the quantum entanglement. After a short break Alexander Gebharter gives us the specific formal tool used in the last two talks, the causal (Bayes) nets. Nina Retzlaff will then apply this tool on certain quantum phenomena and Dr. des. Paul Näger will talk especially about the Causal Markov condition in the quantum realm.

Schedule

09:00–09:15	Workshop Opening: Introduction
09:15–09:45	Prof. Dr. Paul A. Weingartner: *The need of pluralism of Causality*
09:45–10:15	Florian Boge: *Locality, Causality, Reality. Implications of Bell's Inequality*
10:15–10:45	Coffee Break
10:45–11:15	Alexander Gebharter: *Introduction to causal (Bayes) nets*
11:15–11:45	Nina Retzlaff: *Causality within Quantum Mechanics*
11:45–12:15	Dr. des. Paul M. Näger: *The Causal Markov Condition in the Quantum Realm*
12:15–12:45	Concluding Discussion

Abstracts

Florian Boge: Locality, Causality, Reality. Implications of Bell's Inequality

In 1935, Albert Einstein, Nathan Rosen, and Boris Podolsky (henceforth: EPR) published a paper purporting to show that quantum mechanics (QM), today's most successful physical theory, was incomplete. David Bohm (1951) later offered a significantly simplified version of the thought-experiment on which EPR based their argument: Take two systems prepared in a certain type of quantum mechanical state, e.g. two atoms resulting from molecular decay, which are then separated by a large spatial distance. Surprisingly, QM predicts that these two atoms will show a remarkably correlated behavior long after any local interaction at the source (the decaying molecule) should have ceased.

While QM predicts that these correlations exist, any more 'classical' physical theory should include some reasonable assumptions that prohibit this kind of behavior. This especially goes for the special theory of relativity which provokes a conflict with explanations that attempt to invoke a causal connection between the two separated systems (atoms), given that their separation is large enough. In 1964, John Bell found a way to make things testable by deriving an inequality that should hold based on the aforementioned reasonable assumptions, and should be violated according to QM. Experiments, notably that of Aspect et al. (1982), have since been strongly in favor of QM. But what are we to make of this?

In my talk, I want to give an overview of three central questions which 'naturally' offer themselves in this context, and how they are related: (i) what becomes of spatiotemporal constraints set up by the (special) theory of relativity, (ii) what becomes of a causal interpretation of the situation, and (iii) what becomes of our view of reality, in the light of the two aforementioned points? To establish a connection, I will show why a causal explanation must be 'non-local' in a specific sense and what difficulties arise from this and other features of causal assessments of the situation. But if, on the other hand, we give up on explaining this phenomenon causally, this has a definite impact on (certain kinds of) scientific realism. In conclusion, I will offer a glimpse at my own view to provide a constructive outlook on the situation.

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Aspect, A., Dalibard, J., and Roger, G. (1982). "Experimental Test of Bell's Inequalities Using Time-Varying Analyzers". Physical Review Letters, 49(25):1804–1807.

Bell, J. S. (1987[1964]). "On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox". In Bell, J. S., editor, Speakable and unspeakable in quantum mechanics, pages 14-–21. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Einstein, A., Podolsky, B., and Rosen, N. (1935). "Can Quantum- Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?". Physical Review, 47:777–780.

Alexander Gebharter: Introduction to causal (Bayes) nets

In this talk I give a brief and self-contained introduction to causal (Bayes) nets (CBNs) which were developed by researchers such as Neapolitan (1990, 2003), Pearl (1988,2009) and Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (2000). I introduce important basic notions and the theory's core axioms as well as alternative and philosophically more transparent formulations of these axioms. I proceed by illustrating how these axioms connect causal structures to empirical data. Then I highlight a few advantages of the theory of CBNs over more classical philosophical theories of causation. In particular, the theory seems to give us the best grasp on causation we have so far from an empirical point of view: It gives rise to a multitude of methods for uncovering causal structures on the basis of empirical data, it provides the best available explanation of certain statistical phenomena, and certain theory versions (i.e., combinations of the theory's axioms) can be independently tested on purely empirical grounds (Schurz & Gebharter, 2015). Furthermore, the theory of CBNs allows for a clear distinction between observation and manipulation: CBNs can be used for making predictions based on observations, but also for predicting the effects of possible interventions on the basis of (non-experimental) observational data.

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Spirtes, P., Glymour, C., & Scheines, R. (2000). Causation, prediction, and search. MIT Press.

Paul M. Näger: The Causal Markov Condition in the Quantum Realm

The causal Markov condition, which is a generalisation of Reichenbach's principle of the common cause, is the central principle of causal explanation. In a non-technical way it says that every correlation has to be explained by a causal connection. While the principle seems to be well-founded in the deterministic macroscopic realm, van Fraassen (1980: The Scientific Image, 1982: Rational Belief and the Common Cause Principle) and Cartwright (1988: How to Tell a Common Cause, 1989: Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement) have argued that the principle fails for indeterministic quantum mechanics: there are common causes that do not screen off. This poses the dilemma that one either has to deny that the quantum world is causal (van Fraassen's horn) or one denies that the theory of causal Bayes nets adequately captures causal facts (Cartwright's horn). In this talk I shall re-investigate the alleged failure and discuss options for a via media, which upholds basic ideas of the theory of causal Bayes nets and understands the quantum world in a causal way.

Nina Retzlaff: Causality within Quantum Mechanics

To combine causality with quantum mechanics, it is useful to examine probabilistic theories of causality. Using a probability distribution, which assigns a probability to every event of an experiment, cause-effect relations are analysed in the so-called Bayes nets approach (Pearl 2009, pp. 8-14). By means of mathematical formalization, algorithms can be developed, which identify the causal connections of a complex system and output directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) representing these connections. The commonly accepted algorithms like the SGS-algorithm generate a class of related DAGs based on the conditional independence relations derived from the probability distribution, under the assumption that both the Causal Markov Condition and the Faithfulness Condition are satisfied (Spirtes, Glymour, Scheines 2009, p. 81). Certain quantum mechanical phenomena, however, violate at least one of these conditions, so the algorithms' DAG-outputs are not always adequate. One kind of these phenomena are quantum correlations, which have already been discussed with reference to causal discovery algorithms (Wood, Spekkens 2014). In this talk I focus on other quantum phenomena, which have not yet been modeled and analysed by means of causal Bayes nets.

References:

Pearl J. (2009): Causality: models, reasoning, and inference. 2nd edition. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Spirtes P., Glymour C., Scheines R. (2000): Causation, Prediction, and Search. 2nd edition. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Wood C. J., Spekkens R. W. (2014): "The lesson of causal discovery algorithms for quantum correlations: Causal explanations of Bell-inequality violations require fine-tuning", preprint: http://arXiv.org/abs/1208.4119v2 (received 10.02.2015).

Paul Weingartner: The Need of Pluralism of Causality

n this talk it will be shown that a pluralism of causality is needed. Not, as might be expected, for such different domains as natural sciences and humanities, but even within the domain of physics different causal relations are necessary. This will be illustrated with examples from Classical Mechanics and Special Relativity, Thermodynamics and Quantum Mechanics. In these domains causal relations differ in their properties. The talk will be divided into the following chapters:

1. Introduction

2. Three Main Types of Causality

3. Properties of Causality Relations

4. Causality Relations in Causal Explanations

5. The Basic Logic for the Model of Causal Relations

6. The Model RMQC of Causal Relations

Speakers

Florian Boge (University of Cologne, Germany)
Florian Boge is a PHD student in philosophy under supervision of Prof. Dr. Andreas Hüttemann at the University of Cologne. He graduated in 2012 from the M.A. study in philosophy at the Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, with a thesis on trope theory and similarity. His PHD thesis is concerned with the prospects of ontological and epistemological approaches to the interpretation of QM. He is currently also working on a degree in physics.

Alexander Gebharter (University of Düsseldorf, Germany)
Alexander Gebharter is a research fellow at the Düsseldorf center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (DCLPS) at the University of Düsseldorf and within the DFG funded research unit "Causation, Laws, Disposition, Explanation: At the Intersection of Science and Metaphysics" (FOR 1063). His research interests lie in philosophy of science and metaphysics. He is especially interested in causality and related topics such as modeling, explanation, prediction, intervention and control, mechanisms, constitution, supervenience, theoretical concepts, empirical content, etc. For a list of publications and more information, see the following webpage: http://uni-duesseldorf.academia.edu/AlexanderGebharter

Paul M. Näger (University of Münster, Germany)
Paul Näger (Dr. des. phil.), University of Münster. 2000-2008 Studies in physics and philosophy, LMU Munich. 2006 Diploma in physics (with distinction). 2008-2009 Studies in philosophy, University of Oxford. 2008-2013 Dissertation in philosophy: Entanglement and causation (summa cum laude), Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Manfred Stöckler, PD Dr. Meinard Kuhlmann. 2010-2013 Research Fellow (Wiss. Mitarbeiter), Dept. of Philosophy, University of Bremen, Prof. Dr. Manfred Stöckler. Since 2013 Research fellow (Wiss. Mitarbeiter), Dept. of Philosophy, University of Münster, Prof. Dr. Ulrich Krohs.

Nina Retzlaff (University of Düsseldorf, Germany)
Nina Retzlaff is a research fellow at the Düsseldorf center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (DCLPS) at the Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf. She studied mathematics with a minor in biology at the University of Cologne and is interested in quantum mechanics. Her research interests lie in philosophy of science and metaphysics, especially in causality within quantum mechanics. In the context of her PhD thesis, she is investigating causality with regard to quantum mechanics.

Paul Weingartner (University of Salzburg, Austria)
Paul Weingartner is professor emeritus of philosophy (University Salzburg). 1961 Doctor of philosophy (major: philosophy, minor: physics) at the University of Innsbruck. As research fellow he was studying with Popper, Britzlmayr and Stegmüller. 1965 assistant professor of philosophy (venia legendi), University of Graz. 1966 assistant professor of philosophy (venia legendi), University of Salzburg. 1966 Kardinal Innitzer Price for Philosophy of the year. 1970 Associate Professor of philosophy at the University of Salzburg. 1971 Full Professor of philosophy at the University of Salzburg. 1995 Honorary Doctorate (Dr. h.c.) from Marie Curie Sklodowska University, Lublin (Poland). In 1997 he received a Membership of the New York Academy of Sciences.

His research areas are philosophy of science, logic and philosophy of religion, with a particular focus on laws of nature, causality, truth, necessity and possibility - He published 10 Books, 36 editions and more than 160 articles in renowned journals like the Journal of Symbolic Logic, Journal of Philosophical Logic, Journal of Symbolic Logic, Grazer Philosophische Studien, Erkenntnis, and Philosophia Nauralis. In recent times he also published about God, theory of conscience and the natural law in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas.

Numbers: their words, nature, and existence

Katharina Felka & Robert Schwartzkopff & Alexander Steinberg & Julia Zakkou

Venue: University of Salzburg, Universitätsplatz 1
Room: HS 103
Date: 09:00–12:45, September 2nd 2015 (Wednesday)

Background

The question of whether numbers, ostensibly the subject matter of mathematics, exist is as old as it is vexing. Typically, participants of the debate agree that numbers, if they exited, would be abstract objects. According to numerical platonism, such numbers exist. According to numerical nominalism, they do not. Platonists tend to defend their view by appealing to apparently true sentences whose truth would guarantee that numbers exist. Nominalists tend to deny platonism on the grounds that its acceptance would come at too high an ontological or epistemological prize.

Aim and Scope of the Workshop

The aim of the workshop is to critically investigate and challenge some of the presuppositions that inform the debate concerning numerical platonism versus numerical nominalism in the light of recent developments in metaphysics, linguistics, and the philosophy of language.

Alexander Steinberg will scrutinize the nominalists' charge that the costs of accepting the existence of numbers would be too high. Drawing on ideas stemming from the debate concerning metaphysical fundamentality and grounding and the view of reality as hierarchically structured, this talk will introduce and discuss the idea that this charge can be rebutted if numbers are conceived as derivative rather than fundamental objects.

Katharina Felka will focus on the question on whether it is possible to explain why certain sentences such as, for instance, 'The number of Martian moons is two', whose truth is commonly taken to guarantee that a number exists, appear to be true without having to accept that

they are true. In particular, this talk will present and critically discuss a particular such explanation called 'Indifferentialism' according to which the apparent truth of 'The number of Martian moons is two' can ultimately be explained in terms of the actual truth of 'Mars has two moons'.

Robert Schwartzkopff will investigate the platonists' assumption that the truth of certain sentences such as 'The number of Martian moons is two' guarantees that numbers exist. To this end, the talk will focus on the question whether it can be understood in number-wise innocent manner by analysing it in ways that render it equivalent with 'Mars has two moons', a sentence whose truth does not guarantee that numbers exist. In particular, this talk will provide a critical overview of the extant innocent analyses of 'The number of Martian moons is two' and suggest a way to do better.

Julia Zakkou will defend the view that a sentence like 'Mars has two moons' expresses the one-sided proposition that Mars has at least two moons against recent arguments to the effect that it expresses the two-sided proposition that Mars has exactly (i.e. at least and at most) two moons. In particular, this talk aims to show that the data that underwrite the argument in support of the two-sided view can be accounted for without having to give up on the one-sided view. The question of which view is correct bears on the question of whether 'Mars has two moons' can be equivalent with 'The number of Martian moons is two'.

Schedule

09:00–09:10	Workshop Opening: Synopsis
09:10–10:00	Alexander Steinberg: *Numbers as Derivative Objects*
10:00–10:50	Katharina Felka: *On Indifferentialism in Ontology*
10:50–11:05	Coffee Break
11:05–11:55	Robert Schwartzkopff: *Number Words and Ontological Innocence*
11:55–12:45	Julia Zakkou: *At least, at most, and exactly two moons*

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Abstracts

Katharina Felka: On Indifferentialism in Ontology

Some philosophers are not willing to accept the existence of numbers and, therefore, deny that sentences that presuppose the existence of numbers are true. This gives rise to the challenge of explaining why some of these sentences ? e.g. 'The number of Martian moons is two'? appear to be true.

Indifferentialism is an account that is supposed to meet this challenge. According to this account, speakers often only assert the content of sentences that does not arise due to its presuppositions. This can be illustrated with Donnellan's famous example. Suppose a woman at a party points at a man who is drinking water and says 'The man drinking Martini is a famous actor'. This sentence has the false presupposition that there is a man drinking Martini. But if someone points out that there is no man drinking Martini, then the woman will not care. For in uttering the sentence, the woman only asserted that that man is a famous actor, while she did not make a claim about what the man is drinking.

According to Indifferentialism, something similar is going on when speakers utter a sentence like 'The number of Martian moons is two'. In uttering this sentence, speakers only assert the content of the sentence that does not arise due to its presuppositions. More particularly, they only assert that Mars has two moons, while they do not make a claim about whether there is a number. Accordingly, Indifferentalism says, speakers assert something true in uttering the sentence and, thus, the sentence appears to be true even though it carries a false presupposition and is thus untrue.

In her talk, Katharina Felka will present Indifferentialism in more detail and confront it with some substantial worries.

Robert Schwartzkopff: Number Words and Ontological Innocence

Indifferentialism is but one way to steer clear of having to accept the existence of numbers. Another way consists in holding that a sentence like 'The number of Martian moons is two' is ontologically innocent, in the sense that its truth does not, in fact, guarantee the existence of numbers.

The claim that 'The number of Martian moons is two' is not ontologically innocent because its truth requires the existence of numbers is typically justified in recourse to the claim that the number word 'two' functions as, effectively, a proper name that aims to stand for the number 2. If so, the truth of 'The number of Martian moons is two' would guarantee the existence of the number 2 because its truth guarantees that 'two' stands for this number. However, recent years have witnessed an ever-growing opposition against the view that number words in sentences like 'The number of Martian moons is two' function in this way.

In this talk, Robert Schwartzkopff will give an opinionated overview on the debate concerning the semantic function of number words as number names. In particular, his talk has two aims. First, to critically assess whether the extant 'no-name' analyses of number words in sentences like 'The number of Martian moons is two' are ontologically innocent and satisfactory. Second, to suggest that the key to a satisfactory and ontologically innocent understanding of such sentences lies in understanding sentences like 'Mars has an even number of moons' and their relations to sentences like 'Mars has two moons'.

Alexander Steinberg: Numbers as Derivative Objects

here are well-known ontological and epistemological worries surrounding (putative) abstract objects such as numbers. Very roughly, qua abstract objects, numbers would have to be too strange for there to be any (e.g., they would have to be a-causal and lack spatio-temporal location). And even if there were such strange entities, their strangeness would place them 'beyond the reach of the better understood means of human cognition (e.g., sense perception and the like)', as Benacerraf put it. It would, thus, be mysterious how we ever managed to gain the mathematical knowledge we possess if such knowledge concerned numbers.

In recent metaphysics, there has been a renewed interest in ontological structuring notions such as metaphysical grounding. Prominently, Jonathan Schaffer suggests that what there is is structured hierarchically: there are fundamental entities as well as derivative ones, where the latter are ultimately dependent on or metaphysically grounded in the former.

If such a distinction between denizens of reality could be drawn, it conceivably helps to alleviate ontological and epistemological worries. For instance, one might argue that a strangeness-ban is only plausible for fundamental entities, while generation principles for derivative entities should offer maximal bang for the buck; or that knowledge about derivative entities on the basis of knowledge about their grounders is one of the better understood routes to knowledge.

In his talk, Alexander Steinberg will give an opinionated overview to these issues.

Julia Zakkou: At least, at most, and exactly two moons

The dominant view on sentences like 'Mars has two moons' has it that they have a *semantic* lower bound and a *pragmatic* upper bound. More precisely, it holds that 'Mars has two moons' expresses the proposition that Mars has at least two moons and conversationally implicates that Mars has at most two moons. One kind of datum in support of this view is the fact that there is nothing odd about saying 'Mars has two moons, if not more'.

Recent years have seen the advent for arguments against this 'one-sided semantic analysis' and in favor of a 'two-sided semantic analysis'. This view has it that 'Mars has two moons' has both a *semantic* lower bound and a *semantic* upper bound and thus expresses the proposition that Mars has exactly two moons. The data presented in support here involve the interaction with negation ('Mars has two moons' − 'No, Mars doesn't have two moons. It has three'), quantifiers ('No one who travelled to two Martian moons got older than 50 years'), and modals ('Richie Rich had to/ was allowed to buy two Martian moons').

In her talk, Julia Zakkou will have a closer look at the data presented against the one-sided semantic analysis. She will argue that even though some of them ask for a slight modification of the dominant view, they do not support the two-sided semantic analysis.

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Speakers

Katharina Felka (UZH Zurich, Switzerland)
Katharina is a lecturer at the Department of Philosophy at the UZH in Zurich. She mainly works on questions at the intersection of philosophy and linguistics. Before joining the department in Zurich, she wrote her PhD thesis Talking About Numbers - Easy Arguments for Mathematical Realism in the Nominalizations project at the University of Hamburg. Katharina also studied at the MIT in Cambridge, the HU in Berlin, the ILLC in Amsterdam, and the University of Constance.
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Robert Schwartzkopff (University of Hamburg, Germany)
Robert Schwartzkopff is a member of the research group Phlox and the philosophy department at the University of Hamburg. He obtained his M.A. at Hamburg (2005) with a thesis on the Problem of Evil and received his DPhil from the University of Oxford (2015) with a thesis entitled 'The Numbers of the Marketplace: Commitment to Numbers in Natural Language'. Robert works mostly on issues in the intersection of linguistics and the philosophy of language and their application to (meta)ontological questions and has published on philosophy of language, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion.
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Alexander Steinberg (UZH Zurich, Switzerland)
Alex Steinberg received his PhD from University College London in 2011 with a thesis on the grounds of modality, which was awarded the GAP's ontos-award. He is member of the research group Phlox, worked as a lecturer at Mainz University until recently, and is now assistant at the University of Zurich. His research focusses on metaphysics and the philosophy of language.
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Julia Zakkou (University of Hamburg, Germany)
Julia Zakkou is a researcher in the Emmy Noether Research Group "Ontology after Quine" at the University of Hamburg. Her main research interests are in the philosophy of language and (meta)ontology. She wrote her doctoral thesis on relativism, contextualism and the problem of faultless disagreements at the Humboldt University of Berlin.
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Risk Assessment and Values in Science

Alexander Christian & Giovanna Cultrera & Christian J. Feldbacher & Wolfgang Kneifel & Gerhard Schurz & Charlotte Werndl

Venue: University of Salzburg, Universitätsplatz 1
Room: HS 101
Date: 09:00–18:30, September 2nd 2015 (Wednesday)

Workshop Aims & Scope

It is an important task of science to provide means and information for applying decision making procedures to everyday life. A controversially discussed sub-task within this area consists in providing value judgements that allow one, e.g., to figure out maximal expected utilities or an adequate way of drawing qualitative conclusions from statistical tests for such decisions. This debate about the permissiveness of or even a duty for value judgements in science has lasted for more than a century now and is, due to recently rekindled proposals for the value-ladenness of science, still unsettled. The main aims of this workshop are . . .

  (i) . . . to provide a historical and systematic overview of the value-neutrality and value-ladenness problem,

 (ii) to relate the results to concrete constraints of risk assessment, and

(iii) to apply the latter results to intensively discussed decisions under risk in areas of public interest as, e.g., climate-, food- and geosciences as well as medicine.

Funding

Schedule

Wednesday, September 2, 2015:

09:00	Opening
09:00–09:30	Christian J. Feldbacher: *A Historical and Systematic Overview of the Debate about Values in Science*
09:30–10:30	Gerhard Schurz: *Error Probabilties, Rational Acceptance and the Role of Values*
10:30–10:45	Coffee Break
10:45–11:45	Giovanna Cultrera: *Science in a Criminal Trial: The L'Aquila Case*
11:45–12:45	Alexander Christian: *The Suppression of Medical Evidence*
12:45–14:00	Lunch Break
14:00–15:30	SOPhiA 2015: Plenary Lecture
15:30–16:00	Coffee Break
16:00–17:00	Charlotte Werndl: *Model Selection Theory Applied to Climate Science: the Need for a More Nuanced View on Use-Novelty*
17:00–18:00	Wolfgang Kneifel: *Food Safety Risks: Is there a Balance Between Facts and Perception?*
18:00–18:30	Closing: Final Discussion
18:30	Dinner (warm evening buffet)

Abstracts

Alexander Christian: The Suppression of Medical Evidence

One of the most serious concerns about financial conflicts of interest in medical research is that they are likely to result in the suppression of evidence that is at odds with commercial interests of financiers, i.e. pharmaceutical companies. Suppression of medical evidence in terms of „active process[es] to prevent data from being created, made available, or given suitable recognition" (Martin, 1999, 334) runs contrary to principles of good scientific practice like honesty, openness or respect for the law (Shamoo & Resnik, 2015). It can result in ignorance, misrepresentation of scientific evidence (biased scientific evidence) and a suspension of scientific self-correction. Since it is widely assumed that clinical trial registries (CTRs) provide an effective means to prevent data suppression (Dickersin & Rennie, 2003), it is important to find out whether and how CTRs can be outwitted by pharmaceutical companies.

Section 1 of this paper illustrates the problems with data suppression by pointing to the ongoing controversy about the antiviral medication Tamiflu®. Section 2 is concerned with conflicts between data suppression and principles of good scientific practice. Section 3 then provides a detailed overview of questionable research practices that might play a role in the suppression of medical evidence in clinical trials and scientific publishing. In particular, this section adresses the key question of this article, which is whether and how clinical trial registries can be outwitted by pharmaceutical companies. Against this background I am going to discuss the adverse effect that data suppression and ignorance about medical findings have on risk assessment. Finally, in section 4, I describe several responses from the scientific community and discuss additional measures that might prevent data suppression and foster research integrity and professional accountability.

Giovanna Cultrera: Science in a Criminal Trial: The L'Aquila Case

On April 6, 2009 a magnitude 6.3 earthquake devastated the city of L'Aquila (Italy) and its surroundings, causing 309 victims. Two years later, seven experts were convicted to 6 years in jail, perpetual interdiction from public office and a fine of several million euros to be paid to the victims for having caused, by their negligent conduct, the death of 29 persons and the injury of several others.

The "seven" were convened as experts of the *Commissione Nazionale dei Grandi Rischi* (CGR, High Risk National Commission) six days before the mainshock (March 31, 2009) and, according to the verdict's motivations, they were considered guilty of manslaughter for "having conducted the prediction, the prevention and the seismic risk evaluation in a too general and approximate manner" and "for having issued incomplete, imprecise and contradictory information on the nature, causes, dangers and future developments of the seismic activity in the area in question"; "the CGR-meeting resulted in a reassuring message" that would have induced people not to leave their houses, as they were used to do by family tradition, after some shocks before the mainshock. On November 10, 2014, the appeal court demonstrated that it was all about mismanagement of a public order problem, and acquitted six of the seven formerly sentenced experts because the crime does not exist. The seventh, the vice-head of the Civil Protection, was convicted to two years in prison for 13 of the victims because he reported wrong scientific statements and violated the duty of precision and care which should inspire the risk management.

The two verdicts motivations involve difficult juridical aspects and arguments connected to the role of scientists and risk communication, all issues exceeding the local (Italian) dimension and attracting broad interest worldwide. Within the natural risks, the seismic one is characterized by a large epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty related to the expected earthquake shaking (seismic hazard), associated to the buildings vulnerability and the exposure assessment of the hazard zones. For regulatory purposes as well as in the everyday life, that hazard is described by longterm probability maps of shaking occurrence, being the scientific knowledge not enough progressed to forecast time, location and energy of an impending earthquake with the accuracy necessary for

civil protection purposes. This is the reason why, during the occurrence of a small-to-moderate seismicity, scientists cannot give different advices than the ones discussed in the CGR-meeting. However, scientific data and results were largely debated and misused in the first verdict to demonstrate that they should have been considered to correctly estimate the risk indicators (Cocco et al., 2015).

Several reasons led to the L'Aquila trial, none of them related to science: mismanagement of the post-earthquake emergency, unprepared public authorities, society not enough educated about seismic risk and natural risks in general, together with lack of strategies to communicate lowprobability and high-uncertainties phenomena. On the other end, institutional response of research Institutes to the issues raised by the trial and to the legal liability of scientists has been softened in order to keep the conflict among institutions in a low key.

In this frame, the necessity to find a disaster's explanation out of the system, represented by the local political and social community, turned the meeting of experts into a scapegoat, diverting the attention from the real issues concerning the mitigation of seismic risk, such as the responsibility of the builders and the proper land management.

For further details, see http://processoaquila.wordpress.com/ (INGV working group for the information management on the L'Aquila trial).

References:
Cocco M., G. Cultrera, A. Amato, T. Braun, A. Cerase, L. Margheriti, A. Bonaccorso, M. Demartin, P. De Martini, F. Galadini, C. Meletti, C. Nostro, F. Pacor, D. Pantosti, S. Pondrelli, F. Quareni, M. Todesco (2015). *The L'Aquila trial*. In: Peppoloni, S. & Di Capua, G. (eds) *Geoethics: The Role and Responsibility of Geoscientists*. Geological Society, London, Special Publications, 419, 2015.

Christian J. Feldbacher: A Historical and Systematic Overview of the Debate about Values in Science

The debate about the permissiveness of value judgements in science lasts now more than one century. It can be divided into three phases (cf. Schurz & Carrier 2013): The first phase in which Max Weber formulated the so-called "value-neutrality postulate". According to this postulate value judgements should be avoided in science or should be at least clearly marked as such judgements. The second phase which coincides with the so-called "Positivismusstreit" in German sociology. In this phase proponents of critical theory as, e.g., Juergen Habermas argued against critical rationalists as, e.g., Karl Popper with the help of emancipatory reasons in favour of the value-ladenness of science. And finally the third phase which took place mainly in English speaking countries and in which new theoretical arguments in favour of the value-ladenness thesis were put forward.

In this contribution a historical and systematic sketch of the debate about values in science will be given. Then the main arguments of the third phase will be explicated and applied to the so-called "L'Aquila 2009" case where earthquake experts were sentenced for their faults in generating and communicating predictions about an earthquake in this region.

Wolfgang Kneifel: Food Safety Risks: Is there a Balance Between Facts and Perception?

Today's welfare society is characterized by prosperity, increased life expectancy as well as by comprehensive social and health protection. However, in terms of food quality and safety the public is increasingly scared about anxiety and false risk perception. Several factors, such as the apparently growing number of outbreaks of food- and feed borne diseases, local incidents, mass production, criminal fraud, but also changing trends in nutrition and consumer food habits, have stimulated both the public awareness and the consumers' concerns about food. Against this background as well as regional as well as global developments, food safety has become a topic of high complexity and diversity. Somehow, this observation seems to be in contrast to the explicit trend that in so-called industrialized countries consumers, on average and compared to earlier times, spend steadily decreasing proportions of their regular budget for food. So, the value of food seems to be underestimated. Due to the regulatory basis, and quite often for the sake of advertising, the consumer of today is said to be an 'informed consumer'. Notwithstanding, this so-called informed consumer is not necessarily an educated consumer, as he or she often lacks sound information and specific knowledge about food. Hence, food safety experts (either from food industry or from inter/national authorities) play some important role, as they not only contribute to ensure the quality and safety of food but also act in the dissemination of knowledge about food. Importantly, several internationally linked control measures as well as surveillance and alert networks have been established based on food law and official regulations and aim at protecting national markets from (potentially) contaminated, mislabelled or unhealthy food. In this context, there are several interfaces that still need to be further cross-linked and harmonized. In this presentation, the diversity of relevant criteria around food safety will be illuminated from different perspectives. Special emphasis will be placed on current trends and statistics, on case scenarios and related crucial questions, on the gaps and needs of public health systems as well as on risk assessment and communication related to food.

Gerhard Schurz: Error Probabilties, Rational Acceptance and the Role of Values

According to the so-called Lockean acceptance rule, it is rational to accept a hypothesis H relative to a given rational belief function P and a body of total evidence E, iff H's probability given E exceeds a contextually determined threshold $\alpha > 0.5$. Behind this innocent looking rule two philosophical problems are lurking: (a) the problem of determining the right threshold, and (b) the problem of closure under conjunctions.

In this talk I will assume a practical context, in which "to accept a proposition H" means that one will rely on the assumption of H in practical actions. I investigate the consequences of this assumption concerning the problem of passing statistical expert information to society in the form of action recommendations (including a discussion of the L'Aquila case).

Charlotte Werndl: Model Selection Theory Applied to Climate Science: the Need for a More Nuanced View on Use-Novelty

Climate policy needs to be informed by the results of the best climate models, with respect to the issue at hand. To evaluate climate models, it is essential that the best available methods for confirmation are used. A hotly debated issue on confirmation in climate science (as well as in philosophy) is the requirement of use-novelty (i.e. that data can only confirm models if they have not already been used before, e.g. for calibrating parameters). This paper investigates the issue of use-novelty in the context of the mathematical methods provided by model selection theory. We will show that the picture model selection theory presents us with about use-novelty is more subtle and nuanced than the commonly endorsed positions by climate scientists and philosophers. More specifically, we will argue that there are two main cases in model selection theory. On the one hand, there are the methods such as cross-validation where the data are required to be use-novel. On the other hand, there are the methods such as Bayesian confirmation or the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for which the data cannot be use-novel. Still, for some of these methods (like AIC) certain intuitions behind the use-novelty approach are preserved: there is a penalty term in the expression for the degree of confirmation by the data because the data have already been used for calibration. The common positions argued for in climate science and philosophy are either that data should always be use-novel or that the use-novelty criterion is irrelevant. According to model selection theory these positions are too simple: whether or not data should be use-novel depends on the specific method used. For certain methods data should be use-novel, but for others they cannot and thus need not be use-novel.

Speakers

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Alexander Christian M.A. studied philosophy, sociology and biology at
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Giovanna Cultrera is researcher at the Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica
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Her research is focused on the study of ground motion variations at the
earth surface through the analysis of moderate and strong earthquakes
recordings. These studies are finalized to loss and damage estimations
in urban areas and infrastructures, and they have been addressed within
several projects and in cooperation with international research institu-
tions. She also works in the rapid response to seismic emergency in
epicentral area, to improve the monitoring and to collect data for scien-
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Since 2012, she participates in the INGV working group for the infor-
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His research interests are on: food safety, food hygiene, food and feed
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ity management, biorefinery concepts and food side product valorisa-
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He holds several international projects and cooperations with industry.
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Gerhard Schurz is Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Duesseldorf and Director of the Duesseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science. He is a member of the steering committee of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA) and currently leader of several DFG-funded projects on *causality* and *induction*. Before coming to Duesseldorf, he held a chair at the University of Erfurt and was visiting professor at Yale University. His areas of research include amongst others philosophy of science (general; natural science; history of science; explanation and understanding; lawlikeness; induction and abduction; theory confirmation and verisimilitude; normic laws, structural realism), and logic (logic and relevance, probability logic, nonmonotonic logic). He is member of the editorial board of several renowned philosophy journals (amongst others Episteme, Erkenntnis, GPS, Synthese), editor of about 20 collections, and author of more than 6 books (e.g. *Philosophy of Science. A Unified Approach*, 2013)
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Charlotte Werndl holds a Chair in Logic and Philosophy of Science at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Salzburg and a Visiting Professorship at the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics. She is also an associate editor of the European Journal for the Philosophy of Science and an editor of the Review of Symbolic Logic.
Before coming to Salzburg, she was an Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics. Before joining LSE, she was a Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at The Queen's College, University of Oxford. Her doctoral degree is from the University of Cambridge.
Her areas of specialization is in general philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, philosophy of climate science, evidence and philosophy of statistics, philosophy of mathematics.
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Contributed Talks

All kinds of prejudice: Speciesism and the original analogy to racism and sexism

Frauke Albersmeier

When Richard Ryder coined the term speciesism, he meant it to denote a failure to recognize a presumed moral continuum between humans and non-human animals (Ryder, An Autobiography. In: Between the Species, 1992, p. 170, 171), a failure he later described as a form of "prejudice" much like racism (Ryder, Victims of Science, 1975, p. 16). Peter Singer took up this concept and defined speciesism as an "attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one"s own species (Singer, Animal Liberation, 4th edition, 2009, p. 6). Although associated with epistemic problems, the notion of bias itself has not directed much attention towards the epistemic issues that may nourish many manifestations of speciesism. Speciesism has predominantly been discussed as a moral prejudice or a legitimate – and, at times, quite elaborate – moral view. Usually, the term itself is not explicitly connected to the related tendency to take a skeptical stance on non-human animals' capacities.

On the other hand, the fact that humans, and philosophers in particular, have often been reluctant to ascribe certain emotional or cognitive traits to any non-human animal has received relatively wide attention in philosophical discussions about the moral status of animals.

Starting from these observations, this talk will explore a neglected part of the analogy to racism and sexism, which the term speciesism is supposed to indicate. Different kinds of statements that fall within the scope of an everyday notion of racism or sexism will be compared to expressions of certain non-moral beliefs about non-human animals. Similarities between the former and the latter will give rise to the idea that speciesism might be understood as more than just a strictly moral attitude. I will argue that a broader concept of speciesism that covers all kinds of prejudice (which may be at the basis of our moral attitude towards non-human animals) would (1) help us gain a better understanding of so-called indirect speciesism and (2) widen the scope of the analogy to other forms of prejudice.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Maximilian Kiener
Date:	15:30-16:00, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 103

Frauke Albersmeier (University of Düsseldorf, Germany)
Frauke Albersmeier (M.A.), Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf. Ab 07/2015 wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin DFG-Sonderforschungsbereich 991: Die Struktur von Repräsentationen in Sprache, Kognition und Wissenschaft; Teilprojekt A05: Voraussetzungen der Frametheorie in der Geschichte der Philosophie. Dissertationsprojekt zu Fortschrittskonzepten in der Moralphilosophie.
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How to accept the Repugnant Conclusion

Gustav Alexandrie

In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit famously brought attention to the fact that some moral theories such as Total Utilitarianism imply the Repugnant Conclusion: "For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives that are barely worth living". As the name suggests, Parfit and many other philosophers reject this conclusion. However, it has proven very difficult to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion without being forced to accept other equally counterintuitive conclusions.

Following Thomas Søbirk Petersen, I distinguish between two interpretations of lives barely worth living. According to the Global Interpretation, "a life barely worth living is a life in which the sum of welfare in life, taken as a whole, just sneaks above a neutral life." In contrast, the Local Interpretation holds that "a life barely worth living is a life in which each day is at a level barely worth living, so the sum of welfare in such a life may be much greater than a neutral life."

I claim that the Repugnant Conclusion is not repugnant on the Local Interpretation. I then argue that lives barely worth living on the Global Interpretation are inconceivable and that this makes the intuition that the Repugnant Conclusion is false unreliable. Furthermore, I argue that we cannot have reliable intuitions about lives that are barely worth living because they are very short. Therefore, I conclude that the Repugnant Conclusion is not repugnant.

References:

Parfit D (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Petersen T S (2006). On the Repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion. Theoria. 72:126–137.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Frauke Albersmeier
Date:	11:15-11:45, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 103

Gustav Alexandrie (Stockholm University, Sweden)
I am an undergraduate in practical philosophy at Stockholm University. My publications include two reviews in the swedish philosophy journal Filosofisk Tidskrift (edited by professor Lars Bergström).
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Epistemological Status of Models in Science: Galileo and Falling Bodies

M. Efe Ateş

Scientific models constitute an important part of scientific research. They basically help scientists to overcome real world constraints by applying some functions such as simplification and idealization. These functions, by all means, have generated is-sues relevant to philosophy of science. Prominent among these issues are relation between model and theory, representative status of models and epistemological status of models. This paper covers the last-mentioned issue, which is an epistemic one related to the discussion of knowledge.

As known broadly, a scientific model represents an aspect of the world. It represents an aspect because it simplifies some irrelevant conditions and also idealizes physical reality of the world. In other words, scientists often construct and manipulate a model in a simplified and idealized situation. If this can be taken at face value, there is one, maybe the only, promising way of doing this: thought experimenting. Thus, in a nutshell, thought experiments (hereafter TE) play a pivotal role in the process of learning from models. Until recently, however, there are different explanations given for this substantial and crucially important role – throughout the paper I will address two of them. According to one view, some special classes of TE's are platonic which simultaneously destroy an old theory and construct a new one. They provide us with significant scientific understanding and they achieve this without new empirical input. In this sense, small numbers of TE's have a role to provide us information about the nature in an a priori way (Brown 1991, 1993, 2001 and 2004). According to a second view, however, TE's are merely picturesque arguments. Their basic role is to reorganise (deduction) or generalize (induction) what we already know about physical world. What makes their novel outcomes epistemically reliable are that their experientially based premises in the argument form warranted by generalized logic (Norton 1991, 1996 and 2004).

My primary objective in this paper is to argue against these two views and suggest a "coherence account" of TE's by focusing on Galilean model of free fall. Before presenting my own view, I will briefly survey two main views concerning TE's, which I mentioned above. Subsequently, I will try to show that it would be misleading to characterize

Galileo's free fall TE as a conclusive experiment in terms of its outcome. As against these two views, I will defend that the outcome gained on the basis of the model alone is inevitably dubious and overly unreliable. Finally, I will suggest a coherence theory of TEs, which in turn will allow me to put reliability back into the free fall TE. My claim here will be that some models (such as Galileo's free fall model) can have epistemic significance insofar as they cohere with other relevant model(s). So to say, the outcome of Galileo's TE on free fall can be justified neither in a logical nor in an apriori way. Rather, it can be justified only by coherence with the outcome of Galileo's TE on inertia.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Philippe van Basshuysen
Date:	10:45-11:15, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 107

M. Efe Ateş (Mugla Sitki Kocman University, Turkey)
M. Efe Ateş (M.A.) Mugla Sitki Kocman University. 2009 received bachelor degree in philosophy; 2012 master in philosophy; thesis about structure and functions of thought experiments in sciences. Currently is a research assistant in Mugla Sitki Kocman University, Deparament of Philosophy.
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Some Thoughts about the Relata of Ground

Sylvia Barnett

Grounding is the noncausal dependence relation whereby one thing obtains in virtue of another. Some examples are a statue's being grounded in the clay from which it is formed; the fact that murder is wrong being grounded in the fact that it causes harm; a set's existing in virtue of its members. In each of these cases, the latter entity figures in an explanation of the former. Grounding is, therefore, taken to be the relation which backs such noncausal explanations.

The grounding relation has received a huge amount of attention in recent years, brought to prominence by the work of Johnathan Schaffer and Gideon Rosen, amongst others. However, despite the large volume of interest generated by the issue, very little agreement has been reached as to the nature of grounding. In this paper I focus on the question as to the relata of grounding: that is, which sorts of entities enter into grounding relations.

I argue that certain theories about the relata of grounding conflict with the explanatory role of grounding. I proceed by taking the explanatory role of grounding to be central to the nature of the relation. I then maintain that explanation is non-circular and is therefore asymmetric and irreflexive. Therefore, I hold that grounding must also be irreflexive and asymmetric if it is to retain its explanatory role. Kit Fine, however, presents some putative counterexamples to the irreflexivity and asymmetry of grounding which could undermine the explanatory nature of grounding. In this paper I argue that we can avoid the problem which Fine's cases present to the explanatory role of grounding by holding that it exclusively relates facts, understood as obtaining states of affairs. Given that the explanatory role of grounding is retained if we adopt this view of the relata of grounding we have clear motivation to prefer it to the alternative accounts.

Section:	Metaphysics
Language:	English
Chair:	Johannes Korbmacher
Date:	16:40-17:10, 2 September 2015 (Wednesday)
Location:	HS 122

Sylvia Barnett (University of Manchester, United Kingdom)
I am a first year PhD student and Teaching Assistant at the University of Manchester, researching the metaphysical dependence relation known as grounding. I am currently investigating the contentious issue as to the relata of grounding. I also teach on the first year undergraduate metaphysics course and am co-organising Manchester's postgraduate philosophy conference, Open Minds.
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A critical note on Dawid, Hartmann & Sprenger's (2015) No Alternatives Argument.

Philippe van Basshuysen

In a recent paper (2015), Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger give a Bayesian argument in favour of the No Alternatives Argument: the conclusion from a lack of alternatives to a scientific theory to the truth of that theory. If valid, this would constitute a proof for the possibility of non-empirical theory confirmation. In this paper I argue that their "proof" begs the question.

I challenge the validity of the argument in two steps. I first give a principled line of reasoning concerning one critical assumption of their analysis, namely that the probability of a scientific hypothesis depends on the number of its alternative theories. I claim that arguing for this assumption implies either a regress to non-empirical theory confirmation, or a dubious application of the Principle of Indifference. In either case, the assumption stands on shaky grounds. In the second step, I give a counterexample to the assumption in order to show that it must indeed not be expected to hold.

I conclude with a more general claim. I claim that Bayesian analyses, and particularly the use of Bayesian nets, are "dangerous" in that they may entice one to be careless about implicit assumptions about probabilistic (in)dependencies, and how they support normative claims. I intend to broaden this investigation by more case studies and, finally, a general line of reasoning as to the boundaries of normative Bayesian analyses.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Alexander Gebharter
Date:	17:20-17:50, 2 September 2015 (Wednesday)
Location:	HS 107

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The Layer Cake Model of the World and Non-Reductive Physicalism

Matthew Baxendale

n this paper I argue that non-reductive physicalism (NRP) continues to rely on the ontological aspect of the layer cake model of the world (LCM). NRP is a post-unity account of the relationship between phenomena in the world. It is post-unity in the sense that it has been developed in response to the perceived failure of the unity of science thesis, specifically the requirement for theory reduction. The LCM constitutes a framework for the organisation of phenomena in the world. It articulates the idea that phenomena in the world are organised into levels. Specifically, that phenomena are layered into distinct, hierarchical levels of organisation. Historically, the unity of science thesis and the LCM have been intertwined; the LCM being the framework within which a unity of science might be possible. My argument will demonstrate that, despite a move away from unity of science positions, the LCM persists in post-unity accounts. In order to argue for this thesis, I present a close analysis of Oppenheim and Putnam's classic presentation of the LCM; picking out the principle of hierarchic compositionality (PHC) which, I argue, captures the ontological aspect of the LCM. I then demonstrate how NRP continues to rely upon the principle and, as a result, continues to support the ontological aspect of the LCM. This result is significant. It shows that whilst the rejection of the reductionist aspect of the thesis has served as the basis for post-unity positions these positions do not engage directly with the framework within which reduction might be facilitated ? the LCM. Furthermore, it demonstrates that pluralist or disunity accounts of the relationship between phenomena in the world will also have to engage directly with the framework of the LCM in order to avoid being merely anti-reductionist. My hope is that this engagement can begin by using the PHC as a tool of analysis.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Laurenz Hudetz
Date:	14:45-15:15, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 107

Matthew Baxendale (Central European University, Hungary)
I am currently working on my PhD in Philosophy at CEU Budapest. Before that I completed my MA at The University of Sheffield and my BA at Queen's Belfast. My current focus is on the Layer Cake Model and its role in contemporary post-reductive accounts of levels of organisation and scientific explanation. I also maintain a research interest in the Vienna Circle, particularly the work of Otto Neurath. My other interests include normative essentialism in the philosophy of mind; epistemology, specifically communitarian approaches to knowledge; as well as an ongoing interest in political theory, particularly cosmopolitanism, rights, citizenship and multiculturalism.
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Self-Exempting Conciliationism is Arbitrary

Simon Blessenohl

Self-exempting conciliationism is the view that it is rational to give weight to the opinions of peers in disagreement, except in disagreements about how to respond to disagreement. The special treatment of disagreements about disagreement, which is important to avoid self-undermining, seems arbitrary. Two arguments against this objection were put forward. Elga (2010) aims to show that there is an independent motivation for conciliationism to be self-exempting. Pittard (forthcoming) argues that the special treatment is not arbitrary because the concern for epistemic deference motivates conciliatory responses only in ordinary disagreements, but not in disagreements about disagreement. I will argue that both replies fail. None of them can provide a consistent justification for why one ought to be conciliatory in disagreements except in cases of disagreement about disagreement. Elga has not resolved the issue that the arguments for being conciliatory in ordinary disagreements also seem to apply to disagreements about disagreement, and hence cannot be endorsed by the self-exempting conciliationist to justify conciliatory responses in ordinary disagreements. Pittard's argument attempts to address this problem of Elga's argument by showing that the conciliationists' concern for deference motivates conciliatory responses only in ordinary disagreements, but not in disagreements about disagreement. I will argue that his ar-

gument fails to provide a justification for self-exempting conciliationism because it relies on a way of understanding deference which is not justified by the usual arguments for deference, and even if it was, his notion of deference would not motivate full self-exemption.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Michael Bruckner
Date:	12:15-12:45, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 101

Simon Blessenohl (University of Tübingen, Germany)
After finishing his Abitur in 2010, Simon Blessenohl obtained a B.A. in Computer Science from the University of Cambridge. He is now studying towards a second B.A. in Philosophy at the University of Tübingen, expecting to graduate in 2016. Currently, he is particularly interested in formal epistemology, decision theory, and artificial intelligence.
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Do You Really Want to Know? Challenging Pragmatism and Clearing Space for the Intrinsic Value View

Michael Bruckner

Within normative epistemology, we find two camps of views that oppose each other in a particularly straightforward manner: those that ground epistemic norms in the intrinsic value of true belief and those that argue from its instrumental value. One major representative of the instrumentalist camp is pragmatism, which regards belief as a means of promoting our (non-epistemic) desires. I argue that pragmatism faces a dilemma based on the following disjunction: truth-conduciveness either is or is not a universal feature of epistemic norms. First, I offer an example to support my claim that pragmatists cannot consistently maintain the former. Then, I establish the second horn by showing that, if they go for the other disjunct and deny the universality of the truth-conduciveness criterion, they render

themselves incapable of explaining an intuition that most of us share: in cases in which false beliefs generate the same pragmatic output as true ones, truth-conducive procedures of belief formation are still preferable to fallacious ones. I offer a thought experiment to evoke this intuition. After establishing the dilemma, I make a case for the position that regards the intrinsic value of true belief as the source of epistemic normativity by showing how it meets the challenge that pragmatism falls victim to.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Friedrich Lehrbaumer
Date:	14:00-14:30, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 101

Michael Bruckner (University of Vienna, Austria)
Michael Bruckner studies philosophy and law at undergraduate level at the University of Vienna. He has gathered teaching experience as teaching assistant in the area of practical philosophy (especially ethics). His main research interests revolve around the concept of normativity, both at the theoretical and at the applied level. Recent areas of research include epistemic normativity and the problem of anthropocentrism in environmental virtue ethics.
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A Three-Stage Causal Analysis of the EPR/B Experiment

Ilaria Canavotto

uantum correlations are correlations between the outcomes of measurements performed on pairs of particles in two different, spatially separated wings of a correlation experiment. The presence of these correlations is puzzling because, as Bell's theorem demonstrates, no local model can be endorsed to explain them. In light of this, a growing number of philosophers, including D'Espagnat, Howard, Maudlin, Norsen, Jarrett, Shimony, and Teller, have undertaken the program of analysing the derivation of the Bell's Inequalities and to construct theoretical models by denying some of the premises needed for the derivation. Still, the overall debate suffers from a lack of a general framework in which the different proposals can be effectively compared and assessed.

In this paper, I propose a causal analysis of the EPR/B experiment based on an interventionist notion of cause that aims at integrating the debate with this and other missing points. I proceed as follows. First, I build a phenomenological model of the experiment and show that the interventionist approach allows to identify a cause of quantum correlations and to fruitfully distinguish causal and statistical dependencies. Second, I propose a theoretical causal model of the experiment, call it M, in which the state of the two-particle system is introduced as a triple $\lambda = \langle s, s(\alpha), s(\beta) \rangle$, where s is the state of the composite system, and $s(\alpha)$ and $s(\beta)$ are the states of the two particles. After having shown that this approach captures both the Einsteinian and the quantum theoretical models of the experiment, I consider the possibility of specifying M by assuming either outcome dependence (OD) or parameter dependence (PD) (cf. Shimony, 1990). I argue that, although compatibility with special relativity is not a good criterion to distinguish these two options, a metaphysically relevant distinction between them can still be drawn, since PD and OD entail the presence of causal links of different sorts, viz. interventionist and non-interventionist respectively. Finally, I propose a general taxonomy of interactions in which actions at a distance, passions at a distance and holistic interactions are systematically characterized. The upshot will be that at least six theoretical models can be identified, none of which avoids tensions with special relativity.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Laurenz Hudetz
Date:	15:30-16:00, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 107

Ilaria Canavotto (LMU Munich (MCMP), Germany)
Ilaria Canavotto has finished her M.A. in philosophy at the Catholic
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She is currently a Master's student at the Munich Center for Mathe-
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ity, quantum non-locality.
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A Clash of Necessitarians: Dispositional Essentialism and Varieties of Necessity

Fabio Ceravolo

According to necessitarism, some relations between fundamen-
tal properties are metaphysically necessary. As it stands, how-
ever, the view should be further distinguished as for its accep-
tance of a governance thesis, spelling out how the existence
of the properties fixes the existence of the relations. Weak governance
imposes strong supervenience of the relations on the properties; strong
governance adjoins that the actually existing properties cannot change
among possible worlds, and, therefore, that actual property-connections
are necessary and no non-actual property-connection is possible. As a
popular necessitarian view, I consider dispositional essentialism (DE,
Bird 2007), according to which fundamental properties are by their na-
ture dispositional. Expanding on an argument by Kit Fine (2002), I
show (i) that DE is committed to strong governance, an unexpected
consequence of the plausible idea that dispositions ground natural laws
independently of their actuality; and (ii) that if weak governance is true,
DE reduces to a non-necessitarian view. Since necessitarism and weak

governance hold for independent reasons, I argue that we should reject DE and sketch a non-dispositional form of necessitarism consistent with Fine's argument and sensible to recognised forms of counterfactual reasoning in the natural sciences, especially statistical mechanics.

Section:	Metaphysics
Language:	English
Chair:	Sylvia Barnett
Date:	15:30-16:00, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 122

Fabio Ceravolo (University of Leeds, United Kingdom)
First-year PhD student at the University of Leeds, with chief interests in metaphysics of science, composition, modality, emergence, laws of nature, grounding, meta-ontology and philosophy of logic. My thesis is on "Physics and the General Composition Question", supervised by Steven French. I obtained my Bachelor of Arts from the University of Milan in 2012 and my Master of Arts from the University of Tübingen in 2014.
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Consciousness and the Flow of Attention

Tony Cheng

The interaction between consciousness and attention is a complex one. In this paper I take up the question concerning whether consciousness has higher capacities than attention. Ned Block (2007, 2008, 2011, 2014) provides the positive answer (i.e., the OVERFLOW view), arguing that before the cue in the Sperling paradigm, subjects have specific phenomenology for almost every stimulus. Many others demur, including Phillips (2011), Stazicker (2011), and Prinz (2012). The major aim of this paper is to argue for a more plausible version of OVERFLOW, together with two other subsidiary theses. The paper is divided into two parts. Part I sets up the stage for substantial discussions later. Section 1 explains the nature of the easy problems of consciousness (Chalmers 1995). This is important

because the debate we are engaging here falls within this category. Section 2 introduces Block's methodological puzzle: as theorists, we need to know whether participants are conscious of something through their reports. But if we have to measure participants' reports, then how can we tease apart the neural basis of consciousness and the neural basis of reports? Section 3 clarifies the debate by discussing the crucial "what overflows what" question. The candidates for "overflower" include sensory memory and P-consciousness, while the item being overflowed include working memory, attention, accessibility and access. Attention is then singled out as our main target of analysis. Part II provides a detailed critique of Block's view, and ends with a positive account. Section 4 explains George Sperling's iconic memory paradigm (1960) and its relation to varieties of attention, including overt/covert attention and endogenous/exogenous attention. Section 5 examines Block's view by replying to his six major arguments. It will be argued that although they are not decisively refuted, they are much weaker than Block supposes. Section 6 then develops the positive account – postdiction, weak OVER-FLOW and covariance as an inter-related triad. Postdiction says that the Sperling case involves cross-modal retrospective attentional modulation, weak OVERFLOW drops the idea that subjects have pre-cued specific phenomenology for almost every stimulus, and covariance has it that the degree of cognitive access tracks the degree of phenomenology.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Gerhard Kreuch
Date:	16:00-16:30, 2 September 2015 (Wednesday)
Location:	HS 104

Tony Cheng (UCL, U.K.)
In the past few years I have been focusing on the relation between visual attention and awareness. Now for the PhD project I explore various aspects of sense perception and space. Topics might include objectivity, the nature of sensory fields in different modalities, Molyneux's Question, the Kantian Spatiality Thesis, perceptual demonstratives, and so on. I am also interested in various areas in psychology, such as attention, cross-modal interaction/multi-sensory integration, and cognitive development.
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The paradox of toleration

Beba Cibralic

In John Rawls' The Law of Peoples, liberal peoples must not interfere with decent hierarchical societies by promoting liberal rights outside of the set of core human rights. I will defend this controversial position by arguing that the non-interference clause must be respected by liberal peoples if they are to act in a manner that reflects their value of toleration. In the first section of this essay, I will outline Rawls' The Law of Peoples, define ambiguous terms such as 'interference', and establish the scope for the essay. For the purpose of clarification, I will also consider relevant liberal objections to Rawls' decision to centre his international theory of justice on peoples, not individuals. In the second section, I will offer and respond to three key criticisms to Rawls' claim that liberal peoples should not interfere with decent hierarchical societies. The first objection is a challenge to the liberal commitment to toleration. Following the acceptance that toleration is the touchstone value of liberalism, the second and third objections call into question the way in which The Law of Peoples reflects the liberal commitment to toleration. Finally, I will conclude that if liberal societies want to act by their values, they must refrain from coercively promoting liberal rights.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Meredith McFadden
Date:	15:30-16:00, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 103

Beba Cibralic (University of Oxford and Wellesley College, UK)
I am a student from Wellesley College, a women's liberal arts college in the US. I am currently studying abroad at the University of Oxford, with coursework in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. I am also a student of modern languages and study Bosnian/Serbian, Russian, and Spanish. With a passion for both philosophy and geography, I enjoy studying the intersections between a) the theoretical models for global justice, particularly as they pertain to the ethics of humanitarian intervention, positive rights such as the right to water, and trade hegemony, b) the real-world applications in under-studied countries such as Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Peru. I look forward to studying philosophy

and public policy in the future, and believe that academic disciplines such as philosophy would benefit from having more women in the field. E-Mail: beba.cibralic@mansfield.ox.ac.uk

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Is there such a thing as a perfect performance of a musical work?

Annabel Colas

The purpose of this talk is to answer the following question: is there such a thing as a perfect performance of a musical work? I will assess two opposite views:

1. The monist view, stating that only one sort of performance can be perfect, ideal or optimal.

2. The plurality view of musical performance, asserting that there are many sorts of performances that are equally good while being artistically distinct. Thus, some are in fact better than others, some of equal merit but we appreciate one arrangement of a work for some features and another performance for others.

The plurality view is the one I intend to defend by examining the following questions:

- How can the composer's intention be preserved according to performance pluralists (if it has to be preserved, an assumption one might want to discuss)?

- If relevant features of performances have no corresponding features in the score, how do these features relate to the original work?

The answer I endorse is that the performance's features are the original musical work's features, even though these features are not explicitly nor implicitly indicated in the score. If this is true, then the performer is not merely producing the sounds specified in the score, he is interpreting the score and is animated by a musical intention that may either harmonize or compete with the composer's intention, giving rise to a work distinct

from the original work. Thus, I will conclude that, even in performance pluralism, considerable latitude in performance is permitted without changing the identity of the musical work. And without falling into relativism.

Section:	Metaphysics
Language:	English
Chair:	Fabio Ceravolo
Date:	12:00-12:30, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 122

Annabel Colas (University of Bern , Switzerland)
I am a Ph.D. Student following the project "Ontology of Musical works and Analysis of Musical Practices" at the University of Bern (Switzerland), under the supervision of Prof. Dale Jacquette. I graduated from Philosophy at the University of Rennes 1 (France). I also have a Bachelor's degree in History of Arts (University of Paris X, France). My research is mainly focusing on the identity conditions for musical works, and on how this matter relates to the plurality of musical practices. I also have strong interest in music performance studies.
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Cluelessness Again: Against the Principle of Indifference

Nathan Cornwell

Imagine a bandit, Richard, in 1st century B.C. Germany, who with his band has attacked a village and killed all its inhabitants but one, a pregnant woman named Angie. On a whim of compassion, Richard spares her − a single good act in a life of pillage and plunder. Mirabile dictu, however, Angie carries her child to term and thereby cements her place as one of Adolf Hitler's great-times-98-grandmothers. Included in the consequences of Richard's sparing of Angie, therefore, are the 50 million or so deaths caused during World War II. If we accept this story as a plausible picture of our situation as agents, then we have good reason to believe that the consequences of actions that directly affect the identities of future people,

e.g. killings, engenderings, and refrainings from these, are thoroughly unknowable because they are directly subject to Massive Causal Ramification (MCR). Furthermore, it seems likely that a great many of the actions that we perform every day are indirectly subject to MCR, since we also do not know whether they will end up contributing in some way to identity-affecting actions. This is a troubling state of affairs for consequentialism, which requires a degree of knowledge about the consequences of actions that is far higher than that which this illustration seems to show is available to us.

This is a short version of James Lenman's illustration of an objection to consequentialism that has come to be known as The Argument from Cluelessness. In what follows, I shall (1) strengthen Lenman's arguments and then (2) rebut one sort of reply to them. (1) I argue that Lenman stopped short of a stronger conclusion to which he is entitled: if MCR is true, then we are not only in a state of cluelessness but also a state of serious moral paralysis. All that is necessary to demonstrate this stronger conclusion is consider the concepts of culpable ignorance and negligence: if we are never able to ascertain that our actions will not have seriously bad consequences, we are never justified in acting. (2) The general thrust of the reply I consider is to deny that we are in such an impoverished epistemic state with respect to the consequences of our actions. I shall show that two specific versions of it fail because they require for their justification the false claim that all normative ethics are similarly dependent upon discounting invisible consequences.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Meredith McFadden
Date:	14:00-14:30, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 103

Nathan Cornwell (Univeristy of South Carolina, USA)
I am a doctoral student in philosophy at the University of South Carolina. For my B.A. and some graduate work, I attended Franciscan University of Steubenville. My main interests are ethics, particularly virtue ethics, and the philosophy of action, and some of my favorite philosophers on these subjects are Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Elizabeth Anscombe, and Alasdair MacIntyre.
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Hyperintensional Contexts in Explanatory Language

Ryan Cox

In this paper I offer a partial defence of the hypothesis that the only hyperintensional contexts in natural language sentences are psychological contexts, like the contexts created by attitude verbs. This hypothesis most clearly comes under threat from explanatory language, which seems to involve hyperintensional contexts which are not also psychological contexts. I begin my partial defence of the hypothesis by addressing a puzzle about hyperintensional contexts in action explanations. There are clear examples of hyperintensional contexts in action explanations which do not seem to be psychological contexts. For example 'Jane bought the book because it had been owned by George Orwell' does not entail 'Jane bought the book because it had been owned by Eric Blair' even though 'George Orwell' and 'Eric Blair' are necessarily co-extensive. I argue that, contrary to appearances, the 'because'-phrases in such sentences are psychological contexts, and offer an account of such 'because'-phrases in support of the claim. I then examine the prospects of defending the hypothesis that the only hyperintensional contexts in natural language sentences are psychological contexts more generally, and relate the issue to questions about the nature of explanatory information and the prospects of an event-based semantics for 'because'-clauses.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Gregor Walczak
Date:	14:45-15:15, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 107

Ryan Cox (Australian National University, Australia)
I am currently a PhD student in the School of Philosophy at the Australian National University in Canberra. My supervisors are Daniel Stoljar (chair), David Chalmers, Daniel Nolan, and Nicholas Southwood. My research focuses primarily on issues in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, and epistemology. I am particularly interested in questions about self-knowledge and epistemic rationality.
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What gradual modality could and could not be

Jonathan Dittrich

This talk is concerned with the idea of gradual modality regarding metaphysical and natural modality. This is the thesis that metaphysical modality is somewhat stronger than natural modality. Although many philosophers fancy the idea (Lewis, 1973; Fine, 2002; Sider, 2003) there is only little work on a semantics. I shall argue that the proposals in the literature have deficiencies which can be overcome by an alternative.

One idea to do so is via the similarity relation (see Kment, 2006). A kind of necessity is stronger than another one iff altering one necessity of this kind in one world will make this world less similar to the actual world then altering any necessity of the other kind. However, this would commit us to impossible worlds as we will have to alter metaphysical necessities. Moreover, some examples will give out the result that metaphysical necessity is stronger than physical, whereas others will result in the converse.

Another approach employed by (der Hoek, 1992) uses the idea of cardinalities. A kind of modality is stronger than another one iff there are more worlds which satisfy its necessities. However, the problem here is that although we know that there are worlds which satisfy metaphysical but not natural necessities, this is no guarantee for different cardinalities due to the infinite cardinalities of the respective sets of worlds. Examples like the relation between the natural numbers and the integers show that the subset relation is no guarantee for a difference in cardinality.

Last, I will sketch my own proposal for a semantics. The idea is to invoke the subset relation between the two sets of worlds without cardinalities. A kind of necessity is stronger than another iff the worlds of the other kind are a proper subset of its own set of worlds. This analysis seems to overcome the troubles of the other attempts as the counterexamples don't apply and there is a guarantee for the subset relation.

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Section:	Metaphysics
Language:	English
Chair:	Sylvia Barnett
Date:	14:00-14:30, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 122

Jonathan Dittrich (University of Tübingen/Oslo, Germany)
I began my undergraduate studies at the University of Tübingen, followed by a year abroad at the University of Oslo and will begin my MLitt studies at the University of StAndrews in September. My main interests lie in Logic, Metaphysics and the intersections of those fields.
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The functional role of attention in our conscious mental life

Pablo Gutierrez Echegoyen

There is an ongoing discussion in the philosophy of mind regarding the nature of the relationship between consciousness and attention. According to a commonsensical characterization of attention due to William James (1890), consciousness and attention are essentially connected: attention is the concentration of consciousness upon a given thing – say, in vision – out of many simultaneous seen things. In effect, from our first person perspective, to attend to something is to be conscious of it in a certain way – to be

focally conscious of it in clear and vivid form in order to deal effectively with it.

Thus, intuitively, not only would there be a phenomenological contrast between what it is like to perceptually experience an object when attending to it and what it is like to experience the object when not attending it, but also a functional one. Arguably, the Jamesian conception prompts us to explore the question what is the functional role of attention in our conscious mental life? That is to say, what is the capacity of attention for at the level of the subject's conscious experience?

Declan Smithies (2011) claims that the fundamental role of attention is to allow us to access information, providing us thereby with justifying reasons for belief and action. By contrast, John Campbell (2011; 2014) argues that the fundamental role played by attention in our conscious live is not the provision of reasons, bur rather the selection of objects/regions on the basis of perceptual experience of its properties – access would be functionally separable from selection.

In this talk I will outline and assess what I take to be the strengths and possible weaknesses of these prominent contributions on the functional role of attention in our conscious mental life. I will distinguish between the metaphysical, epistemological and phenomenological aspects of the discussion on the relationship between consciousness and attention as a way of shedding light on our understanding of this complex problem. Finally, my minimal conclusion is that these two views do not cover all the plausible possibilities for developing an account of the functional role of attention at the personal level.

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Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Gerhard Kreuch
Date: 17:20-17:50, 2 September 2015 (Wednesday)
Location: HS 104

Pablo Gutierrez Echegoyen (University of Barcelona, Spain)
I am a graduate student at the Autonomous University of Barcelona
enrolled in the "Cognitive Science and Language" program (branch:
philosophy), working under the supervision of Daniel Quesada (AUB)
and Hemdat Lerman (Warwick University). My research focuses on the
variety of possible relationships between consciousness and attention.
I received my master degree from the University of Barcelona (same
program) with a research paper on neurophenomenology. My main
research area is philosophy of mind and psychology.
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Hume's Political Philosophy

Adéla Eichlerová

avid Hume is one of the Enlightenment era philosophers who
continues to have a great impact within the discipline of phi-
losophy. Despite his importance, he was hardly read as a
political theorist until the 1960s and finally 1970s. The reason
may be the fact that he never wrote any systematic treatise on politics.
His political thought must be therefore constructed from his other writ-
ings, especially from A Treatise of Human Nature, his essays and The
History of England. Hume's political studies may be viewed as either
continuations or as empirical confirmations of his philosophy. In my
talk I primarily address Hume's political theory, although his work be-
lies the common view that modern philosophers tend to separate moral
and political philosophy; Hume makes them part of a single coherent
account. Therefore, the main aim of my talk is to show how his account
of moral beliefs, or the psychology of morals, at the informal level of
interaction, generalizes into an account of how these beliefs structure
the institutions that govern us when we go very far beyond informal
small-number interactions.

Section:	Political Philosophy
Language:	English
Chair:	Albert Anglberger
Date:	14:00-14:30, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 104

Adéla Eichlerová (Palacky University in Olomouc, Czech Republic)
2011 bachelor in philosophy at Faculty of Philosophy of Palacky University in Olomouc, Czech Republic. 2013 master in philosophy at Palacky University in Olomouc, Czech Republic; thesis about Philophical bases of the U.S. Constitution. Research interests: Political philosophy, Philosophy of American Consitution, Political philosophy of David Hume.
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Ethical Atomism and the Immorality of Hypocrisy

Samuel Elgin

Moral theory M is atomistic just in case - according to M - the only unit of moral assessment is the individual act. Atomism differs from ethical holism. Moral theory M is holistic just in case - according to M - collections or groups of acts are capable of being right or wrong. Many theories that bridge the consequentialism/deontology divide are atomistic. Classical act consequentialism, which holds that individual acts are right or wrong iff they have the best consequences, is atomistic. Kantianism based on the first formulation, which holds that acting on a maxim is permissible iff that maxim can be appropriately universalized, is similarly atomistic.

Nevertheless, I argue that hypocrisy presents a reason to abandon atomistic theories in favor of holistic ones. In this paper I investigate the nature of hypocrisy. I present a naive account, according to which hypocrisy consists of linguistically endorsing moral norm n and violating n. In light of some counterexamples I amend this account. Still, the amended version is such that instances of hypocrisy consist of two separate acts. Given that is wrong to act hypocritically, I argue that atomistic moral theories lack the resources to explain why hypocrisy is wrong. Moral holism - which allows evaluations of pairs of actions - is needed to adequately account for hypocrisy.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Frauke Albersmeier
Date:	10:30-11:00, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 103

Samuel Elgin (Yale University, USA)
I am currently a 4th year PhD Student in the philosophy department at Yale University. My primary research focus is metaphysics, but I have also developed an interest in normative ethics - which I hope to present on at this conference. In the past month I have published a paper entitled The Unreliability of Foreseeable Consequences: A Return to the Epistemic Objection in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Here I hope to discuss the implications that hypocrisy has for ethics.
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Epistemic Normativity in Social Epistemology

Christian J. Feldbacher

Several forms of epistemic consequentialism assume analogue to a deontic means-end-principle, which is often used to express normative instrumentalism in ethics, an epistemic means-end-principle also for norms of knowledge and belief of the following form: If M is an optimal means in order to achieve epistemic goal G, then, since G is on its very basis epistemically ought or rationally accepted, M is also rationally acceptable. This principle has at least two components that require further clarification: (i) the concept of an epistemic goal and (ii) the concept of an optimal means to achieve such a goal. In this paper we focus on a clarification of the second concept and show how optimality results of the theory of strategy selection allow for spelling out the normative part of rationality in a social epistemic setting.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Christian J. Feldbacher
Date:	09:00-09:30, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 101

Christian J. Feldbacher (DCLPS, University of Duesseldorf, Germany)
Research Fellow and DOC-scholar (Austrian Academy of Sciences) at the Duesseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (DCLPS) at the University of Duesseldorf. Before coming to Duesseldorf, he was a visiting fellow at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) and project staff at the University of Innsbruck. Christian's area of research focuses on general philosophy of science (analogical reasoning and concept formation, and the problem of induction) and social epistemology (tesimony, judgement aggregation).
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The Centrality Argument: Justifiability and Revisability of Logic

Maria Paola Sforza Fogliani

The aim of my talk is to discuss a general argument in defense of logic's basic rules of inference, that is, the centrality argument. In a nutshell, the argument runs as follows: logic can neither be justified nor revised on empirical grounds, because logic is so central in every rational argument that we need to make use of it also in the very process of trying either to justify or to revise logic itself; this being so, such attempts will always turn out to be somehow circular.

Firstly, I will try to spell out the argument a bit more precisely. Secondly, I will briefly consider two objections that can be raised to the centrality argument, and try to provide an answer to them. Then, I will claim (a) that the centrality argument is the main reason that has been offered in favor of logical apriorism; (b) that this argument works better when applied to rules of inference than when applied to logical principles (what we want to do when trying either to justify or to revise logic on empirical grounds, is drawing consequences from some kind of experience, and to do that we need logic's rules of inference more straightforwardly than its principles); (c) that, though it is mainly used in the context of the apriorism/aposteriorism debate, this argument actually prevents all kinds of logical revisions and justifications (no matter which kind of justification, or of revision, we are trying to provide for

logic, our move will always be circular, because we will always be forced to use logic in the process).

In conclusion, if the centrality argument is sound, the propositions of logic – or at least its rules of inference – are not justifiable, neither in light of empirical nor of non-empirical evidence. But, on the other hand, they are not revisable either. This being so, it can be argued that the issue of their justifiability might become less pressing.

Section:	Logic
Language:	English
Chair:	Vlasta Sikimic
Date:	09:00-09:30, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 107

Maria Paola Sforza Fogliani (IUSS Pavia, Italy)
I am a first year PhD student in Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy of Mind at the Institute for Advanced Study (Istituto Universitario di Studi Superiori – IUSS), Pavia and at San Raffaele University (Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele), Milano; in the latter, I obtained both my bachelor degree in Philosophy and my master degree in Philosophical Sciences. My main interest is the philosophy of logic. In general, I am very interested, on the one hand, in the application of formal systems to traditional philosophical questions and, on the other, in the philosophical issues that logic itself raises. In particular, I have been working on non-classical logics, on the logical apriorism/aposteriorism debate, on the justifiability and revisability of logic's basic rules of inference, and on logical pluralism. My master's thesis was devoted to the defence of modus ponens and modus tollens from the counterexamples that have been raised to these rules; since I have considered these arguments as inferences of ordinary speakers and not as their formal counterparts, I have relied also on psychological and pragmatic results. Therefore, I have a highly interdisciplinary approach; this is also reflected by the nature of the institutions where I am currently taking my PhD, which gather philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists and linguists.
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Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets

Alexander Gebharter

In this paper I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations formally behave like causal relations. If this is correct, then it turns out that both versions of the exclusion argument are valid when assuming the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition. I also investigate some consequences for the recent discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory of causation such as Woodward's (2003) and discuss a possible objection to my causal Bayes net reconstruction.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Laurenz Hudetz
Date:	14:00-14:30, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 107

Alexander Gebharter (DCLPS, University of Düsseldorf, Germany) Alexander Gebharter is a research fellow at the Düsseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (DCLPS) at the University of Düsseldorf and within the DFG funded research unit "Causation, Laws, Disposition, Explanation: At the Intersection of Science and Metaphysics" (FOR 1063). His research interests lie in philosophy of science and metaphysics. He is especially interested in causality and related topics such as modeling, explanation, prediction, intervention and control, mechanisms, constitution, supervenience, theoretical concepts, empirical content, etc. For a list of publications and more information, see the following webpage: http://uni-duesseldorf.academia.edu/AlexanderGebharter
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Relevant Presuppositons: The Proviso Problem

Arno Goebel

Recently Daniel Lassiter (2012) argued that the proviso problem for presuppositions of conditionals is best solved and explained within a probabilistic set up. Bart Geurts (1996) describes the proviso problem which arises for classical satisfaction theories of presuppostion. They cannot explain why the propositions of some consequents of conditionals give rise to conditional presuppositions – they get connected to the antecedent, too – while others inherit unconditional presuppositions. These theories assign conditional presuppositions tout court and rely on ad hoc strengthening mechanisms to derive unconditional presuppositions from conditional ones. But still they can't explain in which cases the mechanism is active.

Lassiter gives a probabilistic account which is able to model relations of probabilistic dependence and independence between propositions within epistemic states. His explanation for the differing presuppositions of conditionals then is based on the observation that unconditional presuppositions arise if the presupposition of the consequent is probabilistically independent of the antecedent in the relevant epistemic state – presumably the one of the speaker. Conditional presuppositions are traced to a dependence between the antecedent and the presuppositions of the consequent.

By and large I share Lassiter's strategy, but in my talk I will propose a heavily modified picture. First, I would like to express my doubts about threshold conceptions as used by Lassiter. From this, a different dynamic account emerges. Second and most important, Lassiter can't derive the unconditional presupposition directly. He has to suppose an intermediate step from a conditional with "irrelevant" conditional probability to the unconditional presupposition. This step is mainly justified by invoking the Gricean Maxim of Quantity. The central notion in my account will be the notion of probabilistic relevance, which is able to evade this difficult point and does not controversely rely on the Maxim of Quantity. In general I will claim that operationalizing relevance as the driving force of discourse gives us a much finer picture of dependence/independence relations among propositions and so a more elegant and explanatorily more powerful account for explaining and solving the proviso problem and its relatives.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Gregor Walczak
Date:	15:30-16:00, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 107

Arno Goebel (University of Konstanz, Germany)
Arno Goebel (M.A.). University of Konstanz. Magister Artium in philosophy and linguistics at the University of Frankfurt a.M. Currently PhD student at the University of Konstanz. Major interests in philosophy of language, conditionals, formal epistemology.
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Epistemic Game Theory: Farewell to Common Knowledge of Rationality and Nash Equilibrium?

Gregor Greslehner

pistemic game theory aims at investigating the epistemic foundations of game theory. By making epistemic assumptions in game theoretic models explicit, it takes another approach to finding "rational" solutions than classical game theory does. In order to achieve the best outcome in interdependent choice situations, agents will try to anticipate each other's decisions. This does not only require to take into account what the others' preferences and possible choices are, but also what the others know (or believe), what the others know that you know, what the others know that you know that they know, etc. Studying such higher-order epistemic attitudes towards each other and to what strategic solutions this leads is the scope of epistemic game theory.

In this talk, I briefly outline the epistemic program in game theory and address the question whether common knowledge of rationality is a necessary or sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium. Contrary to commonly held beliefs that this was the case, there are results that show otherwise: common knowledge of rationality is neither necessary nor sufficient for Nash equilibrium. With this negative result and the fact that both common knowledge assumptions and Nash equilibrium

play a less central role in game theory today, a promising new area of research in game theory is emerging.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Patricia Meindl
Date:	14:45-15:15, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 101

Gregor Greslehner (University of Salzburg, Austria)
Gregor Greslehner is a PhD student in philosophy at the University of Salzburg, working on the philosophy of molecular biology. In 2014, he wrote his diploma thesis on "The Epistemic Foundations of Nash Equilibrium: Common Knowledge of Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and the Epistemic Program in Game Theory" at the University of Salzburg. He also holds a bachelor's degree in molecular biosciences (from the Universities of Salzburg and Linz). Currently, he is doing his master's thesis in molecular biology at the University of Salzburg.
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Loners, Slaves and the Selves in the Middle

Svantje Guinebert

Making your own decisions can be exhausting; wouldn't it be wonderful if there were someone to make them for you? Schmid (2011) is a recent entry in one of the debates triggered by the Milgram Experiment, over how we are to assess Milgram's "absolutely obedient" subjects. Like many others, Schmid takes the subjects to have acted immorally, but his relatively moderate stance appeals to an understanding of collective action on which it involves a specific sort of commitment. He contrasts the nearly autistic subjects who broke off the experiment on their own with other subjects' attempts to respect such commitments.

In my view, the sort of collective action that Schmid discusses is not a good model for Milgram Experiment circumstances. Nonetheless, Schmid's argument is worth close consideration for two reasons. First,

it allows us to introduce a useful distinction, between *obedience* and *subjugation*; this turns on whether the subject takes final authority (where the buck stops, in American idiom) to rest with himself or another. Importantly, we evaluate obedient subjects differently than we evaluate mere slaves. Second, his argument puts us in a position to ask whether, and in what ways, self-constitution can depend on others. I conclude by floating an intriguing possibility: that there are forms of collective action that are conducive to self-organisation on the part of individuals, but in which that final authority is, however, deferred to others. If I am right, neither the life of a hermit nor servility can support the emergence of a fully-functioning self; but there is a happy medium that does.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Elias Moser
Date:	16:40-17:10, 2 September 2015 (Wednesday)
Location:	HS 103

Svantje Guinebert (University of Bremen, Germany)
Svantje Guinebert. Erstes Staatsexamen für Philosophie und Französisch an der Universität des Saarlandes. Seit 2012 wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin an der Universität Bremen. Dissertationsprojekt: "Die Selbstzuschreibung letztinstanzlicher normativer Autorität: Eine Pflicht gegen sich selbst?"
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Metaontological Deflationism in the Aftermath of the Quine-Carnap Debate

Jonathan Egeland Harouny

With metaphysical philosophy gaining prominence in the aftermath of the Quine-Carnap debate, not only has it become assumed that the Quinean critique leaves ontological pluralism behind as an untenable approach, but also that the same is true of deflationism more generally. Building on Quine's

criticisms against the analytic-synthetic distinction and the notion of quantifier variance, contemporary metaphysicians like van Inwagen and Sider continue to argue for the untenability of deflationary approaches to metaontology. In this paper I will argue that Quine's criticisms do not provide sufficient grounds for revitalizing metaphysics, as the aforementioned metaphysicians conceive them as doing, and that they also don't eliminate all hope for Carnapian pluralism. Furthermore, Carnap's initial position may even yield the most promising route for the pluralistically inclined. Moreover, pluralism is often conceived as being equivalent with the narrower notion of quantifier variance, often associated with Hirsch and Putnam. As this notion often is attributed not only to Carnap and other pluralists, but also is taken to be an essential feature of deflationism,1 explicating how their merits in fact don't necessarily coincide with those of quantifier variance will clarify matters. I will conclude by noting how neither pluralism nor deflationism is committed to quantifier variance, and thus how arguments against the latter don't entail a refutation of the former.

Section:	Metaphysics
Language:	English
Chair:	Johannes Korbmacher
Date:	18:00-18:30, 2 September 2015 (Wednesday)
Location:	HS 122

Jonathan Egeland Harouny (University of Bergen, Norway)
I am currently a master student of philosophy at the University of Bergen. This paper/presentation has been developed in conjunction with a course in metaphysics, supervised and taught by Ole Hjortland.
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Freiwilliger Verzicht auf Nahrung und Flüssigkeit (FVNF) als der vermeintlich rechtlich und moralisch bessere Suizid

Barbara Sophie Hartl

In Österreich und in Deutschland ist die aktive Sterbehilfe verboten. In Österreich machen sich Ärzte sogar mit der Beihilfe zum Suizid nach §78 StGB strafbar. Trotz der lebhaften Diskussion und der Empfehlung der Bioethikkommission ist mit einer Aufweichung des restriktiven Paragrafen nicht so schnell zu rechnen.

Mitarbeiter palliativmedizinischer Einrichtungen und empfehlen daher Patienten, die um Hilfe beim Sterben bitten, den freiwilligen Verzicht auf Nahrung und Flüssigkeit (FVNF). Unter diesen Umständen tritt der Tod nach etwa 2-3 Wochen ein.

Von den Befürwortern dieser Methode wird vorgebracht, dass sie rechtlich vollständig abgesichert ist, denn die Letztverantwortung für sein Tun übernimmt der Patient. Im Sinne eines informed consent beugt sich der Arzt dem Willen des Patienten und zwingt ihn nicht, eventuell durch Magensonden, Nahrung oder Flüssigkeit zu sich zu nehmen.

Nicht selten wird der FVNF als eine Alternative zum assistierten und begleiteten Suizid gesehen. Während eine Person beim assitierten Suizid auf eine bestimmte Medikation angewiesen ist, kann die selbe Person den FVNF mit geringer Unterstützung von Angehörigen und Pflegepersonal selbst durchführen. FVNF bezeichnet Birnbacher als "passiven Suizid". Manch anderer möchte FVNF nur als Behandlungsabbruch verstanden wissen. Warum sich viele so sehr gegen ein begriffliches Naheverhältnis zum Suizid wehren ist leicht erklärt:

1. Die beim klassischen Suizid feststellbare Außeneinwirkung ist beim FVNF nicht gegeben. Suizid zählt wie Unfalltod oder Mord zu den unnatürlichen Todesursachen.

2. Durch die Interpretation des FVNF in Punkt 1 ist es auch religiösen Menschen möglich, ihr Ableben zu beschleunigen. Im Vordergrund steht ein erwünschter natürlicher, sanfter Tod und keine moralische Beurteilung der Handlung an sich.

In meinem Vortrag versuche ich, den FVNF begrifflich richtig einzuord-

nen, ihn moralphilosophisch zu bewerten und dem assistierten und begleitetem Suizid gegenüberzustellen.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	German
Chair:	Svantje Guinebert
Date:	12:15-12:45, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 103

Barbara Sophie Hartl (University of Salzburg, Austria)
2014: Mag. phil., Philosophie, University of Salzburg, Austria. Master thesis: "Das Problem mit der menschlichen Willensfreiheit unter der Annahme einer determinierten Lebens(um)welt". 2014 - now: Doctoral candidate, Philosophie, University of Salzburg, Austria. Working Title: "Assistierter und begleiteter Suizid als Ausdruck einer humanistischen Auffassung der Menschenwürde".
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The preface paradox and epistemic justification

Matt Hewson

The paradox of the preface sets two plausible facets of our epistemic life against one another. On the one hand, it seems right that the author of a long, ambitious non-fiction book (a scientist, say) should be prepared to apologise in the preface for the errors her book doubtless contains. On the other, it seems like the set of our beliefs should be both consistent, and contain (at minimum) lots of the things entailed by our beliefs. We cannot have both. The latter consideration – deductive cogency – ensures that we believe the conjunction of all the claims in our book to be true. The former consideration – a modest preface claim – is an admission that some of those claims are false. Our scientist cannot consistently believe both. Something has to give.

Some philosophers (David Christensen or Scott Sturgeon) sacrifice deductive cogency and allow the modest preface claim. They are preface-writers. Others (Mark Kaplan, for example) drop the modest

preface claim in order to rescue deductive cogency. They are preface-rejecters. In this paper, I advance a new argument for the former position, by suggesting that Kaplan and other preface-rejecters must deny a highly plausible justificatory norm. Indeed, the norm is so plausible that it may even be analytic: "one shouldn't believe unjustified things".

The trouble arises because preface-rejecters must believe not only that all the claims in their book are true, but that they think it is highly unlikely they are right about this; after all, one of the attractions of preface-writing is its likelihood of truth. I suggest that on characteristically internalist and externalist pictures of justification, these constitutive preface-rejection beliefs cannot be epistemically justified. Accordingly, preface-rejecters preserve deductive cogency only at the expense of the justificatory norm.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Friedrich Lehrbaumer
Date:	15:30-16:00, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 101

Matt Hewson (University of Birmingham, United Kingdom)
I'm currently completing a masters in philosophy at the University of Birmingham. I'm writing my dissertation on the epistemic permissivism debate in epistemology, and trying to defend a comparatively strong version of the thesis. Before my masters I did a bachelors in philosophy, also at Birmingham. My main interests are in epistemology; in particular, I'm interested in evidential norms, preface / lottery paradoxes and the relationship between beliefs and confidences. I also have pretty substantial metaphysical and ethical interests; in terms of the former, I like thinking about mereology and nihilism. In terms of the latter, I'm interested in both normative and applied questions to do with harms.
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The Conjunction Fallacy, Belief and Inference to the Best Explanation

Benjamin Horrig

The conjunction fallacy is often considered to be the most paradigmatic example for human irrationality: the fallacy consists in judging a conjunction to be more probable than one of the individual conjuncts. This is taken to be irrational because rational agents are assumed to believe propositions that serve the goal of believing true propositions, and believing conjunctions is less probable to serve that goal than believing the individual conjuncts.

Ever since Tversky's and Kahneman's (1983) exposition of the conjunction fallacy, accounts have been proposed to save human rationality, at least partially. Nevertheless for all those theories one problem remained: in how far are agents rational that prefer to believe propositions that are demonstrably less probable to serve the goal of believing true propositions.

In my talk I want to suggest a completely new approach that takes it starting point in recent theories of cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. According to the predictive coding framework, the brain (and the mind) is a prediction machine that constantly tries to predict its sensory inputs. Thus, agents do not have the epistemic goal of believing the truth; they have the goal of accepting beliefs that let them accurately predict (future and past) evidence. In accordance with this, I suggest a theory of belief that satisfies both desiderata: it is a good predictor of the conjunction fallacy and one can demonstrate that in these cases believing the conjunction is more probable to serve the goal of predicting evidence than believing only one of the conjuncts. Formally the suggested theory is a Bayesian variation of the inference schema inference to the best explanation.

Finally, I will argue that the presented theory is an equally good predictor of the conjunction fallacy as the incremental confirmation account of Crupi, Russo and Tentori (2012).

References:

Crupi, V., Russo, S., & Tentori, K. (2012). On the determinants of the conjunction fallacy: Probability versus inductive confirmation. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 142, 235–255.

Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional vs. intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293–315.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Andrew J. Routledge
Date:	11:30-12:00, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 104

Benjamin Horrig (Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany)
I was born on January 29th, 1988, in Duisburg and started studying in 2007 at the Ruhr-University Bochum. This is also where I currently work on my Master Thesis to finish the Master programme Cognitive Science this semester.
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The Cartesian theatre and the modification of the metaphor of a theatre in Dennett's multiple drafts model, Baars's global workspace theory and O'Regan and Noe's sensorimotor theory

Kinga Jęczmińska

In my paper, I discuss several possibilities of the rejection the Cartesian theatre, exemplified by Dennett's multpile drafts model, Baars's global workspace theory (Baars 1988, 1997, 2010) and O'Regan and Noe's sensorimotor theory (O'Regan 1992, O'Regan and Noe 2001, Noe 2004, O'Regan 2011). Dennett (1991) defines the Cartesian theatre as a central place in the mind or brain where all information is gathered to be presented to an internal observer and where consciousness occurs. The model of consciousness he criticizes is deeply rooted in Cartesian dualism that postulates the existence of res cogitans and res extensa that could come into contact in the central point in the brain. Dennett rejects the Cartesian model by claiming that feature detections or discriminations take place simultaneously in various processors inside the brain. Once a particular observation has

been made in some part of the brain, it does not have to be sent to be viewed by any audience in the Cartesian theatre.

I show how the theories that explicitly reject the model of the Cartesian theatre can still be understood through a modified metaphor of a theatre. These theories may be classified on a scale of modified metaphors of a theatre. The global workspace theory and the multiple drafts model introduce a mild modification of the metaphor of a theatre, since the boundaries of the theatre are still within the brain. In these theories, the stage and the audience are understood functionally and change their localisation all the time. The sensorimotor theory adopts an extreme modification of the metaphor, in which the boundaries of the 'Cartesian theatre' are pushed as far away from the central point in the brain as possible and in which the consciousness theatre assumes a form of an interactive theatre. In this metaphor, actors present in the external environment interact with active members of the audience consisting of specific modules inside the organism.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Pascale Lötscher
Date:	09:45-10:15, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 104

Kinga Jęczmińska (University of Warsaw, Jagiellonian University Medical College, Poland)
Kinga Jęczmińska (MD, MA) is a PhD student in Philosophy at the University of Warsaw and a PhD student in Medicine at the Jagiellonian University Medical College. She graduated from the University of Warsaw (MA in Philosophy of Being, Cognition and Value, and MA in English Studies in 2013, BA in Philosophy of Being, Cognition and Value, and BA in English Studies in 2008) and from the Medical University of Silesia (MD in Medicine in 2007). Her MA thesis in Philosophy was on physicalism and qualia; her BA thesis in Philosophy was on functionalism. Her PhD thesis in Philosophy deals with contemporary anti-Cartesian theories of consciousness. She has published articles in philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive studies, history of medicine, bioethics and psychiatry.
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Let's Talk about Pegasus

Raffael Joggi

Paul Kripke's conception of a rigid designator has been strongly influential in analytic philosophy over the last decades. Even though the Kripkean view that proper names and natural kind terms function like rigid designators is widely accepted, there remain some unsustainable consequences like reference to non-existing entities. According to the Kripkean framework one cannot meaningfully refer to fictional objects because they do not exist in the actual world. So uttering sentences like 'Pegasus might have existed' or even 'Pegasus is a counterfactual entity' is at best necessarily false in Kripkean possible world semantics.

In the following talk I will be concerned with an alternative interpretation of rigid designators and how this might eventually enable us to meaningfully express propositions about non-existing entities. In order to do this I will, firstly, propose an interpretation of rigid designators as two sets of properties – one for actual properties and one for necessary properties. This follows from a rigid designator's characteristic which requires at least one actual property in order to access a rigid designator's set of necessary properties. Hence, I claim that it is sufficient to indicate the property, say 'being actually the teacher of Alexander', in order to express the same meaning as the rigid designator 'Aristotle' does. Secondly, I will propose that one could omit the set of actual properties and directly leap over to the set of necessary properties in order to meaningfully refer to non-existing objects. In claiming this, I suggest that one can analogously refer to non-existing objects by using a property like 'being necessarily a winged horse'. Consequently, I will argue that we do not have to restrict ourselves to the domain of actual existing objects. Rather, we can express meaningful propositions about non-existent things by using the necessary properties these concepts entail.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Markus Tschögl
Date:	11:30-12:00, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 122

Raffael Joggi (University of St Andrews, Switzerland)
Raffael Joggi is currently a MLitt Student at the University of St Andrews. He did his BA in Philosophy at the University of Berne and the HU Berlin. His momentary research interest lies in making a case for semantic internalism, the epistemology of modality, 2D-semantics and verbal disputes.
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On Why Innate Is not Within

Riin Kõiv

It is widely accepted in philosophy as well as in psychology that some or many mind/brain states with content are innate. Call this view semantic nativism. Pitt (2000) argues that if a mind/brain state with content is innate then informational externalism is not true of its content. Pitt argues as follows. If informational externalism is true of content then mind/brain's interaction with the world is necessary for a mind/brain state to have content (premise 1). However, if the mind/brain state is innate then mind/brain's interaction with the world is not necessary for it to have content (premise 2). Therefore, if a mind/brain state with content is innate then informational externalism is not true of its content.

Despite wide acceptance of both semantic nativism and informational externalism, Pitt's argument has so far not been challenged. In my paper I argue that Pitt's argument is invalid. Pitt's argument is valid only if the mind/brain's interaction with the world that is necessary for a mind/brain state to have content (according to informational externalism (in premise 1)) is the same or the sub-part of interaction that is not necessary for a mind/brain state to have content if the mind/brain state with content is innate (in premise 2). I will show the following. If 'interaction' in premise 1 is understood in accordance with the widely discussed psychological conception of innateness that Pitt seems to have in mind and if 'interaction' in premise 2 is understood in accordance with informational externalist theories of content (as Pitt intends), then the mind/brain's interaction with the world that is necessary (according to informational externalism) for a mind/brain state to have content is

not the same or a sub-part of the interaction that is not necessary for a mind/brain state to have content if the mind/brain state is innate. Hence, Pitt's argument is invalid.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Pascale Lötscher
Date:	10:30-11:00, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 104

Riin Kõiv (University of Tartu, Estonia)
I am a PhD student in philosophy at the University of Tartu. At the same university I obtained my MA in philosophy (2012). As a guest student I have studied at the Philipps-Universität Marburg (2010-2011) and the University of California San Diego (2012-2013). Current areas of interest: philosophy of mind (theories of content and the notion of representation), philosophy of biology and psychology (notions of genetic information, genetic causation, psychological nativism), critical theory and ideology critique, Ludwig Feuerbach's philosophy.
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The Role of History in a Theory of Meaning

Ken Kamiya

It is possible to argue that a certain use of a word is appropriate by referring to its history. This simple fact supports the recently discussed view that semantic theories explaining the meanings of the expressions of a language and foundational theories of meaning explaining the historical genesis of these meanings cannot be completely separated.

Against such views, reference to history could be considered a justification of the institution of a new word or of a renewal of an old one, not concerning the word as it is used normally; or it could be that the use, although independent of history, can be made clear by using its history as a mere reminder of this independent use. However, in the former case, the mechanism through which new or renewed words are added to the language remains to be explained. If the ability of making such modifications based on historical knowledge is itself an integral part of language use, then it must be said that understanding of language involves an understanding of history. In the latter case, it should be asked whether there is any real distinction to be made between a use that is independent of history but forgotten and revived in virtue of this history, and a use that is independent of its present use and dependent on its history.

The point is different from the one made by classical causal theories of meaning. Classical causal theories are centered on the semantic contents of words that are a function of their history in the sense that they have meanings which are specifiable without knowledge of history but have been historically determined. The problem addressed in this paper concerns cases in which understanding the history of the word is an integral part of understanding the word.

Perhaps for a being that has perfect knowledge of the language with its history, it may be possible to formulate every aspect of its use explicitly. Then the use of the language will be comprehensible from these formulations alone without regard for its history. This will allow us to get rid of history only if everything relevant to the use of language is written into the theory; lest the past will continue to be a source of understanding expressions. The prospects of us human beings mastering the contents of such a theory of meaning seems at most quite bleak.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Markus Tschögl
Date:	12:15-12:45, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 122

Ken Kamiya (Waseda University, Japan)
Ken Kamiya is a PhD student in Philosophy at Waseda University. He received his M.A. in Philosophy from Keio University in 2011. His undergraduate studies were also completed at Keio University. He is currently a research fellow of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. His work is supported by the Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research. His research interests include theories of meaning, the analytical/continental divide, modality, indexicality, ontology, and time.
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Why sufficientarianism is not indifferent to taxation

Philipp Kanschik

The doctrine of sufficientarianism has recently seen some momentum in distributive justice as a challenger of prioritarianism and egalitarianism. However, the indifference objection arguably remains one the most severe objections against the doctrine. It accuses sufficientarianism of being objectionably indifferent to distributions of benefits and burdens, once everyone has secured enough. In particular, critics hold that sufficientarians are indifferent about choosing between progressive and regressive burdening regimes. Such indifference runs counter common sense intuitions towards a progressive tax regime and is not even acceptable for critics of such a regime.

Counter this objection, the talk outlines a sufficientarian account in favor of progressive burdening. In a nutshell, it is argued that even those above the sufficiency threshold(s) face a risk of becoming insufficient due to changing life circumstances. Risk of insufficiency should be understood as a function of distance to the threshold: it decreases the better off someone is. Eventually, this effect wears off, as there seem to be no significant risk differences between the rich and the super-rich.

Thus, the argument justifies progressive burdening, while maintaining the core sufficientarian intuition that it is absurd to demand redistributions between the rich.

The argument relates to all kinds of burdens that are distributed within a society, even though taxation burdens shall generally be in focus. If the argument succeeds, it rebuts one of the main objections against sufficientarianism and marks a step to establish sufficientarianism as a fitting theory of justice to justify the modern welfare state that taxes progressively. Furthermore, unlike a number of alternative sufficientarian responses to the indifference objection, the presented argument is distinctively sufficientarian, i.e. it does not depend on any egalitarian or prioritarian reasoning.

Section:	Political Philosophy
Language:	English
Chair:	Albert Anglberger
Date:	14:45-15:15, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 104

Philipp Kanschik (University of Bayreuth, Germany)
Philipp Kanschik is currently PhD student at University of Bayreuth, focusing on the theory of sufficientarianism and its practical applications. He holds degrees in Philosophy and Economics (B.A., Bayreuth) and Philosophy (M.A., HU Berlin) and has worked as a strategy consultant.
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Paradox and Empirical Semantics

David Kashtan

The dominant paradigm in contemporary empirical semantics is governed by a disquotational T-schema, akin to Tarski's schema for truth. Tarski's schema is contradictory if applied to a semantically closed language. Natural languages are taken to be semantically closed. What, if anything, saves empirical semantics from inconsistency? In this paper I will consider and argue against one possible response to this worry. In general I see the issue as consisting of three questions:

1. Is a paradoxical sentence at all formulable in empirical semantic theory?

2. If yes, does it entail the inconsistency of the theory?

3. If yes, what are the implications for how we should think about the theory?

Trouble arises if we have positive answers to the first two questions and a dire one for the third. In this paper I will focus on the second question and examine a particular kind of negative answer, namely that semantics is not about the relation of language to the world, but about its relation to further cognitive systems. I call this approach the internalistic, and its opposite the genuinely referential view of language. I will present a general consideration against internalism.

The main internalistic strategy is to reject the disquotational aspect of the T-schema and reinterpret it as an interface to extra-linguistic cognitive systems. I will offer a consideration against letting the liar paradox determine for us the scope of semantics, based on the following premises:

a. Humans do achieve genuine reference, even if not in language;

b. This is due to some cognitive system or complex of systems;

c. This system will contain genuinely referential representations;

d. It will be compositional and semantically closed.

I will argue that these assumptions together are a sufficient condition for the paradox, by reconstructing the disquotational T-schema from them.

From this it follows that the liar paradox will haunt whatever cognitive theory of genuine representation we devise. The fact that the paradox is visible in semantics is due to the latter being in a better state, in terms of precision and formalization, than other cognitive sciences. This makes semantics the best ground we have for facing the paradox.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Markus Tschögl
Date:	10:45-11:15, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 122

David Kashtan (Hebrew University, Israel)
Born and raised (mostly) in Tel-Aviv. After some years of wandering (both geographical and professional), at 25 I moved to Jerusalem to study at the Hebrew University. I completed my BA in philosophy and Hebrew philology. I then studied for a teaching certificate and an MA thesis in philosophy while working in computational linguistics for a psychometric institution. My MA thesis was about a link between Kant, Tarski and Quine. As part of my MA studies I spent a year in Germany (Heidelberg and Berlin), during which I attended an ESSLLI school in Bordeaux, which inspired my PhD dissertation topic - Tarski's concept of truth and its implications for the concept of language. I am currently writing my dissertation and enjoying a fellowship at the Language, Logic and Cognition Center at HUJI. I live in Jerusalem with my wife and one year old daughter.
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Constructivism As a Genuine Metaethical Theory

Maximilian Kiener

Contemporary moral philosophy has been increasingly occupied with an account called Constructivism, which considers (correct) normative claims to be the outcome of some idealized process of rational deliberation, choice, or agreement. Within such a process, normative claims are considered constructed by practical agents.

However, as constructing means compounding together simple bits which are themselves not constructed, many critics thought the account of constructivism would ultimately end up being parasitic on something which it cannot provide on its own. As a result, constructivism would not be a genuine theory but rather a disguised form of another already existing type of theory.

Against those critics, I will argue that although constructivism hinges on non-constructed starting points, this does not lead to a parasitic nature. I will elaborate my claim by use of a so called transcendental argument. Such arguments will always take two steps: first, there is a Y, which is already given or endorsed, and second, there is an X, which is a necessary condition for Y to obtain. So, if Y is already there, X must be the case, too. With regard to my specific line of reasoning, the X's will be the non-constructed starting points we are looking for and the Y will be a conception of ourselves as practical agents. Herein, being a practical agent means being autonomous in the sense of having the ability to choose one or another course of action. I consider this conception not only as something which we cannot untangle ourselves from but also as something which we instantly commit to when facing a practical challenge. To make this approach more concrete I will discuss it along Christine Korsgaard's Constitutive Arguments as an account of metaethical constructivism.

I conclude that constructivism can gain proper starting points without abandoning its attractiveness. As those starting points are also considerably different from everything else found in traditional metaethics, constructivism has the potential to be a full-fledged metaethical theory on its own.

Maximilian Kiener (University of Regensburg, Germany)
I am currently a student at the University of Regensburg, studying in my final term for a bachelor's degree in philosophy (major) and public law (minor). I am going to do a BPhil at the University of Oxford from October this year. My main interests are moral and political philosophy as well as the philosophy of law.
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A semantic conception of truthmaking and the problem of undecidable sentences

Karol Kleczka

The notion of truthmakers presented by Mulligan, Simons and Smith (1984), and supported latter by David Armstrong (2004) is an intriguing realist proposition which has a strong impact on a debate on the status of relation between metaphysics and theory of meaning. Truthmaker-supporters claim that a truth of each sentence is determined by the structure of reality, which is made of subject-independent facts or entities.

It seems that the idea of a truthmaker provides us a solution for a semantic problem of undecidable sentences. If a subject cannot actually state the logical value of a sentence, then she simply assumes that it is already determined on metaphysical level by some portion of reality to which we do not need to have an access. However metaphysics with truthmakers has a high cost: we either have to presume that the theory of being precedes the theory of meaning, or we trivialize metaphysical debate and claim that truthmakers do not differ from truth conditions.

Stephen Yablo in "Aboutness" (2014) presents yet another approach. Yablo argues that his conception of semantic truthmakers (highly inspired by Tarski's semantic conception of truth) is a vertical relation

between a proposition and a truthmaker. It differs from the traditional conception in which a relation between a truthmaker and a proposition is horizontal. Yablo describes two alternate attitudes toward truthmaking: a recursive one, and a reductive one. In my presentation I aim to (1) refer Yablo's arguments, (2) present the differences between his own and the metaphysical approach and finally (3) try to check if Yablo's semantic truthmaking deals with anti-realist problem of undecidable sentences.

Section:	Metaphysics
Language:	English
Chair:	Johannes Korbmacher
Date:	17:20-17:50, 2 September 2015 (Wednesday)
Location:	HS 122

Karol Kleczka (Jagiellonian University, Poland)
Karol Kleczka (M.A. philosophy). Jagiellonian University. 2010 baccalaureate in philosophy; 2012 masters degree in philosophy (with distinction); title of the thesis: "The problem of foundations of meaning in modern realism vs anti-realism debate". PhD student on the third year of his studies at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow. Works on a dissertation that is going to cover the discussion between semantical realism and anti-realism (specifically on possible metaphysical consequences of Dummett's semantical anti-realism). Interested in analytical metaphysics and the theory of meaning.
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Yet Another Puzzle of Ground

Johannes Korbmacher

n this paper, I will discuss predicational theories of partial ground. Partial ground is the relation of one truth holding either wholly or partially in virtue of another. For example, take two atomic sentences p and q. If p is true and q is false, then the truth of the disjunction $p \vee q$ holds wholly in virtue of the truth of p. And if both p and q are true, then the truth of the conjunction $p \wedge q$ holds partially in virtue of the truth of p and partially in virtue

of the truth of q. A predicational theory of partial ground is one that is formulated in a first-order language that expresses partial ground by means of a relational predicate of sentences. In this paper, I will show that any predicational theory of partial ground that proves some commonly accepted principles of partial ground is inconsistent. The reason for this result is that the principles of partial ground admit for a paradox of self-reference in a non-obvious way. Specifically, if we combine principles like the ones governing our examples before with a principle to the effect that only true sentences can enter into the relation of partial ground, disaster ensues. This is the main result of the paper. In the rest of the paper, I will discuss the prospects of a consistent predicational theory of partial ground. In particular, I will show that by restricting the principles of partial ground to their grounded instances, I can block the derivation of the paradox of self-reference in the context of partial ground. I argue that this is both a natural and promising solution to the problem posed in this paper, since a predicational theory of ground already has the expressive resources to formulate the solution to the problem.

Section:	Logic
Language:	English
Chair:	Vlasta Sikimic
Date:	12:00-12:30, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 107

Johannes Korbmacher (LMU Munich (MCMP), Germany)
Johannes Korbmacher, PhD Fellow at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy. Magister Artium in Philosophy at the WWU Münster in 2011. Interests in mathematical and philosophical logic, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mathematics.
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Self-Feeling. Can self-consciousness be understood as affective phenomenon?

Gerhard Kreuch

γνῶθι σεαυτόν – Know thyself! This is a long-standing ideal in philosophy. In this tradition, there has been a vivid debate on problems of self-consciousness and self-knowledge in the last years (i.e. Bar-On 2004; Bilgrami 2006; Cassam 2014; Dretske 1994, 1999; Evans 1982; Gallois 1996; Gennaro 2012; Kriegel 2009; Moran 2001; Peacocke 2014; Rödl 2007; Rosenthal 2005). How do we know what we want or believe? How do we know ourselves?

Today's philosophy of self-consciousness suffers from serious problems. Most importantly, reflective theories (i.e. Rosenthal 1986, 2005) struggle with an infinite regress.

In this paper I offer a fresh perspective on this issue. I suggest to understand the core of self-consciousness as a specific kind of feeling, namely a self-feeling. Recent developments in the philosophy of emotion support this move (Ratcliffe 2005, 2008; Slaby 2008, 2012; Slaby et al. 2013; Slaby and Stephan 2008; Stephan 2012). They show that deep, existential feelings fundamentally shape all our experience and thought.

First, I present a major problem in current philosophy of self-consciousness. Second, I introduce Ratcliffe's account of existential feelings. Third, I present my own account of self-feeling and show how it contributes to this problem.

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Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Andrew J. Routledge
Date:	12:15-12:45, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 104

Gerhard Kreuch (University of Vienna, Austria)
Gerhard Kreuch graduated in philosophy and business sciences (socio-economics). His interdisciplinary master thesis was about reductionism in social network analysis. His current research interests are philosophy of emotion, self-consciousness, phenomenology, and philosophy of mind.
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Two Extensions of McCulloch and Pitts type neural networks

Cornelia Kroiß

The basic units of the McP theory "A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity" (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943) are simplified neurons which are characterized by the all-or-none law. Every neuron either is sending or is not sending an signal to the next neuron. McP state a connection between this all-or none character and the truth values of classical logic. They aim to show that every neuron and every network of neurons can be expressed by a logical formula. A proposition is true if the neuron fires, otherwise it is false. The connection between two neurons is called 'synapse'. A neuron that is sending a signal is called 'presynaptic' and one that is receiving a signal is called 'postsynaptic'. Every neuron has a 'threshold' such that the sum of all incoming signals has to reach a threshold to trigger a signal in the postsynaptic neuron. A synapse can have either an 'excitatory' or

'inhibitory' influence on the postsynaptic neuron. In case no incoming
signal is present the electrical potential is called 'resting potential'.

In the literature it is usually claimed that the McP neuron is able
to represent all logical connectives of propositional logic. But in the
McP calculus it is not possible to represent all logical connectives, only
'and', 'or', 'and not' are defined. The McCulloch-and-Pitts-like neuron
introduced in the literature is only able to represent all logical connective
because the original basic physical assumptions has been changed. I will
introduce a way of implementing the negation without changing the
physical assumptions by considering a neuron named 'h' which always
sends a signal and an inhibitory neuron named 'c' both presynaptic to
the postsynaptic neuron named 'd'.

In the McP theory 'total inhibition' is a physical assumption. To-
tal inhibition means that the activity of any inhibitory synapse of a
presynaptic neuroan at a time t absolutely prevents the excitation of a
postsynaptic neuron at a time $t + 1$. I will weaken the concept of to-
tal inhibition and introduce the concept of 'relative inhibition'. Relative
inhibition means that an inhibitory signal at time t of a presynaptic neu-
ron does not absolutely prevent the excitation of a postsynaptic neuron
at time $t + 1$, but decreases the likelihood of sending a signal.

Section:	Logic
Language:	English
Chair:	Vlasta Sikimic
Date:	11:15-11:45, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 107

Cornelia Kroiß (LMU Munich, Germany)
Currently I'm a doctoral fellow at the LMU Munich and interested in
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Demonstrating the Infallibility of Thought

Jonathan Krude

In my talk, I would like to prove the infallibility of psychologically undoubted thoughts (IF). In order to do so, I will formulate a Reductio of fallibility, combining a well-known and usually unsuccessful type of sceptical argument with an equally infamous argument against scepticism. Together, they will show that the assumption of fallibility leads into what I would like to call Total Scepticism and that, since the latter can be excluded, IF must be correct.

The central elements for the argument to work are the notions of a Thought and of Total Scepticism (TS). 1. A Thought is defined as a psychologically undoubted judgement. I will show that it is unintelligible that there are no Thoughts in this sense. Since thoughts are – ex hypothesi – psychologically equal, the Cartesian step from the fallibility of some Thought to the fallibility of any Thought is feasible. From there, we can follow on to Total Scepticism, which is the thesis that no judgement we make is internally more likely to be true than its alternative. 2. I will thus attempt to reduce the hypothesis of fallibilism to the thesis that, on the level that is available to us, none of our thinking has any special relation to truth (TS). Since, however, the judgement of Total Scepticism is always occurring on the level that is available to us, it turns TS into a structure that undermines its own intentionality. This works, since the criterion for TS is defined in terms of the independence from truth, so that it cannot be thought with coherent truth-conditions. Thus, TS will be shown to be unintelligible and the Reduction will be completed.

Apparent problems with infallibility will be resolved, such as differing opinions between people and across times. Then I will explore some attractive consequences of the account, including the revival of ambitious Transcendental Arguments and an elegant solution to the problem of induction.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Christian J. Feldbacher
Date:	09:45-10:15, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 101

Jonathan Krude (Trinity College Cambridge, Germany)
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Paradox of Fiction: What does it mean to be moved by the fictional character?

Tereza Kunešová

Analytic philosophers have given a great deal of attention to problems related to fictionality. This contribution deals with the so-called Paradox of emotional response to fiction or simply Paradox of fiction. The paradox is based on three intuitively plausible propositions:

1. Readers or audiences often experience emotional response towards objects they know to be fictional.

2. A necessary condition for experiencing emotions is that those experiencing them believe the objects of their emotions exist.

3. Readers or audience who know that the objects are fictional do not believe that these objects exist.

As these three propositions are mutually inconsistent at least one must be false. Many philosophers have tried for forty years to find out a solution in order to understand why and how this paradox happens – how is it that we can be moved by what we know does not exist? This contribution will explore and analyse the most important solutions of this paradox. It will be shown that none of the responses given during last 40 years is unproblematic and that many objections can be raised towards those responses.

Section:	Metaphysics
Language:	English
Chair:	Fabio Ceravolo
Date:	11:15-11:45, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 122

Tereza Kunešová (Masaryk University, Czech Republic)
Kunešová (Mgr. = MA phil.). Masaryk University, Brno, 2010 Baccalaureate in philosophy; thesis Conception of Experience by Hans-Georg Gadamer; 2013 Master in Philosophy; thesis Hermeneutic Philosophy of Art in Thought of H.-G. Gadamer; 2015 Master in Upper Secondary School Teacher Training in Social Studies Basics; thesis: The Dialectics of the Concrete in Contemporary Responses and Discussions of the Sixties. Publications in Philosophy of Art, Czech Philosophy, Hermeneutics.
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The epistemic value of reasonable peer disagreement

Friedrich Lehrbaumer

Currently it is discussed whether there can be peer disagreement when the whole body of evidence is shared. There are strong reasons against this possibility – yet we are faced with seemingly reasonable disagreement on a daily basis. In such cases it is normally advocated by philosophers like Ernest Sosa to suspend judgement and reassure us of our relevant competence.

My claim however is that it is possible to be an epistemic peer, share the same body of evidence and have a reasonable disagreement where suspending judgement just won't do. In fact the only reasonable thing to do is to stick to your guns and argue.

These cases are of such sort that both peers are right, but just do not see it yet. Consider the historical example of Morning Star and Evening Star. Advocates of either side are reasonable, share virtually the same evidence yet have different concepts and it is necessary for them not to suspend judgement because only in combining these concepts, presumably via arguing and explaining the respective concept, they will get the full picture, in that case the Venus.

So in my mind we are in some instances of peer disagreement troubled by these half-baked concepts and not yet discovered similarities.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Michael Bruckner
Date:	11:30-12:00, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 101

Friedrich Lehrbaumer (University of Vienna, Austria)
Friedrich Lehrbaumer is an undergratuade student at the University of Vienna. His research interests focus on social ontology, epistemology and philosophy of language.
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Keep it simple! Intentionen in der Metasemantik von Demonstrativa

Lukas Lewerentz & Benjamin Marschall

Demonstrativa wie 'dies' und 'das' sind nützliche Ausdrücke, denn mit ihnen können wir die unterschiedlichsten Dinge bezeichnen. Was aber legt fest, welches Objekt ein Demonstrativum in einer bestimmten Situation bezeichnet? Eine Antwort auf diese metasemantische Frage lautet: Demonstrativa bezeichnen immer genau das, was Sprecher mit ihnen bezeichnen möchten.

Diese Sicht, Simple Intentionalism (SI), wurde bislang vor allem mit heftiger Kritik bedacht, unter anderem von Reimer (1992), Gauker (2008), King (2013, 2014) und Speaks (2014). Wir hingegen möchten SI verteidigen, indem wir zwei zentrale Einwände gegen SI ausräumen.

Laut SI legen die Absichten eines Sprechers auch dann fest, was ein Demonstrativum bezeichnet, wenn sie für Zuhörer nicht erkennbar sind. Jeffrey King hält das für unplausibel. Zum einen widerspreche es sprachlichen Intuitionen, zum anderen stehe es in Spannung zum Ziel sprachlicher Kommunikation, Zuhörern etwas mitzuteilen. Dagegen spricht: Um Kommunikation realistisch zu beschreiben, müssen metasemantische Theorien zulassen, dass Zuhörer bisweilen nicht erkennen können, was Demonstrativa bezeichnen. Andernfalls ist beispielsweise unverständlich, wie Demonstrativa missverstanden werden können. Zudem

lassen sich Kings Intuitionen sehr gut durch pragmatische Mechanismen erklären.

Der zweite Einwand gegen SI geht von der Beobachtung aus, dass Sprecher zugleich mehrere konfligierende Absichten haben können, ohne sich dessen bewusst zu sein. Bezeichnet ein Demonstrativum in so einem Fall etwas? Wenn ja, welche der Absichten ist ausschlaggebend? Eine überzeugende Antwort auf diese Fragen scheint nicht in Sicht zu sein. Dies spricht laut Jeff Speaks gegen SI. Wir teilen diese Schlussfolgerung nicht, sondern schlagen vor, dass ein Demonstrativum mehrere Objekte bezeichnet, wenn ein Sprecher konfligierende Absichten hat. SI-Vertreter müssen daher kein Kriterium angeben, das genau eine Absicht als relevant auszeichnet. Wieso dieser Vorschlag plausibel ist, werden wir anhand von Beispielen demonstrieren.

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Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	German
Chair:	David Kashtan
Date:	14:45-15:15, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 122

Lukas Lewerentz (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany)
Lukas Lewerentz (B.A.), Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. 2015 B.A. Philosophie/Sozialwissenschaften an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, derzeit im M.A. Philosophie ebendort.
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Benjamin Marschall (B.A.), Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. 2014 B.A.
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Structural Realism and the Semantic Theory of Truth

Marco Marletta

Most philosophers of science would maintain that an adequate theory of truth is a basic desideratum for every kind of scientific realism (which usually claims that scientific theories are at least approximately true). My talk aims to check whether scientific structural realism (SR) is consistent with the semantic theory of truth. The main claim of SR (both ontic and epistemic) is that scientific progress is cumulative even if successive theories posit different theoretical entities, since we should believe only in the structural aspects of scientific theories (the mathematical core preserved across theory change). From this viewpoint, for example, we do not care if phlogiston does not exist, since modern chemistry preserves all the relevant relations between the properties that the phlogiston theory correctly pointed out. But, although this may be a satisfactory theory of scientific realism, I do not think that it is sufficient as a theory of truth; I will argue that SR's weak reference relation cannot account for the role played by reference in the semantic theory (ST) According to ST, the truth predicate can be defined only referring to "interpreted" languages. In order to define a proper truth predicate for a language L, we need an interpretation function (I) to conceptualize the language-world relations: I gives the extension of the terms of L in the world W. Even though this model is compatible with various methods of fixing reference (and with a "structuralist way" as well), only interpreted scientific theories can be true or false. To apply ST to scientific theories one should: 1) assign the referents to all the physical laws; 2) define the sets of objects to which these laws are applicable (and the relevant spatio-temporal notions). So, my conclusion will be that, in so far as SR treats scientific theories as mathematical structures, they are not

true-or-false from ST's viewpoint.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Alexander Gebharter
Date:	16:00-16:30, 2 September 2015 (Wednesday)
Location:	HS 107

Marco Marletta (University of Palermo, Italia)
Marco Marletta (MA phil.). University of Palermo. 2010 baccalaureate
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Reasons, Value, and Valuing

Meredith McFadden

Though I may recognize a career in the military, or being a lawyer, barista, or social worker to be valuable, it is the career of an academic that draws me. Though I recognize the value in them all, I value being an academic. This distinction is widely recognized, and recent work by Bennett Helm, Sam Scheffler, Agnieszka Jaworska and Jeffrey Seidman has attempted to capture what valuing amounts to, as a relationship to what's valuable beyond the recognition of something as valuable.

In this paper I am interested in the relationship between both of these orientations we have to value in the world (recognizing it and valuing it) and our reasons for action. Most agree that we all share reasons to recognize or respect what is valuable in the world. These are agent neutral reasons. But there is also agreement that valuing influences the reasons you have, and that agents have particular reasons to value. For instance, while I have reasons to value being an academic given my pedantic nature, say, you may have reasons to be a social worker given your benevolent soul. These are agent-relative reasons. I argue that two core views of the relationship between reason and value have difficulty accounting for these two kinds of reasons. Teleologists take an agent's

reasons to be determined by what she sees as valuable. Buck-passers have the inverse position, where what the agent sees as valuable is just what she sees reason to do. Both of these views have difficulty with accommodating the reasons involved with the two orientations we can have to value in the world.

For teleologists, an agent's reasons are functions of what is valuable. What an agent has reason to do is to bring about good states of affairs, so what the agent sees reason to do will be a function of what she thinks would be good. Because this view sees reasons as a function of what is valuable, I argue that it runs roughshod over the agent relative reasons that are involved in the valuing relationship: the possibility that agents can take up what is valuable as having special significance in their life and that this is normatively relevant.

For buck-passers, value is just a function of what agents have reason to do. This view thus can capture what is of special significance to particular agents, but it may seem puzzling how such a view can capture the agent-neutrality of recognizing something as valuable. Our common sense notion of something being valuable, or an agent seeing something as valuable, seems independent of individual agents seeing particular reasons. Using T. M Scanlon as an example of a buck-passing view, I contrast this approach to the reason/value relationship to that of the teleologist, and show that it doesn't accommodate a deep contrast between the two orientations agents can have towards value in the world. I then see how close to our common sense notion of valuable such a view can get.

For both views, reasons and values can be read off one another, and this leads to difficulty in accounting for both ways that we take agents to be able to relate to the value they see in the world. Agents can recognize something as valuable, and they can take up that value to be of particular significance to them. I articulate these puzzles that arise out of our evaluative agency and argue that though both views have this difficulty, the buckpasser has an easier time accounting for the side of the puzzle that they face.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Frauke Albersmeier
Date:	09:45-10:15, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 103

Meredith McFadden (University of California, Riverside, USA)
I am a fifth year graduate student at the University of California, Riverside. My area of research is in metaethics and philosophy of action, and I have been working on a dissertation on the relationship between seeing a reason to act and seeing that action as valuable. I earned my Master of Arts degree in philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee in 2010. I am interested in value theory, especially as it relates to our normative agency. At UCR, I have been lucky to work with professors and peers on how philosophers have attempted to understand our agency as reasoners through the Western tradition with special emphasis on the influence of Kantian themes. This conference would be a great opportunity to hear from other young professionals about the work and issues that excite them.
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Epistemological relativism, reflection and "thick" experiences

Patricia Meindl

Epistemological relativism features prominently in the "Strong Programme" (SP) in the "Sociology of Scientific Knowledge", which is particularly associated with the work of Barry Barnes and David Bloor. In their influential paper "Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge", Barnes and Bloor make an important and fundamental argument for relativism, which was more recently criticised by Harvey Siegel. According to this argument, acknowledging the impossibility of context-independent or "perspectiveless" judgements commits one, ultimately, to the view that non-relative judgements are impossible. In arguing against this relativistic claim, Siegel denies SP's presupposition that non-relative judgements require the possibility of adopting a "perspectiveless" perspective. Rather, the fact that we can alter our perspectives is sufficient to defeat SP's argument for relativism. In order to avoid the charge of merely begging the question against the SP-relativist, however, it is necessary for Siegel to provide an argument that proves the ability to change one's perspectives sufficient to account for non-relative judgements. As I will argue, Siegel's own considerations are barely adequate to meet this burden

of proof. Hence, it is the aim of this paper to address precisely the question Siegel fails to raise: the question just what it is about changing one's perspectives that renders non-relative judgements possible. In taking a closer look at the very subject performing the transition from one perspective to another, two features will turn out to be crucial: First, the human being's capacity to reflect, i.e. the ability to take in a critical stance towards one's beliefs and actions. Second, its capacity to have "thick" experiences, i.e. experiences loaded with descriptive, evaluative, affective and imaginative elements. It is argued that acknowledging both one's reflective capacity and the possibility of sharing one's "thick" experiences is a proper starting point to cut one's way out of the relativistic predicament.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Friedrich Lehrbaumer
Date:	14:45-15:15, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 101

Patricia Meindl (University of Graz, Austria)
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Extended Modal Meinongianism

Daniel Milne-Plückebaum

Meinongians don't have it easy. They've dealt with round squares, vaguely identical objects and existent golden mountains. Modal Meinongians (following Priest (2005)) welcome these nonexistent objects within a plurality of (nonexistent) worlds. Yet a new allegedly untameable object is ready to cause trouble: the actually existent golden mountain.

In this talk, I argue that Modal Meinongianism can't cope with the actually existent golden mountain – unless the account is somehow extended. Specifically, drawing on arguments by Beall (2006) and Sauchelli (2012), I first lay out what I call 'the argument from actuality' against Modal Meinongianism, before I show, second, that both the official reply put forward by Priest (2011) as well a two-dimensional reply put forward by Wolfgang Barz (2015) are unsuccessful in that neither of them can do justice to some imaginative intentions. This leads to a new argument from actuality, which forces Modal Meinongians into a tight argumentative corner. Arguing their way out of this corner, I claim, requires Modal Meinongians to concede that there's indeed no place for the actually existent golden mountain within the Modal Meinongian's plurality of worlds.

Yet I finally suggest that the Modal Meinongian must merely expand the logical (and illogical) space into a plurality of pluralities of worlds, which the actually existent golden mountain can happily inhabit. This leads to a form of Modal Meinongianism that introduces objects that are hardly tameable beasts – but tameable nonetheless, at least until the Meinongian's imagination fails to handle them.

Section:	Metaphysics
Language:	English
Chair:	Fabio Ceravolo
Date:	10:30-11:00, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 122

Daniel Milne-Plückebaum (Bielefeld University, Germany)
M.A in philosophy (2015); thesis on Extended Modal Meinongianism. Publications on the ontology of fictional entities and the epistemic and aesthetic significance of computer games.
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On some first-order spatiotemporal logics

Attila Molnár

will present a first-order temporal logic where possible worlds represent events of a spacetime, accessibility is causality, the one universal domain is for numbers, the individual concepts / nonrigid designators represents *timelike curves* or *physical processes* or just simply *clocks*. For simplicity, I refer to logics of these first-order tense languages as *clock logics*. In my talk I will present results concerning

(1) *Expressive Power:* In these languages, the basic paradigmatic relativistic effects of kinematics such as time dilation, length contraction, twin paradox, etc. are expressible and can be quantized.

(2) *Operationality:* The coordinatization of Minkowski spacetimes itself is definable using metric tense operators with *signalling procedures*.

(3) *Completeness, decidability and incompleteness:*

    (a) For any $n \geq 2$, the clock logic of *timelike geodesics* of the n-dimensional Minkowski spacetime is axiomatizable and decidable.

    (b) For any $n \geq 2$, the clock logic of *all timelike curves* of the n-dimensional Minkowski spacetime is not axiomatizable.

(4) *Comparability to the literature:* Standard translations of clock logics of Minkowski-spacetimes are *definitionally equivalent* with standard axiom systems of the Andréka-Németi research group.

(5) *Applications in indeterminism:* I will present how can we apply these modal results in the axiomatization of branching spacetimes.

Section:	Logic
Language:	English
Chair:	Vlasta Sikimic
Date:	10:30-11:00, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 107

Attila Molnár (Eötvös University Budapest, Hungary)
Attila Molnár is a PhD student at the Department of Logic of the Eötvös University Budapest. He works on connections between modal logics and relativity theories. His fields of interest are first-order modal logic, algebraic logic, intuitionistic logic, bi-intuitionistic logic, category theory, provability logic, metalogic, philosophy of mathematics as well as connections between logic and cognitive science.
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The Right to Life, Voluntary Euthanasia, and Termination of Life on Request

Elias Moser

The presentation tries to uncover the moral implications of the permissibility of voluntary euthanasia VE. It will be argued that it implies the permissibility of killing or life termination on request LTR.

The former is subject to a vivid debate in applied medical ethics, whereas the latter is prohibited in every country and so far not refered to in philosophical and political discussion. The aim is to show that it should be taken into account arguing for VE.

The argument can be sketched as follows:

(P1) If LTR should be forbidden, the right to life is inalienable.

(P2) If VE should be allowed, the right to life is not inalienable.

(K) From (P1) and (P2) follows that if VE should be allowed, LTR should not be forbidden.

The goal of the presentation is to show that a consistent set of moral beliefs cannot include the conviction that VE should be allowed and LTR should not be allowed. The argument focusses on consistency and has no direct normative or legal implications.

In the first part the applied concepts will be explicated. In the second part the argument will be introduced. In the last part one major objection will be discussed.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Svantje Guinebert
Date:	11:30-12:00, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 103

Elias Moser (Bern University, Switzerland)
Elias Moser is assistant at the Institut für Strafrecht und Kriminolo-
gie, Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Uni Bern. MA Political and Eco-
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Sind der naive Realismus und der wissenschaftliche Realismus kompatibel?

Adem Mulamustafić

Der Physiker Arthur Eddington unterscheidet zwei Tische: einen makroskopischen Tisch, der ausgedehnt, farbig und fest ist, und einen Tisch, der größtenteils aus Leere besteht, die be-spickt ist mit ein paar Mikropartikeln. Den ersten Tisch (den manifesten Tisch) kennen wir aus dem Alltag und von dem zweiten Tisch (dem wissenschaftlichen Tisch) wissen wir aufgrund von natur-wissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen. Vor diesem Hintergrund stellt sich die Frage: Welcher der zwei Tische existiert objektiv, d.h. geistunab-hängig?

Die verbreitetste Antwort auf diese Frage besagt, dass beide Tische objektiv existierten. Im Kontext unseres Problems läuft diese Antwort auf die Behauptung hinaus, dass der manifeste Tisch aus den von der Wissenschaft postulierten Entitäten besteht. Somit sind der mani-feste und der wissenschaftliche Tisch numerisch identisch. Also gibt es eigentlich nur einen Tisch, der aber aus zwei Perspektiven betrachtet wird: Aus einer Alltagsperspektive besitzt der Tisch die wahrnehm-baren Eigenschaften, die wir ihm für gewöhnlich zuschreiben; aus einer

wissenschaftlichen Perspektive hingegen ist er ein System von nicht-wahrnehmbaren Entitäten.

Ich möchte ein Argument vorstellen, das genau diese Antwort ausschließen soll. Das Argument soll zeigen, dass der manifeste und der wissenschaftliche Tisch ontologisch inkompatibel sind. Da das Tischbeispiel nur ein willkürliches Beispiel ist, können wir auch allgemein sagen, dass das Argument zeigen soll, dass die Existenz von manifesten Entitäten inkompatibel ist mit der Existenz von wissenschaftlichen Entitäten. Das Inkompatibilitätsargument besagt mit anderen Worten, dass der naive Realismus und der wissenschaftliche Realismus unvereinbar sind. Mein Vortrag verfolgt zwei Ziele. Das erste Ziel besteht darin, eine genaue Rekonstruktion des Inkompatibilitätsarguments von Sellars zu liefern, die eine detaillierte Untersuchung aller Prämissen beinhalten soll. Das zweite Ziel besteht darin, darzulegen unter welchen Voraussetzungen das Argument Gültigkeit besitzt.

Meine zentrale These lautet: Das Inkompatibilitätsargument ist unter Annahmen schlüssig, die der Großteil der gegenwärtigen Philosophen und Philosophinnen vertritt. Somit gilt, dass der Großteil der gegenwärtigen Philosophen und Philosophinnen im Kontext unseres Problems inkompatible Ansichten vertritt.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	German
Chair:	Alexander Gebharter
Date:	16:40-17:10, 2 September 2015 (Wednesday)
Location:	HS 107

Adem Mulamustafić (Universität Potsdam, Germany)
Adem Mulamustafić (M.A.), 2008-2014 Studium der Philosophie (B.A. und M.A.) in Potsdam. Ab 04/2013 wiss. Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für theoretische Philosophie der Uni Potsdam. Dort ab 10/2014 Doktorand. Forschungsschwerpunkte: Metaphysik, allg. Wissenschaftsphilosophie, Sprachphilosophie. Fragestellung der Dissertation: Sind der naive Realismus und der wissenschaftliche Realismus kompatibel?
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Should rationality and justification be interpreted in internalist or externalist terms? The relationship between epistemic rationality and justification.

Aleksandra Ninković

By the rationality of a belief we mean the rightness of the process of acquiring our belief. To evaluate rationality we turn to sources of a belief. We also turn to sources of a belief to evaluate the justification of a belief. By justification of a belief we mean the necessary connection between a belief and the truth of a belief. First, different interpretations of epistemic justification are discussed. Arguments against both the internalist and the externalist interpretation of epistemic justification are presented and it is concluded that, to define epistemic justification, we need to include elements of both the internalist and the externalist interpretation of epistemic justification. Afterwards, the discussion turns to the relationship between epistemic rationality and epistemic justification. It is argued that, since we can enquire into the rightness of the process of acquiring our belief without enquiring into whether there exists a necessary connection between a belief and the truth of a belief, the concepts of epistemic rationality and epistemic justification should be understood as partly separate concepts. In the end, the discussion turns to whether epistemic rationality should be understood in internalist or externalist terms. It is argued that, although to define epistemic justification we need to include elements of both the internalist and the externalist interpretation of epistemic justification, to define epistemic rationality we only need to include elements of the internalist interpretation of epistemic rationality. It is concluded that epistemic rationality and epistemic justification are partly separate concepts and that epistemic justification should be defined in both internalist and externalist terms, whereas epistemic rationality should be defined only in internalist terms.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Christian J. Feldbacher
Date:	12:00-12:30, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 101

Aleksandra Ninković (University of Belgrade, Serbia)
Aleksandra Ninković is a second-year undergraduate student at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade. Her main philosophical interests are epistemology and philosophy of mind.
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The Notion of Harm in Reproductive Ethics

Alina Omerbasic

The starting point of this paper is the assumption that individuals should be given some room in reproductive decision-making – that there is "reproductive freedom". In respect of the ever-growing possibilities in artificial reproductive technologies the question arises what this freedom exactly consists of and where its limits lie. It makes sense to fix these limits on the basis of the principle of nonmaleficence. But then we need to clarify when resulting children are harmed by their parents' reproductive decisions.

By pointing out to the now famous Non-identity Problem Derek Parfit showed that this proves to be very difficult in so called 'genesis' or 'non-identity'-cases. In the context of reproduction these are cases in which some undesired conditions or traits like incurable genetic disorders are inevitably tied to the conception and therefore the existence of a child. No matter how questionable, unreasonable or even negligent the parents' decision was, which lead to the birth of the affected child, following the person-affecting harm principle it is not harmed by their decision. Consequently, it is not legitimate to intervene in the prospective parents' reproductive freedom.

Following Parfit and Dan Brock, it is argued that a promising – but also controversial – solution consists in the departure from a mere person-affecting harm principle in non-identity-cases simply because such principles cannot capture the moral wrong done in these cases. The moral wrong done does not consist in the reduction of a particular individual's well-being. Apparently we are concerned with another "category" of harm, which is best captured by a non-person-affecting harm principle.

Alina Omerbasic (University of Potsdam, Germany)
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Disagreement, Self-Refutation and the Minority Report of the Meta-Skeptics

Tamás Paár

There is a growing number of the advocates of meta-skepticism. Those who I call meta-skeptics in my paper argue that one should suspend judgment about every philosophical question. Most often they use the argument from disagreement to show that the suspension of our philosophical beliefs is our epistemic obligation. In the present paper I argue against the main motivation for this view and show that since even the meta-skeptics' stance is a contested philosophical one, their argument cannot succeed without refuting itself. Various meta-skeptics proposed counter-objections to this self-refutation objection. I consider here Jason Brennan's quite simple and Bryan Frances's more sophisticated counter-objections and in my replies to these I show why both are problematic. Brennan says that widespread disagreement is a sign of philosophy's unreliability. Yet, since even his position is subject to disagreement, it is self-undermining. Furthermore, Brennan does not give any reason why any first-order philosophical theory must lack the virtues that his proposal possesses. Frances argues

that even if the argument from disagreement is self-refuting and meta-skeptics have to suspend judgment about it, they might still remain skeptics after all. In my reply I show how Frances's defense of his position still relies on principles that could be the objects of further arguments from disagreement. This way Frances's application of the argument proves to be arbitrary. I conclude that the self-refutation objection shows that philosophers do not always have to adhere to the epistemic principle endorsed by meta-skeptics. My conclusion implies that avoiding every disagreement is not an option in philosophy: every one of us is entangled in deep philosophical disagreements.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Michael Bruckner
Date:	10:45-11:15, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 101

Tamás Paár (Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Hungary)
Former student of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences of the Pázmány Péter Catholic University (philosophy and communication studies) and the Central European University (philosophy), PhD student of the Doctoral School of Political Theory at the Pázmány Péter Catholic University.
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In Search of Greene's Argument

Norbert Paulo

The moral psychologist Joshua Greene has recently proposed new arguments for his claims concerning the normative significance of empirical (neuro-)science and the reliability of deontology. In this talk I discuss the arguments supporting these claims. Although it is often hard to pin down the details of Greene's position, much seems to hinge on the combination of various components of his research – namely the dual-process theory of moral judgment, personalness as a significant factor in moral decision-making, and

his functional understanding of deontology and consequentialism. Incorporating these components, I reconstruct three distinct arguments and show that the Personalness Argument for the claim that empirical research in general can advance normative ethics and the Combined Argument against deontology are both sound, empirically well-supported, and interesting in themselves. They do not, however, cast doubt on traditional deontology or reserve a specific role for cognitive science. The Indirect Route argument overcomes some of the other arguments' limitations. It is, however, invalid. I nonetheless suggest that Greene should give up the argument against deontology and should instead elaborate his argument along the lines of the Indirect Route. Properly developed, such an argument could yield interesting normative results without necessarily provoking an outcry amongst traditional philosophers.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Meredith McFadden
Date:	14:45-15:15, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 103

Norbert Paulo (University of Salzburg, Austria)
Norbert Paulo is assistent at the Department of Social Sciences and Economics, Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy of the University of Salzburg. He studied philosophy and law in Hamburg, Washington DC and East Anglia. His main research areas are Ethics, Applied Ethics and Philosophy of Law. He is also interested in Political Philosophy and Empirical Ethics.
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Why Epistemic Situationism is Bound to Fail

Daniel Pinto

ark Alfano (2011, 2013, 2014) along with John Doris and Lauren Olin (2014) have recently attempted to mount a situationist challenge to virtue epistemology. Situationism argues that given findings in cognitive psychology we can conclude

that (i) situations unlike intellectual traits have superior predictive and explanatory power and that (ii) robust or global traits do not seem to be widely instantiated in human psychology such that "mixed" virtue theories are undermined because the traits are not "praiseworthy" as traditionally conceived (Alfano 2011) and virtue reliabilist theories are undermined because the traits are construed so narrowly as to loose normative appeal (Doris & Olin 2014). I argue against situationism that (i) the preconception of "praiseworthiness" is not the proper criteria to judge knowledge, but rather success from ability and that (ii) the distinction made by Sosa (2007) of theory of knowledge and intellectual ethics is being conflated. Finally I argue using Greco's (2012) theory of knowledge attribution that (iii) given that the reliability component is determined by the structure of abilities; and given that the structure of intellectual abilities is fixed by the relevant interest, informational needs and the practical environment; it follows that situationism tracks the situations that are irrelevant to determine the structure of intellectual ability such that situationism cannot undermine the reliability of such abilities regardless of potentially new empirical data.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Patricia Meindl
Date:	14:00-14:30, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 101

Daniel Pinto (University of Waterloo, Canada)
I completed my B.A Honours in philosophy and minor in philosophy of science at the University of Western Ontario in 2014. I am in the process of completing my M.A in philosophy at the University of Waterloo in 2015. My main areas of interest are metaphysics, specifically modality, as well as epistemology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science.
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A Solution to the Complex First Paradox

Nina Laura Poth

The complex-first paradox consists in the fact that children acquire complex concepts (concrete nouns like dog) earlier than simple concepts (abstract attributes like green), even though in the light of our best neuroscientific theories of word learning one would expect learning the former is harder than learning the latter and, thus, takes more time (Werning 2010). In particular, we know that concrete nouns "are semantically more complex and their neural realizations more widely distributed in cortex than those expressed by the other word classes in question" (Werning 2010, 1097). We also know that the more widely distributed neural realizations are, the more costly it is for the organism to implement these neural realizations and the more time it takes to implement them. Together these claims present a puzzle for cognitive scientists and philosophers of language: how is it possible that children learn complex concepts earlier than simple concepts?

In my paper I want to present a novel philosophical solution to the complex-first paradox. Instead of focusing on neuroscientific theories about the development of neural realizations of mental representations, I suggest employing theories of rational learning. In particular, I introduce a Bayesian theory of word learning that not only demonstrates how agents can infer a hypothesis about the meaning of a word from just a few instances but also why agents learn the meaning of concrete nouns faster than the meaning of abstract attributes. The theory I want to suggest is a generalization of Xu & Tenenbaum's (2007) theory of word learning (which is restricted to learning nouns). Thus, even though it might be more costly for an organism to implement neural realizations of complex concepts children are nevertheless faster in learning them, because it is easier to infer their meaning from just a few instances than it is to learn the meaning of simple concepts.

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Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Gerhard Kreuch
Date: 18:00-18:30, 2 September 2015 (Wednesday)
Location: HS 104

Nina Laura Poth (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany)
Nina Laura Poth is a Master student in the Cognitive Science Program at Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Department of Psychology. She is currently working as a student assistant in the Mercator Research Group I "Structure of Memory", under supervision of Univ. Prof. Dr. Markus Werning, Chair of Philosophy of Language and Cognition. Her research interest focuses on how agents infer causal relationships regarding word learning.
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Interpersonal Aggregation and Lexically Ordered Harms

Johanna Privitera

Let rescue cases be cases in which an agent can spare different persons from different harms but cannot help all of them. An ongoing debate in ethics concerns the question of how to account for our intuitions regarding moral duties in these cases. In particular, it is difficult find a rationale that accommodates both the intuition that we ought to save the larger number of persons in cases in which the harms at stake are similarly bad and the intuition that we ought to save those suffering the individually worst harms if the harms at stake are very different.

My talk is divided into two parts. In the first part, I will discuss a recent proposal by Alex Voorhoeve (*How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims*, Ethics 125(1), 2014), which builds on both aggregative and nonaggregative reasoning to account for our duties in rescue cases. Voorhoeve's theory, however, violates the axiom of transitivity and therefore judges actions to be morally good that should not count as such. A natural attempt to solve this problem fails. It would make the theory violate the axiom of irrelevance of independent alternatives and thus render it incapable of accounting for the obvious wrongness of certain other actions.

In the second part of the talk, I will then argue for an alternative account that divides harms into different, lexically ordered classes and that builds on aggregative reasoning only to account for our duties in rescue cases. First, I will show how this account can accommodate our intuitions about duties in rescue cases. Then I will show how it can avoid the problems Voorhoeve's theory faces. And finally, I will defend my account against the objection that it forces us to characterize certain harms as belonging to different classes while we intuitively think they should belong to the same.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Elias Moser
Date:	18:00-18:30, 2 September 2015 (Wednesday)
Location:	HS 103

Johanna Privitera (Humboldt University Berlin, Germany)
Johanna is an M.A. candidate in Philosophy at Humboldt University, Berlin. She holds a B.A. in Philosophy and Political Science from Free University, Berlin. Her main philosophical interests lie in normative and applied ethics.
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Plato, Self-Predication, and Identity

Jonas Raab

In my presentation, I shall consider a section of the Platonic dialogue "Sophistes" (249d-255e) in which Plato introduces the so-called greatest genera (megista gene Soph. 254d4) and discusses them. I shall look for an identity criterion for these Ideas/Forms and discuss it. Working on the assumption (which will only be argued for very roughly) that the so-called "Third Man" argument rests on an identity criterion, I will show that even if the "Third Man" does not provide a problem for a theory of Forms, the underlying identity criterion does not provide a sufficient basis to distinguish between these. Thus, Quine's dictum "no entity without identity" is not satisfied and

the theory of Forms collapses. Finally, I will work towards a reading of the Forms which will fix this problem in a more general setting. However, the Platonic spirit of the underlying theory shall be preserved as much as possible. This will lead to the suggestion that every Form is distinguishable only by the fact that it does not partake of itself.

Section:	History of Philosophy
Language:	English
Chair:	Albert Anglberger
Date:	15:30-16:00, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 104

Jonas Raab (LMU München, Germany)
I am currently not enrolled in philosophy since I graduated in 2014; however, I just applied to the MCMP master program in logic and philosophy of science. Right now I am trying to get someone to supervise a PhD thesis.
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What kind of principle is the Precautionary Principle?

Tanja Rechnitzer

Climate change confronts us with the question of how we should deal with the risk of uncertain, yet possibly catastrophic, harms. One principle that is often proposed to answer this question is the Precautionary Principle (PP). In this paper, I present an integrative understanding of the PP as part of a framework for risk-regulation.

The basic idea underlying the PP can be summarized as "better safe than sorry". In this vague formulation, the PP is broadly accepted. How it must be understood, however, is highly controversial. Three interpretations dominate the discussion. First, the PP has been discussed as an action-guiding rule, telling us which course of action to choose given certain circumstances. Second, it has been interpreted as an epistemic principle, telling us what we should reasonably belief under conditions

of uncertainty. Third, it has been argued that the PP is best understood as expressing procedural requirements for decision-making.

I propose that we should not regard these interpretations as principles which are mutually exclusive or incompatible, but as expressing complementary aspects: Each interpretation addresses an important element of precautionary risk regulation, but on its own, none of them is sufficient to provide a convincing understanding of the PP.

I argue that the PP is a normative principle for practical decision-making in public policies, and consequently action-guiding. However, it requires that risks are assessed in a suitable way and it needs to be embedded in a broader procedural framework which helps to identify when the PP applies and what it demands in a specific context. The "epistemic" and the "procedural" interpretation are thus not principles of their own, but necessary supplements to the correct interpretation of the PP as an action-guiding principle. I will show how these aspects can be combined in a systematic way, thereby enabling the PP to structure our decision-making processes when facing uncertain harms.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Frauke Albersmeier
Date:	09:00-09:30, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 103

Tanja Rechnitzer (Universität Bern, Switzerland)
Tanja Rechnitzer is a Ph.D. student at the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Berne, working on a dissertation with the title "Justifying a Precautionary Principle for Climate Policies – A Case Study for Reflective Equilibrium". Her dissertation is part of the project "Reflective Equilibrium – Reconception and Application", funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. She holds a Master's Degree in European Studies (Europäische Kultur- und Ideengeschichte) from the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.
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The "Social" in Social Empiricism

Miguel de la Riva

My presentation is about scientific objectivity. "Contextual" or "Social Empiricists" like Helen Longino argue that scientific objectivity is dependent upon social features of science. That is, she maintains that scientific knowledge is objective, or acquires a higher degree of objectivity, if it is produced in a social process characterized by mutual criticism. She argues that theory choice would otherwise be arbitrary, for theories are underdetermined by data. Since for any set of empirical data there is a great number of empirically equivalent but mutually contradicting theories, theory choice would be subject to individual preferences and idiosyncrasies, were it not a matter of a collective process transcending individual contributions. Only if scientific knowledge is produced "collectively through the clashing and mashing of a variety of points of view", Longino says, it can be assumed to be independent of subjective preference.

Some have criticized this position on the ground that it overestimates the range of possible theories for any set of data. Partly because I think this criticism is mistaken, I want to continue discussion in a different direction: What notion of the social is inherent in Social Empiricist's conception of scientific objecitivity? I try to show that Longino's conception of scientific objectivity rests on an individualist conception of the social and that her account of scientific objectivity can be challenged by challenging the conception of the social implicit to it.

Therefore, I think, we need to ask how to understand the nature of the social in science in order to develop a coherent conception of scientific objetcivity. In a concluding section, I wish to indicate avenues of further research to this end. I will briefly look on the career of the concept of the social in 20th century philosophy of science, focusing here on writings of Ludwik Fleck and Karl Popper.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Philippe van Basshuysen
Date:	12:15-12:45, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 107

Miguel de la Riva (Universität Wien, Austria)
Miguel de la Riva is enrolled in a B.Sc. degree in psychology at the
University of Vienna. Previously, he studied Philosophy and Sociology
in Cologne and Munich and obtained a B.A. in 2015. He has been a
guest at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna from February to
April 2012 and has between Summer 2013 and Summer 2014 been the
editor-in-chief of a student magazine in philosophy at LMU Munich,
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Production, Dependence and Mental Causation worth wanting

Matthias Rolffs

The biggest challenge for non-reductive physicalism is certainly Jaegwon Kim's Argument from Causal Exclusion (ACE). Kim (1998, 2005) argues that non-reductive physicalism inevitably leads to epiphenomenalism. Epiphenomenalism, however, is tantamount to "the end of the world", as Jerry Fodor (1989) puts it. So non-reductive physicalism must be abandoned.

One promising way of reacting to the ACE is to focus on the involved concept of causation. Ned Hall (2004) distinguishes two concepts of causation: production and dependence. Kim (2005, 2007) concedes that the ACE's plausibility rests on a production-account of causation – maybe in the spirit of Dowe's (2000) Conserved Quantity Account of physical causation. Non-reductive physicalists typically try to defend themselves against the ACE by putting forth some kind of dependence-account of causation – for example along the lines of Lewis' (1973) counterfactual account or Woodwards (2003) interventionist account of causation.

I take it that both Kim and his non-reductive opponents are perfectly right: Given non-reductive physicalism, mental properties really do not produce physical properties. But still, even given non-reductive physicalism, physical properties causally depend on mental properties. There is mental dependence, but no mental production (cf. Loewer (2007)). Therefore, the decisive question is: What kind of mental cau-

sation is worth wanting? How terrible is productive epiphenomenalism? And how worthwhile is mental dependence?

In my talk I will argue that, contrary to what Kim (2007) claims, the only important kind of mental causation is mental dependence. Neither causal action theory nor folk psychology requires mental production. For those purposes, mental dependence will suffice. Kim does not make a convincing case for the claim that something additional is required. If my argument goes through, non-reductive physicalists do not need to worry about the reductionists' ACE: There is no mental production, but there is no reason to think that mental production is important anyway. There are, however, good reasons to think that mental dependence is important. But mental dependence does not fall prey to the ACE.

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Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Pascale Lötscher
Date:	11:15-11:45, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 104

Matthias Rolffs (University of Bonn, Germany)
Matthias Rolffs (M.A.), University of Bonn. 2013 Master of Arts with a thesis on Compatibilism and the Ability to do Otherwise. Currently working on a PhD-thesis on Mental Causation and Causal Pluralism.
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Could envatted brains be rational?

Giovanni Rolla

It seems like we can conceive of situations in which a subject in a radical skeptical scenario is rational*. Imagine an envatted brain (henceforth, BIV) who avoids inferential pitfalls and is thoroughly careful when assessing the available evidence on any given matter, despite being systematically deceived by the one controlling the BIV's perceptual inputs. By joining the two theses exposed below, however, we arrive at the conclusion that BIVs cannot hold rational thoughts about its environment. I take this to be a puzzle worthy of consideration.

Consider first epistemological disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge, a view that denies the existence of a common-factor between cases perception and the equivalent bad cases (illusion, hallucination, being a BIV)**. A radical version of disjunctivism holds that there is nothing epistemically common between cases of perception, in good circumstances, and the equivalent bad cases, for perception that P implies P. Thus, when I look out the window and see a goldfinch with sufficient attention and under favorable lights, I entertain a perceptual state that qualifies as knowledge. Suppose I have a counterpart who is a BIV and only appears to see a goldfinch (his perceptual belief that here is a goldfinch is false). According to the radical version of disjunctivism I propose, the BIV is not in a perceptual state (and obviously lacks knowledge). Although it seems an unorthodox doctrine, we should be

aware of the advantages disjunctivism has to offer. In particular, it enables us to give a compelling response to the skeptical problem of underdetermination. This variety of skepticism says that our beliefs are unjustified, since they are based on underdetermined evidence, i.e. evidence that is compatible both with everyday beliefs and skeptical scenarios. Disjunctivism allows us to say that our beliefs are not based on underdetermined evidence, for our perceptual deliverances are veridical when we exercise them in good circumstances. Furthermore, according to epistemological disjunctivism, one can readily access the rational basis of one's perceptual beliefs, if they are formed in favorable conditions, thus acquiring reflective knowledge. In the case above, the fact that I see a goldfinch is all I need to appeal to in order to reflectively justify my first-order knowledge that there is a goldfinch yonder.

Now, a transformative view of rationality holds that rationality is not something logically posterior to first-order thinking about the world, it is rather the actualization of conceptual capacities in perception. This view is entailed by the rejection of the myth of the Given, according to which perception provides us with an epistemically efficient and non-conceptual given upon which all our beliefs are based. In the contemporary literature, Sellars (1997) is the pioneer in attacking the myth of the Given, followed by McDowell (1994) and many others. Matthew Boyle recently argued (in an unpublished paper) that to deny the myth of the Given is to commit oneself to a transformative view of rationality. I will accept these results in order to advance the main argument.

By joining the radical version of epistemological disjunctivism I propose above with a transformative view of rationality, we extract the consequence that envatted brains cannot be rational, for they lack perceptual experiences, the kind of experience in which rationality operates. My aim in this presentation is to defend this conclusion - instead of interpreting it as a reductio ad absurdum of at least one of its premises - by independent considerations. My stance here depends on the assessment of rationality attributions to individuals in real, non-fictional cases of illusion and hallucination, for those cases are presented as the possibilities which supposedly ground the more general possibility of being a BIV.

In usual cases of illusion, one is either being systematically deceived or being rational. A down-to-earth description of illusion episodes must allow for the fact that we are perfectly able to put ourselves, imaginatively or otherwise, in different positions. Through the use of memory

and inference we can refrain from believing in illusions – consider the classic case of a stick partially immersed in the water. Instead of simply believing it is suddenly broken, we are generally able to remember whether it was broken before being immersed, and we have plenty of background knowledge which plays against the hypothesis that things suddenly break when we see them through different mediums (such as water and air). What Noë (2004, 2012) calls our sensorimotor abilities plays an important role in plausible cases of illusion as well: we can move around, see things from different perspectives – and we have a practical understanding on how our perception of things remains the same or changes in relation to our movement. We can, for instance, pick up the stick or touch it and find it is not broken despite "looking" so (if we are gullible enough to think it is). In normal cases of illusion, we would say we are rational if we avoid believing illusions are real, because it is entirely available to us to do so. Skeptical scenarios, in contrast, demand us to imagine a situation in which there is nothing the BIV can do to avoid being systematically deceived. Therefore, to the extent that skeptical scenarios trade upon the concept of illusion to offer an extrapolation of that kind of error, they are undue extrapolations.

We achieve the same result if we construe skeptical scenarios as extrapolations of hallucination cases. Consider individuals that suffer from Charles Bonnet syndrome (henceforth, CBS) – a condition that causes periodical visual hallucinations due to the gradual loss of vision. These individuals are able to reliably discern intermittent hallucinations from veridical perception. In these cases, including ones in which the patient partially retains her perceptual capacities, there is no definitive impact on the ability to reason, what allows one to identify hallucinatory episodes through the context in which they occur, through cross-modal inspection (such as touch and hearing) and through the repetition of certain patterns (such as lilliputian individuals, fancy and colorful clothes, bizarre augmentations of facial features, lack of sound and interaction with the hallucinating subject, etc.) Thus, patients with CBS remain rational – as opposed to, for instance, delusional individuals who recurrently fail to distinguish perception and hallucination. We are more inclined to say that the individual is irrational when she is unable to achieve the right perceptive results. However, skeptical scenarios invite us to think of subjects who are systematically entertaining false beliefs and have perfectly functional cognitive abilities – they can reason properly, they can remember stuff, they are careful when considering the available evidences, etc. (otherwise we would not even be tempted to

say that they are rational in the first place) – so, to the extent that such scenarios trade upon cases of hallucination, I claim they are undue extrapolations of the normal uses of the concept.

Philosophical tradition has ignored the implicit discrepancy between, on the one hand, the philosophical use of the concepts of illusion and hallucination and, on the other, everyday attributions of rationality. As a consequence, it has put more weight on the idea that we are inclined to say that envatted brains could be rational, instead of questioning the legitimacy of skeptical scenarios. The theoretical justification for this is in part due to the wide and unscrutinized acceptance of additive views on rationality, as Boyle puts it, – yet the underlying common-kind (i.e., non-disjunctivist) view on perception also plays a part. Now, if the construction of skeptical scenarios uses the concepts of hallucination and illusion in ways that conflict with our intuitions about normal cases regarding the rationality of individuals suffering from hallucinations or entertaining episodes of illusion, it is not surprising that we could not know what to say when we take a closer look on skeptical hypotheses. The upshot is that skeptical scenarios show us nothing about our rationality, in particular, they do not testify against our conclusion that it is only possible for an individual to be rational about her environment if she entertains genuine cases of perception. The core of my critique to the construction of skeptical scenarios (namely, that they rely on undue extrapolations of everyday concepts and, by doing so, show us nothing about what is to be rational), is similar to an idea brilliantly described by Austin:

If we have made sure it's a goldfinch, and a real goldfinch, and then in the future it does something outrageous (explodes, quotes Mrs. Woolf, or what not), we don't say we were wrong to say it was a goldfinch, we don't know what to say. Words literally fail us: "What would you have said?""What are we to say now?""What would you say?" (Austin, 1946: 88).

As a corollary of my main argument, we face important considerations on the value and the limits of using skeptical scenarios (and maybe, more generally, science fiction) in doing philosophy.

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Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Christian J. Feldbacher
Date:	10:30-11:00, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 101

Giovanni Rolla (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil)
Is a Brazilian student of philosophy. Has a bachelor's degree (2007-2010) and a master's degree (2011-2013) in philosophy from Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. Currently is a PhD candidate at the same university (since 2014). Works mainly with analytic epistemology and philosophy of mind.
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Representing phenomenal properties: Pereboom's panacea for physicalism

Andrew J. Routledge

hysicalism has come under sustained fire due to its alleged inability to explain certain apparent features of phenomenal properties. In particular, it is often claimed that we have an inner awareness of the intrinsic qualitative nature of phenomenal properties and that this cannot be captured in physical terms. Carving out a new defensive strategy, Pereboom (2011) argues that our awareness of phenomenal properties may involve systematic error. In part 1 I set out Pereboom's case. Drawing an analogy with our perception of colour, he observes that our visual experience arguably represents colours as having certain intrinsic qualitative properties that science suggests that they actually lack. Pereboom claims that it is an open possibility that our introspective representations of phenomenal properties misattribute intrinsic qualitative properties in a parallel way. Moreover, he argues that this possibility defuses a range of textbook anti-Physicalist arguments, such as the Knowledge Argument, the Conceivability Argument, and the Explanatory Gap Argument.

In part 2 I describe how Pereboom fails to establish that such radical error is possible. I argue that its feasibility hinges on which model of inner awareness is correct. I review three possible models and show that two are prima facie incompatible with systematic error whilst the third is revisionary and unpopular with Anti-Physicalists. I go on to suggest that the only way to break this deadlock is to provide independent motivation for adopting a compatible model.

In part 3 I attempt to discharge this duty. I argue that our experience of relations, such as simultaneity, offers a surprising insight into the mechanics of our inner awareness. I show, firstly, that it is plausible to think that every phenomenal property appears to stand in at least one relation to a property that is represented. I then argue that it is implausible to claim that we can experience hybrid relations where our awareness of one relatum is representational and involves the capacity for error whilst our awareness of the other relatum is non-representational and does not. I suggest that this gives us good reason to think that we only ever represent phenomenal properties and systematic error is possible. This grants Physicalists the resources to challenge the standard battery of anti-Physicalist arguments.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Gerhard Kreuch
Date:	16:40-17:10, 2 September 2015 (Wednesday)
Location:	HS 104

Andrew J. Routledge (Philosophy, United Kingdom)
Andrew J. Routledge is currently in the process of completing a PhD at the University of Manchester, where he also tutors on a range of modules and works as a Widening Participation Fellow. His research interests lie predominantly in Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, and Philosophy of Psychology. Under the supervision of Tim Bayne, his thesis examines three core questions concerning the basic structure of experience and the relationship between these questions. The first of these is the Unity Question: What does co-consciousness consist in? The second is the Counting Question: How many experiences does a unified region of consciousness involve? Should we think of our experience at a time as consisting in just one very rich experience, in a handful of sense-specific experiences, or in many simpler experiences? The third and final question, the Dependency Question, is interested in the degree of autonomy that the various different aspects of our experience have. I offer a new answer to the Unity Question and argue that it has striking implications for the way that we address the Counting Question and the Dependency Question.
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<p style="text-align:center">❦</p>

"I was blind, but now I see"? - the critique of aspect-seeing approach to religious beliefs

Stanisław Ruczaj

One of the elements of Ludwig Wittgenstein's thought which became inspiring for contemporary Philosophy of Religion is his discussion of aspect seeing, developed in Philosophical Investigations. Authors such as N. K. Verbin (2000, 2001), Hick (1969), Kellenberger (2002) and Scott (1998) present an approach to religious beliefs which identifies them with seeing aspects. Just like one

may suddenly perceive likeness between two faces, so can religious believer see the world as created or perceive certain book as the word of God. In both cases the other person who observes the same thing may fail to notice the relevant aspects. So, the believer and atheist are in a way perceiving the same world, but in different ways.

In my speech, I will present the assumptions of this approach to the nature of religious beliefs and I will point to its weak points. There are two arguments against identifying religious beliefs with seeing aspects. The first is that seeing aspect is an event which is temporary in a way which having belief is not. The second is that one can see religious aspects of reality and not have the relevant religious beliefs, so the two cannot be identified.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Patricia Meindl
Date:	15:30-16:00, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 101

Stanisław Ruczaj (Jagiellonian University, Poland)
I am PhD Student in Philosophy at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, Poland. My research focuses on Philosophy of Religion (the nature of religious faith, the problem of evil and the theories of religious language) and philosophy of Soren Kierkegaard. In my work, I try to connect analytic and continental approaches. I am also interested in Theology, especially the Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith. I like cats and German football.
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The Close Enough View in distributive ethics and two dominance objections

Korbinian Rüger

How ought we to distribute harms and benefits across different individuals when they have competing claims to be helped? Starting from a Nagelian point of view that engages in pairwise comparisons of individual claims to be helped, I defend an essentially non-aggregative approach to this problem. However, I hold that this approach ought to make room for aggregating competing claims that are sufficiently close to another in strength. Following Derek Parfit I call this the close enough view.

I then go on to defend the close enough view against two dominance objections. These objections hold that the close enough view prescribes actions that can lead to outcomes that are dominated by outcomes that alternative, thoroughgoing aggregative approaches would produce. The first of these objections holds that it could lead one to act in a way that makes every anonymized position involved worse off. In other words, the approach is in violation of what has been called the anonymous Pareto principle. I argue that this objection assumes that we always ought to do what leads to the best overall (anonymized) outcome. If one denies this consequentialist presupposition, like an adherent of the close-enough view is likely to do, the objection is drained of its force. In other words, I argue that while it is true that in some cases the close enough view does violate the anonymous Pareto principle, this is not necessarily a problem.

The second dominance objection holds that when faced with a choice not between single acts but between sequences of acts, the close enough view could even lead one to act in a way that makes every "identified" individual involved worse off, violating what I call the person-affecting Pareto principle. I argue that this objection also fails. If an adherent of the close-enough view knew that a sequence of acts would lead to making every identified individual worse off, she would not choose this sequence. If, on the other hand, she does not know that a certain sequence of acts would make every identified individual worse off, then she does not do anything wrong by performing single isolated acts that are prescribed by the close enough view, even if they are part of such a sequence. I therefore argue that the close enough view does not violate the person-affecting Pareto principle.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Elias Moser
Date: 17:20-17:50, 2 September 2015 (Wednesday)
Location: HS 103

Korbinian Rüger (London School of Economics and Political Sciences, Germany)
Korbinian Rueger's research interests mainly lie in moral and political philosophy. He holds a BA in Philosophy and Economics from the University of Bayreuth and is currently studying for an MSc in Philosophy from the London School of Economics.
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"...but in any case you will have the Poles on your side." Prior's Reception of Lesniewski's Ideas: A Comparison of Sobocinski's and Lejewski's Influence

Zuzana Rybaříková

A. N. Prior was deeply influenced by Leśniewski's system of logic. However, Leśniewski's premature death and the destruction of his archive during the Warsaw Uprising meant that Leśniewski's system of logic was not easily available for him. Prior discussed Leśniewski's system of logic in his papers, but since his knowledge of Leśniewski's logic was only indirect, the papers contained several mistakes and misinterpretation. In order to assess Leśniewski's system of logic profoundly, Prior started a correspondence with two of Leśniewski's students, Bolesław Soboćinski and Czesław Lejewski.

These two logicians made divergent approaches to the system of their professor. Soboćinski adopted Leśniewski's preciseness and in his papers introduced and developed Leśniewski's system. Therefore, when Soboćinski presented Leśniewski's system of logic to Prior in his letters, he stressed what Leśniewski's ideas originally were and provided throughout them demonstrations of Leśniewski's Protothetic, Ontology and Mereology. On the contrary, Lejewski approximated more

Leśniewski's logic to orthodox systems of logic (based on Frege's and Russell's views). Lejewski also found in his papers parallels among these two systems and provided an illuminative comparison of them.

The main aim of my talk is to present how these two approaches reflected Prior's understanding of Leśniewski's system of logic. This will be demonstrated in Soboćinski and Lejewski's letters to Prior, their papers and in Prior's work where Leśniewski's logic was discussed and included into Prior's philosophy. In addition, the differences between orthodox logic and Leśniewski's system will be introduced, specifically, which advantages of Leśniewski's system were so tempting for Prior that, despite the difficulties, he dared to use it.

Section:	History of Philosophy
Language:	English
Chair:	Albert Anglberger
Date:	14:00-14:30, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 104

Zuzana Rybaříková (Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic)
Zuzana Rybaříková (Mgr.) Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic. 2010 Bacalaureate in Philosophy and History, 2012 master in Philosophy and History, theses about The Antique and Medieval Inspirations of A. N. Prior's Temporal Logic. Publications in History of Logic and Ontology.
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Circularity and Coordination. A non-circular account of collective intentional action

Jules Salomone

Various accounts of joint intentions to perform collective actions have been recently offered by way of conceptual analyses. As they stand, such analyses have had to face circularities objections. Consider first Bratman's authoritative account: that each participant intends that we perform some collective action X is a necessary condition for the intended performance of such X. Critics

have complained that this proposal is circular insofar as the analysans seems to presuppose the collective intentional action that it is meant to analyze. Tuomela's reputable account falls prey to the same circularity charge. According to him, a group of people have a joint intention to perform the collective action X only if each of them intends to perform his/her bit of X. Critics have argued that in individually intending to contribute to the collective action X, participants are already assumed to jointly intend the performance of X, in which case the analysandum occurs in the analysans. Although distinctively different from Bratman and Tuomela's approaches, Gilbert's account is laid open to a similar worry.

In this paper, I will first assess the relevance of these circularity objections and the solutions offered in order to defuse them. In doing so, I will be led to distinguish viciously circular conceptual analyses from non-viciously circular ones, and argue that even the latter fail to capture the distinctive features of collective intentional actions. As a result, it will be clear that neither the sharp distinction between the theoretical and the practical upheld by Tuomela, nor Searle's claim in favor of the primitiveness of collective intentionality, nor Bratman's appeal to intention-neutral actions are conclusive.

I will then proceed to my positive account of collective intentional actions and argue that such actions presuppose a background of intention-neutral collective actions leading to normatively evaluable collective outcomes. Explaining first why the powerful intentionalist bias that has pervaded the literature on collective intentional actions must be resisted, I will seek to offer the existence and identity conditions of intention-neutral collective actions. In doing so, I will engage with the emerging literature on the topic, and claim that intention-neutral collective actions are collective neither in virtue of agents' shared goals, nor in virtue of causal powers ascribed to collective units of agency, but because of individuals' strategic interactions with one another. I will then spell out the reasons that may lead individuals involved in such coordinated actions to engage in full-blown collective intentional actions.

This discussion should cast doubt on the somewhat individualistic, social-contract theoretic approach that dominates the existing literature on the subject of collective intentional actions. I also believe that my account is well-suited to adequately capture collective intentional actions more complex than the ones usually addressed in the literature (e.g.

painting a house, taking a walk, moving a table etc.). More specifically, my account should cast light on a variety of collective actions related to the economic and the environmental spheres.

Section:	Metaphysics
Language:	English
Chair:	Fabio Ceravolo
Date:	09:00-09:30, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 122

Jules Salomone (CUNY/Graduate Center, USA)
Currently enrolled at CUNY/The Graduate Center as a first-year Ph.D. candidate, I previously studied philosophy in France at the Ecole Normale Supérieure. My areas of interest fall within three categories. I am highly interested in social ontology, an emerging field of research straddling well-established sub-disciplines of philosophy (namely philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, ethics, meta-ethics, metaphysics, social and political philosophy, philosophy of social sciences). More specifically, I am keen to explore the ways in which social ontology may cast light on long-debated issues familiar to social scientists, and especially to economists. This has recently resulted in a paper on the subject of money that I presented at the NYU-Columbia Graduate Conference last March. Stemming from this fascination for social ontology, I have developed a keen interest in metaphysics, especially in issues that arise in social ontology (artifacts, dependence relations, general ontology etc.). I am currently working on a paper on the slingshot argument. Finally, owing to my former continental education, I am very curious about German Idealism, and more particularly Kant. After having recently presented a paper on Transcendental Idealism at the Princeton-Penn-Columbia Graduate Conference, I will soon attend the International Summer School in German Philosophy at Bonn University.
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Animal Rights - Interpretation and Justification - Towards a UN-Declaration of Animal Rights

Doris Schneeberger

In this talk, a proposal for a future Universal Declaration of Animal Rights is presented. Alongside the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this proposal provides a basis for a discussion about animal rights concerning diverse aspects of animal life and the quality of it. Next to the basic and most important rights (right to life, right to proper nutrition and shelter, right to freedom), also social rights (right to enjoy social (and sexual) relationships, family, love, procreation, etc.) and even political rights will be discussed. Additionally, ways of political and juridical representation of nonhuman animals in a society which respects human and animal rights will be thematised.

Two major aims of this project are firstly to discuss animal rights regarding many aspects of a "good" animal life and secondly to test our intuitions concerning which rights should justly be granted to animals. As basis for the normative argumentation lies, of course, a more fundamental reflection on what (for example) love or family means for some species. Without this basic reflection on the values necessary for a "good" and "happy" animal life (and the claim that a good and happy animal life is something worth protecting and worth striving for), a normative reasoning for why animals should be granted this or that right would not be thoroughly grounded and thus possibly not strong in its argumentative and persuasive force.

Animal dignity is, of course, a central metaphysical concept when it comes to discussing animal rights. This concept will therefore be thematised as well. An intriguing research question is furthermore whether acknowledging animal dignity is a solid foundation for normative ethical reasoning or whether an interest-centred approach would be preferable. A reason for accepting the latter assumption is that "dignity" is a highly metaphysical (maybe even religious) concept whereas interests can be studied from an apparently less problematic biological point of view.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Maximilian Kiener
Date:	14:00-14:30, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 103

Doris Schneeberger (University of Salzburg, Austria)
Doris Schneeberger is a PhD student at the University of Salzburg. Her main area of interest is animal ethics.
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Quantum-logical arguments against the distributive law and their defeaters

Annika Schuster

t is argued by Garrett Birkhoff and John von Neumann in "The Logic of Quantum Mechanics" (1938) and by Hilary Putnam in "Is logic empirical?" (1968) that the distributive law

$$\text{(DL)} \ p \wedge (q \vee r) \leftrightarrow (p \wedge q) \vee (p \wedge r)$$

does not apply in quantum logic, a logical system covering propositions from the area of quantum mechanics, the reason being that certain quantum phenomena lead to a set of propositions p,q,r which serves as a counterexample for DL. It is concluded that a new logic is needed to deal with quantum mechanics (QM) and according to Putnam this new logic is the "real" logic of the world.

Birkhoff and von Neumann name a set of propositions for which the DL does not hold because of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle according to which to certain statements on the position and the momentum of a particle at the same time cannot be assigned the truth value true.

Putnam argues that the DL cannot apply for quantum phenomena for mathematical reasons. In the course of his argument he assigns to each quantum proposition a one-dimensional subspace in Hilbert space and examines which implications this assignment has for a certain set

of propositions. This leads to the conclusion that not only does the DL not hold in QM but also its failure can be used to explain why certain statements are not possible in QM.

In my talk I will show why the failure of the distributive law in quantum logic does not imply the invalidity of classical logic in quantum mechanics. I will reconstruct Birkhoff & von Neumann's and Putnam's arguments against the DL and show how they might be defeated by arguments from Karl Popper and Gerhard Schurz (who criticize the propositions that Birkhoff and von Neumann use for logical or quantum-mechanical reasons) as well as John Stachel and John Bell & Michael Hallett (who criticize the way in which Putnam derives implications from his logical system).

Annika Schuster (Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Germany)
Annika Schuster (B.A.), Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf. 2015, B.A. in Philosophy; Thesis about Quantum Logic.
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A Unified Transparency Account of Self-Knowledge

Lukas Schwengerer

I argue for an original account of self-knowledge regarding propositional attitudes. The core claim is that every time a first-order attitude is produced, a dispositional second-order belief is also formed. Both attitudes share parts of their production, which ensures reliability while still keeping fallibility. This account can be labeled as a transparency account because it satisfies Gareth Evans's (1982) idea that one can acquire self-knowledge by attending to an outward phenomenon instead of "gazing inward" of any sort. Thereby it is vastly different of traditional inner-sense or acquaintance based accounts of self-knowledge.

Consider this example: You look with full awareness, and under normal conditions, at a nearby red car. The process of perception causes you to believe that there is a red car. Now, if I am correct, the very same process also partially causes the second-order belief that you believe there is a red car. It is, in a sense, correct to claim that perception produced this second-order belief, and that it was caused by a complex of whatever is part of the process: the car, light, visual organ, neural activity, etc. Suppose that a friend asks you whether you believe there is a red car nearby while you are still looking at it. You instantly affirm that you do. This can be explained by you having the second-order belief about the first-order belief regarding the car, simply from looking at the car. There is no need for additional monitoring or inference to obtain to this second-order belief, because it was already formed as soon as you looked at the car. Even more so, you will probably be startled when your friend asks you this while you are still looking at the car. This would certainly be a very strange question in everyday speech, but why? This is because the answer to the question seems to be so obvious. And I think that this indicates a direct connection of believing to have a perceptual belief about the red car and having a perceptual belief about the red car, i.e., the connection of the second-order attitude and the first-order attitude. I propose that this connection can be best explained by the attitudes' shared formation processes.

In a first part I present the key features of self-knowledge as an explanandum. I thereby identify the characteristic asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of others' mental states and the requirement of explaining both reliability and fallibility. In the second part I describe the core idea of transparency as popularized by Evans (1982) and how this relates to my approach. Finally, in the third part I present the central principle of my account and show how it explains the key features identified in part one. I show how this basic model explains privileged access, reliability, and the possibility of self-deception. Furthermore, the model is applicable to all propositional attitudes, which is an explanatory advantage compared to other transparency accounts of self-knowledge.

Reference:

Evans, G. (1982). The varieties of reference. (J. McDowell, Ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Christian J. Feldbacher
Date:	11:15-11:45, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 101

Lukas Schwengerer (University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom)
Lukas Schwengerer MA (University of Edinburgh). BA and MA at the
University of Vienna, with a MA thesis on inference to the best expla-
nation and the hard problem of consciousness. Since 2014 PhD student
at the University of Edinburgh working on epistemology and philosophy
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Testing epistemic efficiencies via data-driven simulations

Vlasta Sikimic

A shift in applied epistemology from a single-agent knowledge to examination of group knowledge acquisition aroused the interest in research of multi-agent dynamics. The scope of knowledge distributed within a group ("virtual knowledge") is always wider than that of individual knowledge although the agents typically may not be aware of this. In the pioneering attempt of exploring this phenomenon, K. Zollman and others used the hypotheses-driven computer simulations to demonstrate that cognitive diversity of individuals increases virtual knowledge.

First of all, we will introduce the necessary conceptual notions from social epistemology of science, since our focus will be on knowledge acquisition in science. Secondly, we point out the virtues and the limits of hypotheses-driven computer simulations. We conclude that data-driven simulations are more adequate than hypotheses-driven ones when testing epistemic efficiencies of concrete real-life situations.

Finally, in the third part of the presentation, we use data envelopment analysis (DEA) as an illustration of the power of data-driven simulations. More concretely, we present a novel application of DEA used

for analyzing experimentation efficiency of a series of experiments in the high energy physics laboratory, namely Fermilab. We argue that such an approach can unambiguously show optimal ways of virtual knowledge aggregation and, therefore, maximization of group knowledge within a given timeframe.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Philippe van Basshuysen
Date:	11:30-12:00, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 107

Vlasta Sikimic (University of Belgrade, Republic of Serbia)
Vlasta Sikimic (MSc in Logic). PhD candidate at the Department of Philosophy, University of Belgrade. Member of the research team of the subproject: Cognitive Diversity in Science, Institute of Philosophy, University of Belgrade. 2013 Master of Science in Logic, University of Amsterdam; thesis On Proof-Theoretic Semantics for Dynamic Logics. 2008 baccalaureate in philosophy, University of Belgrade; thesis On Carroll's "Achilles and the Tortoise". Publications in logic, epistemology and animal rights.
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Sometimes Coincidence and De Re Modality

Mattia Sorgon

Material objects are characterized by two essential features: their location in spacetime and their material constitution. A material object occupies a region of space at every time in which it exists, by being constitued by a specific material composition. However, these entities do not simply occupy space, but they materially fill the specific region occupied. Within the concrete domain, material objects compete therefore with each other for space.

On such a basis, the sometimes coincidence criterion of identity can be defined:

(SC) If a and b are material objects, then a is identical with b iff a and b sometimes coincide.

(SC) seems for different reasons a good criterion. It derives from some basic intuitions about such entities and respects the characteristics of numerical identity. Nevertheless, Kripke (1980) claims that two different concrete things can be in all the same places at all the same times, and be made of all the same matter at all the same times. Presenting the case of "the plant and its stems" (Kripke 1980, Hughes 2004), he provides a counterexample to (SC), which would not be able to track properly material objects' identity because it does not consider at all another essential feature of this kind of entities, their de re modal properties.

The aim of this article is to explore two defence strategies of (SC). On one hand, it will analyse two different non standard accounts of de re modal predication, the modal counterpart theory (Lewis 1986) and the contingent identity theory (Gibbard 1975). Discussing both the viability and the consequences of each view, this first strategy will attempt to provide a reductive account of de re modal properties. Both accounts deny indeed any kind of trans-world identity of concrete entities, allowing to strictly maintain (SC).

On the other hand, it will develop the suggestive penta-dimensional view provided by Lewis (1986). According to this view, material objects are five-dimensional concrete entities composed of spatial, temporal, and modal parts. Spread out through space, time, and (concrete) possible worlds, material objects would then result complex mereological sums of both temporal and modal parts. This view will provide a reply to Kripke's case, but it will meanwhile imply a strong reformulation of (SC), which should consider the fifth modal dimension of concrete things.

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Kripke, Saul (1980), "Naming and Necessity", Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Lewis, David K. (1986), "On the Plurality of Worlds", Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Section: Metaphysics
Language: English
Chair: Sylvia Barnett
Date: 14:45-15:15, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location: HS 122

Mattia Sorgon (Roma Tre University / King's College London, Italy)
Mattia Sorgon (MA phil.). Roma Tre University / King's College London, postgraduate student. 2010 baccalaureate in philosophy, 2012 master in philosophy, University of Milan; research project about identiy and persistence of material objects, modality, and metaphysics of time.
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Kripkensteinian stand off and magical robust realism

Henrik Sova

There are several prominent arguments advancing the philosophical scepticism about the notion of meaning. Notably Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic arguments concerning the underdetermination of reference and Saul Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein (referred to as Kripkensteinian scepticism) to the effect that expressions in our language do not possess a determinate meaning. P. Boghossian has argued ("The Rule-Following Considerations" (1989)) that the only way to confront the Kripkensteinian scepticism and the irrealist position arising from it, is to accept the non-reductionist robust realism about meaning.

I'm going to discuss two aspects of this opposition of irrealism vs robust realism to advance the claim that Boghossian's robust realism is at least as implausible as its alternatives.
(1) I argue that the opposition presents a certain stand-off (or burden-of-proof-problem), where disputants render their positions undefeatable by their own presumptions. Irrealism presumes that the meaning-ascriptions must have some expressible empirical and/or verificational truth-conditional content. Once you presume that, you can launch the Kirpkensteinian argument to any theory of meaning-ascription. But the denial of this presumption is exactly what defines the robust realism claiming that there can be no reduction of meaning-ascriptions to

physical/functional properties. And in that case, Kripkensteinian argument is cancelled by presumption.

(2) I argue that in cancelling the Kripkensteinian argument in this way, the robust realist renders his position either incoherent or fixes the meanings of symbols purely appealing to magic. I explicate this dilemma by applying Putnam's arguments to Boghossian's robust realism. In doing so I rely partly on the argumentation of Tim Button's recent analysis of Putnam's arguments ("The Limits of Realism" (2013)). As a side effect, this illustrates how we can interpret the Kripkensteinian argument as a version of the Putnam's argument.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Gregor Walczak
Date:	14:00-14:30, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 107

Henrik Sova (University of Tartu, Estonia)
I'm a full-time doctorate student (starting the 3rd year) in the Department of Philosophy (Chair of Theoretical Philosophy) at the University of Tartu. My supervisor is prof dr Daniel Cohnitz and my primary research fields are inscrutability of reference and meaning scepticism.
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Crane on Truth about the Non-Existent

Jan Stühring

How there can be true statements about the non-existent is one of the perennial problems of philosophy. Recently, Tim Crane proposed a solution in his The Objects of Thought (2013). Crane's approach is based on, amongst others, the following assumptions: (1) we can think and talk about non-existent objects, (2) we cannot refer to non-existent objects, as reference is a real relation, (3) a logic suited for reasoning about the non-existent is such that its quantifiers range over all objects, existent and non-existent, furthermore, (4) it is a positive free logic.

Although I am not completely unsympathetic to Crane's approach, I think that it suffers from some flaws. In my talk I will discuss the following points. First, given (1) it seems hard to motivate (2). If Holmes is an object, and 'Holmes' is about Holmes, then why does 'Holmes' not refer to Holmes? Crane does not give an answer to this question. Secondly, it seems hard to reconcile (2) and (3). According to Crane, (S) 'Some non-existent objects are self-identical' is true. But in standard semantics the truth conditions of quantified sentences are spelled out in terms of the denotation of singular terms. If individual terms cannot denote non-existent objects then (S) is not true. Third, it seems hard to reconcile (3) and (4). Free logics are logics whose singular terms need not denote members of the quantificational domain. The rationale is that not every singular term denotes an existing object. Thus, if the quantificational domain contains non-existing objects there is no reason for the logic to be free.

Section:	Metaphysics
Language:	English
Chair:	Fabio Ceravolo
Date:	09:45-10:15, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 122

Jan Stühring (University of Göttingen, Germany)
Jan Stühring studied Philosophy and Literature in Göttingen. Since he graduated in 2014 he has pursued a PhD on the logics, semantics, and ontology of metafictional speech.
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❧

George Berkeley's Reasons Why the Immediate Object of Perception Is Not a Physical Substance

Mika Suojanen

This talk explains Berkeley's reasons for why a sensible object or an idea that we immediately perceive is neither a physical substratum located in the external world nor a representational item causally related to the unperceivable matter. Other

philosophers, such as Broad, Dancy, Pappas, Pitcher, Marc-Wogau and Russell have not carefully considered the consequences of Berkeley's theses against the existence of mind-independent matter. First, I examine why, according to Berkeley, the sensible object does not represent a physical substratum. Second, I evaluate Berkeley's Master Argument: it is not possible to have an experience of unperceivable entities. Berkeley accepted one's perception of houses, rivers and trees. However, he continues that these physical things are ideas dependent upon mind. According to Berkeley, nobody can conceive or perceive a thing not being conceived or perceived. Contemporary philosophy has provided an easy answer to Berkeley's question. Because my thinking or experiencing of a tree is mind-dependent, it does not follow that what I am thinking or experiencing of is also mind-dependent. When we imagine a tree standing alone in a forest, we conceive of an unthought-of-object. For Berkeley, an experience or a thought of the tree never represents "an unthought-of-object". I will show that he did not confused experience (an act) with what an experience is about (an object). Berkeley just asks one to consider whether it is possible to conceive or perceive a contradictory entity. My conclusion is that a possibility to conceive of a thing does not refute Berkeley's thesis that we always conceive of the sensible object.

Section:	History of Philosophy
Language:	English
Chair:	Albert Anglberger
Date:	14:45-15:15, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 104

Mika Suojanen (University of Turku, Finland)
Mika Suojanen, Lis.Soc.Sc. Philosophy, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy University of Turku. Research Interests: Mind/World Relationship, Experience, Perception, Bertrand Russell, George Berkeley, Knowing.
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Wer oder was hat Recht? Warum wir etwas an unserem Umgang mit Tieren ändern müssen

Sebastian Thome

Die Begriffe *Tierschützer* und *Tierrechtler* werden im alltäglichen Sprachgebrauch oftmals synonym verwendet. Doch während letztere ihre Aufgabe darin sehen, das Verhältnis Mensch-Tier grundsätzlich in Frage zu stellen und gängige Praktiken des alltäglichen Umgangs mit nichtmenschlichen Tieren zu analysieren und zu kritisieren, bewegen sich erstere i.d.R. innerhalb eines Diskurses grundsätzlicher Anerkennung des Status quo.

In meinem Vortrag werde ich diesen Status quo nicht anerkennen. In zwei Schritten werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass auch nichtmenschlichen Tieren, insofern sie bestimmte Bedingungen erfüllen, grundlegende Rechte zugesprochen werden müssen: Denn betrachtet man den Begriff des Rechts, so lassen sich zwei Merkmale als konstitutiv für das Tragen von Rechten erkennen:

1. *Subjekt-eines-Rechts* zu sein bedeutet immer *Subjekt-eines-Lebens* (Regan) zu sein. Im Gegensatz zu Merkmalen wie Personalität, der Verwendung von Sprache, Vernunftfähigkeit oder des Menschseins liefert der Begriff des *Subjekt-eines-Lebens* alle notwendigen Voraussetzungen für das Tragen grundlegender Rechte. Denn das Vorhandensein einer rudimentären Form des Bewusstseins geht einher mit der Herausbildung spezifischer Interessen und Präferenzen. Insofern der Rechtsbegriff für die Vertretung und Verteidigung grundlegender Interessen aller in eine Gemeinschaft eingebundenen Individuen bürgt, muss dieser in großen Teilen auch auf den Bereich der nichtmenschlichen Tiere ausgeweitet werden.

2. Wer oder was Träger grundlegender Rechte ist, wird durch das Verhältnis der Rechtsgemeinschaft zum Individuum bestimmt. So definiert der Begriff "Tier" eine Kategorie, die sich ontologisch und axiologisch von der des Menschen unterscheidet. Die im Hinblick auf den Status eines Rechtssubjekts unterschiedliche Einordnung von Mensch und Tier leitet sich unmittelbar aus dieser qualitativ (d.h. nicht graduell) gedachten Differenz her.

Ich argumentiere dafür, dass sich dieser ontologische Hiatus nicht fundiert begründen lässt und damit zusammenhängend dafür, dass wir, wenn wir den Begriff des Rechts konsistent anwenden wollen, diejenigen

nichtmenschlichen Tiere, die durch unser Handeln unmittelbar betroffen sind, nicht weiter aus der Gemeinschaft der Träger grundlegender Rechte ausschließen dürfen.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	German
Chair:	Maximilian Kiener
Date:	14:45-15:15, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 103

Sebastian Thome (Universität Trier, Germany)
Sebastian Thome (B.Ed.). Universität Trier. 2014 Abschluss des Bachelorstudiums mit einer literaturwissenschaftlichen Arbeit über das Verhältnis von Selbst und Zeit in Hermann Hesses Roman "Demian". Nach Abschluss des Bachelorstudiums Lehramt Wechsel in den akademischen Studiengang mit den Fächern Philisophie (HF) und Germanistik (NF). E-Mail: s2sethom@uni-trier.de

Challenging Relativism

Markus Tschögl

Relativism has long been deemed unintelligible and in itself hopelessly confused. However, due to John MacFarlane's recent contribution, Assessment Sensitivity, even more radical forms of truth relativism have become increasingly coherent. Today we no longer have to ask whether we can understand truth relativism, but rather whether it is the right way to look at certain aspects of our life and language. In my talk, I will try to show how MacFarlane's radical approach is different from standard views and other forms of relativism, before finally discussing the problems that seem to go hand in hand with his form of truth relativism. I will argue that truth relativism misconstrues judgements of taste and fails to account for the normative dimension of moral claims and judgements of taste. In the end, I will defend the view that truth relativists, as well as contextualists, will either have to refrain from expressing certain claims, or soften their relativist stance by adopting what I would like to call second order objectivism.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	David Kashtan
Date:	15:30-16:00, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 122

Markus Tschögl (University of Vienna, Austria)
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Drones: A case for extended mind, cognition and emotions

Marek Vanzura

The notion of drones as vehicles without humans on board, that is considered to be a beneficial factor for their remote operators, seems to be misleading if we consider a real life implications for these "pilots". It turned out that the existence of the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among those operators is at least at the same level as in the case of pilots fighting inside the cockpits above war zones. Thus remoteness of a "pilot" and his physical absence in military vehicle in fact does not really solve problems of harm and imply that human is still in some sense physically present in unmanned systems. If so, "unmanned" is not a proper word for these machines. In this talk I am going to argue from the position of the extended mind theory that unmanned vehicles create together with their operators coupled extended cognitive systems, where drones function as the extension of operators' cognitive functions, minds and potentially emotions. I will explore this concept of extended emotions in detail as one of the causes of such a high number of PTSD among drone operators. This could eventually lead to the reconsideration of a concept of drones as systems without humans and to a better grasp of them as extended systems where a man is still in a loop and highly physically participating. Such updated notion would bring new demands on the ethics and politics of drone use and consequently on their operations.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Pascale Lötscher
Date:	09:00-09:30, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 104

Marek Vanzura (Masaryk University, Czech Republic)
Marek Vanzura (Mgr./MA phil.) is a PhD student of the Theory and history of science at the Faculty of arts at Masaryk university (Brno, Czech Republic). 2012 baccalaureate in Philosophy; thesis on the extended mind theory; 2014 master in Philosophy; thesis on the human tool use, its foundations and implications for human nature. Current research covers topics on the intersection of the philosophy of mind, philosophy of technology and cognitive science; namely an autonomous technology, so called embodied technologies and their relationship to humans.
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Aristotle meets Grice: Why Conversational Implicatures are Cancellable

Gregor Walczak

According to Paul Grice, conversational implicatures are cancellable in that a speaker may withdraw what she merely suggested by her utterance (see Grice 1989: 44). However, in recent years, the view that conversational implicatures are cancellable has been challenged. My aim in this paper is twofold: on the one hand, I want to demonstrate that the objections against the cancellability of conversational implicatures are unwarranted and are due to a blurred understanding of the Gricean notion of cancellation; on the other hand, I want to provide an argument in favour of cancellable implicatures which is based on the view that the Gricean notion of conversational implicature may be connected to the Aristotelian notion of enthymeme (see Rolf 2013: 77). Given that conversational implicatures can be regarded as enthymemes, it becomes clear that they are cancellable for an enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism which is non-demonstrative by its very nature. That is, an enthymeme is concerned

with things that may turn out to be other than they are (see Aristotle 1991: 43).

Aristotle (1991). On Rhetoric. A Theory of Civic Discourse. Translated by George A. Kennedy. Oxford.

Grice (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, Mass.

Rolf (2013): Inferentielle Pragmatik. Zur Theorie der Sprecherbedeutung. Berlin.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	David Kashtan
Date:	14:00-14:30, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 122

Gregor Walczak (WWU Münster, Germany)
Gregor Walczak is PhD student in German linguistics at the University of Münster in Germany. His research interests focus on the semantics-pragmatics interface and experimental approaches to the study of meaning. He is currently working on a dissertation on the Gricean notion of cancellation.
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Powers without Finks

Allert van Westen

Accounts of causality in terms of dispositions have been plagued by the problems of finking, masking, and mimicry. What these issues show is that on a standard account of dispositions, an effect may occur without the manifestation conditions of the disposition occurring, or the manifestation conditions may be realized without an effect occurring.

I propose an account of causality in terms of powers that doesn't have the pitfalls that make other accounts susceptible to finking. Powers are dispositional properties that cannot be reduced to non-dispositional or

categorical properties. On this view, causation on the scale of macroscopic objects is supervenient on causation at a fundamental level: that of elementary particles and their properties. It is these properties of elemental particles, such as the negative charge of an electron, that form the fundamental level of powers in nature. I take the standard model of particles to give us an account of which fundamental powers there are. The four forces of the standard model (weak force, strong force, gravitation, electromagnetic force) are to be analyzed as dispositions. The manifestation conditions of these dispositional properties are given in laws of nature, since these describe how particles will act if they have these properties.

The traditional view of dispositions that sees the fragility of a glass as the paradigm example of a disposition runs into trouble with finking, masking and mimicry because of the relation between the manifestation conditions and the effect. On my account, finking is impossible. The paradigm examples of nature's dispositions to me are microphysical properties such as the negative charge of an electron. The manifestation conditions of such dispositions are given by the laws of nature. Because of the necessary connection between manifestation conditions and effect, and the exceptionless status of laws of nature, there can be no cases in which the effect obtains without the manifestation conditions, or vice versa. Strengthened by the impossibility of finking, masking and mimicry, this account adequately spells out the necessary and sufficient conditions for causation in terms of the powers of particles, and the laws of nature.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Alexander Gebharter
Date:	18:00-18:30, 2 September 2015 (Wednesday)
Location:	HS 107

Allert van Westen (Utrecht University, Netherlands)
I am a research master student at Utrecht University, in the final stages of finishing my thesis. I did my bachelor's at Utrecht University and attended Washington University in St Louis for a semester during my master's.

I was first gripped by the topic of causation when I was working on my bachelor thesis on mental causation. Later I took a course on the

metaphysics of causation with Carl Craver and John Heil, which inspired me to write my master's thesis on the topic. Over the past few years I have come to endorse a brand of philosophy that strongly distinguishes metaphysics from semantics. I also think philosophy should respect and use the results of other sciences and let physics and other sciences inform our ontologies.

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❧

Republican International Relations

Nathan Wood

Proponents of republican political theory place great emphasis on the concept of freedom and its implementation within a state, but there is little attention paid to what it prescribes in the international realm. In this essay I argue that if we take freedom as non-domination seriously, it cannot be enough to merely secure it domestically, but also requires that non-domination be guaranteed between states and multi-national organisations. Only in this way can individual agents be truly free. I argue that this type of international non-domination could theoretically be achieved by either making all nations powerful enough to protect their own interests, or by establishing a global sovereign to ensure that no group arbitrarily interferes in the choices of another. However, I argue that the strategy of reciprocal power is unfeasible and normatively problematic, and as a result, we should instead seek to establish a global state. I close by indicating how this global state might be created and addressing likely objections.

Section:	Political Philosophy
Language:	English
Chair:	Albert Anglberger
Date:	15:30-16:00, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 104

Nathan Wood (Universität Bayreuth, Germany)
Nathan Wood received his B.A. in Philosophy from the California Poly-technic State University in 2011, and is currently finishing his M.A. in Philosophy & Economics at the Universität Bayreuth. His thesis explores the logic of permission statements, focusing on their application in Just War Theory. Current research interests also include political philosophy, general deontic logic, and theories of rationality.
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De Se Beliefs: Troubles With Self-Ascription

Florian Leonhard Wüstholz

Some of our beliefs are about ourselves in a seemingly irre-ducible de se way. However, there is a problem of de se be-liefs which has been systematically illustrated by Perry (1979): How can we draw the distinction between Alpha believing 'I am making a mess' and her believing 'Alpha is making a mess' within the Frege-Russell framework of propositional attitudes? It seems that de se beliefs are notoriously underspecified if their objects are determined truth-conditionally. Lewis (1979) argues for a solution which unifies the objects of all beliefs. All beliefs are de se beliefs with properties, and not propositions, as their object. When a subject entertains a de se be-lief, she self-ascribes a specific property. This in turn ensures that the subject takes herself to have the property in question. In this paper I will argue for a positive and a negative claim. The positive claim is that Lewis' solution of the problem gives us a fruitful tool to accommodate important epistemic features of de se beliefs, such as their purported immunity to error through misidentification, or their aptitude to ac-count for self-knowledge. The negative claim is that Lewis' solution is question-begging, insufficient, and epistemically problematic. First, Lewis' generalisation of de se beliefs presupposes what needs explain-ing: What is it for Alpha to have a belief about herself? Secondly, the explanatory work rests solely on the shoulders of the notoriously unexplored and largely ignored notion of self-ascription. Thirdly, the solution is incompatible with the widespread idea that de se beliefs are generally identification-free. If de se beliefs are understood as ascription of properties under the acquaintance relation of identity (Lewis 1979:

543; Chisholm 1981: 28), then they involve an unwanted identification element.

References:

Chisholm, Roderick M. (1981): The First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality. University of Minnesota Press.

Lewis, David (1979): "Attitudes De Dicto and De Se". Philosophical Review. Vol. 88, 4. 513–543.

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Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Andrew J. Routledge
Date:	10:45-11:15, 3 September 2015 (Thursday)
Location:	HS 104

Florian Leonhard Wüstholz (University of Fribourg, Switzerland)
Florian Wüstholz (MA). University of Fribourg. 2010 BA in philosophy from the University of Berne. 2011 MA in philosophy from the University of Sheffield, UK. PhD thesis on the first person in thought an action.
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<center>❧</center>

Truthmaking as an account of how grounding facts hold

Jack, Tak Ho YIP

Grounding, as a way to articulate ontological dependence, faces the problem of what grounds grounding facts themselves (such as the fact that the singleton of Socrates is grounded in Socrates). This problem stems from the need to account for the holding of grounding facts, which generates the hierarchical structure of ontological dependence. Within the grounding framework, grounding facts are either ungrounded or grounded. I will first argue that neither option can provide us with a satisfactory account. The

main reason is that non-fundamental entities have to be counted as fundamental or involved in the essences of fundamental entities in order for either of the two options to work—the non-fundamental is being smuggled into the fundamental.

My suggestion is to appeal to the notion of truthmaking and tackle the problem about the holding of grounding facts outside the grounding framework—instead of asking what grounds grounding facts, I ask what makes grounding claims true. Truthmaking is a prima facie relation holding between the representational and the non-representational such that the latter makes the former true. With the principle 'if <p> is true, then it is a fact that p', we can account for the holding of grounding facts in a derivative sense. As a proposition contains the information about its truthmaker, the nature of grounding claims will tell us how grounding facts hold. I accept a realm of concepts which make up propositions (which might be needed already if there are propositions and propositions are compositional). These concepts will act as part of the truthmaker for grounding claims (in addition to the non-conceptual fundamental entities)—the concept of the ground must figure in the concept of the grounded. For a concept to figure in another, it is to be involved in the constitutive essence of the latter (analogous to Kit Fine's idea that the ground of a grounded entity figures in the essence of the grounded entity). This account will not smuggle anything non-fundamental into the fundamental realm. The implication is that ontological dependence stems from our different kinds of conceptualisations (perhaps of the same stuff, as in the concepts of water and H2O), which justifies metaphysicians' armchair method.

Section:	Metaphysics
Language:	English
Chair:	Johannes Korbmacher
Date:	16:00-16:30, 2 September 2015 (Wednesday)
Location:	HS 122

Jack, Tak Ho YIP (University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong)
I am a MPhil student in the department of philosophy at the University of Hong Kong. I am interested in Metaphysics and Philosophy of Language. Currently, I am working on truthmaking, grounding, and some other meta-metaphysical issues.
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Internal Causes and External Reasons

Marta Zaręba

The aim of my presentation is to critically analyse and examine the causal theory of action developed within the contemporary analytic philosophy of action. The presentation is structured in the following way:

My considerations will begin with a detailed reconstruction of Donald Davidson's early reductionist view (1963), according to which intentions (reducible to the desire-belief pairs) constitute primary reasons for actions and the relation between intentions and actions has causal nature. According to the basic principle common to all causal theories of action, the agent performs an action only if an appropriate internal state of the agent (belief, desire, intention) causes a particular result (e.g. bodily movement) in a certain way.

In the second part of my talk I will analyze one of the most influential arguments for causalism (labeled as 'Davidson's Challenge'), i.e. the claim that only the causal view offers an account of action's explanation – which is a causal explanation – and allows to distinguish it from a mere justification of one's action.

In the third part I will present two main arguments formulated against the causal theory of action: problem of deviant causal chains and vanishing agent objection. In order to consider the prospects for non-causal theories of reasons I will also critically analyze (i) a teleological answer for the Davidson's Challenge (Sehon 2000, 2005), according to which proper explanations of actions are teleological explanations ("the agent ϕ-d in order to bring about the state of affairs that she believed could be brought about by ϕ-ing") and (ii) E.J. Lowe's externalist view according to which reasons considered as states of affairs in the world (not internal states of an agent) do not cause the agent to will in this or that manner (LOWE 2008, 2009, 2012).

My presentation ends with an evaluation of the externalist and teleological arguments in the context of Bernard Williams' (1979) defense of reasons internalism.

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Williams B., 1979. Internal and External Reasons. In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. 101-113.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Pascale Lötscher
Date:	12:00-12:30, 4 September 2015 (Friday)
Location:	HS 104

Marta Zaręba (University of Warsaw, Poland)
Marta Zaręba, PhD student at the Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw; master in philosophy (2011), thesis: "The Debate on Action Individuation. An Analysis of Arguments against Minimalism" (dissertation supervisor: prof. Katarzyna Paprzycka); PhD thesis (in progress) concerning the concept of intention in analytic philosophy of action; areas of philosophical interest: analytic philosophy of mind and action, ontology and analytical aesthetics.
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